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The militia of London, 1641-1649

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THE MILITIA OF LONDON, 1641-1649

by

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A thesis submitted in the Department of History,
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for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy

September 1982



ABSTRACT

The Trained Bands and Auxiliaries of London and its suburbs were not only required to defend the nation's great armoury, treasury, port and political headquarters during the First Civil War; they also served as the Parliamentary armies' strategic reserve and were called upon to fight in places as far afield as Gloucestershire, Sussex and Cornwall. Their readiness for battle at Turnham Green in November 1642 in support of the Earl of Essex's army helped deny the king his only opportunity of ending the war at a stroke. They made important contributions in the Gloucester campaign of August 1643 - a campaign which rescued Parliament from near-despair - and at the battle of Cheriton in March 1644, which finally put the king on the defensive. The struggle for political control over the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries between 1646 and 1648 illustrates the seriousness with which they were regarded by both Presbyterians and Independents, emphasised by the abortive attempt to raise a new City-based army to oppose the New Model in 1647 and the series of purges which followed.

There is a wealth of information on the role of the London militia between 1641 and 1649, but it has never been assembled and analysed at length in a serious way. This thesis shows who the men of the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries were, where they lived, how they were organised, armed and supplied, and how and where they fought - and why they sometimes refused to fight. It includes information on the fortifications of the City and suburbs, how these defences were constructed and manned, and how useful they were. The role of the

militia forces in civil disturbances is also discussed. But the main emphasis of the thesis is on the officers of the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries: their military training, conduct during campaigns, and promotions; their wealth, ^{backgrounds} and family relationships; their political and religious persuasions; their participation in the committees and councils of the City and in their wards and parishes; their fates during the purges of 1647 and 1648; and the assessments of their characters made by supporters and opponents.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

BL - British Library.

Boynton - L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 1967.

CJ - Journals of the House of Commons.

Clarendon - Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of, History of the Rebellion, 3 vols., 1702-4.

CLRO - Corporation of London Record Office.

Crawford - P. Crawford, Denzil Holles 1598-1680, 1979.

CSPD - Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series.

CSPVen - Calendar of State Papers, Venetian.

E - British Library E Tracts (Thomason Tracts).

Goold Walker - G. Goold Walker, 'The Trained Bands of London', in Journal of the Honourable Artillery Company, 1938-9.

Harl. Soc. Regs. - Harleian Society Register Series.

Juxon - Diary of Thomas Juxon, Dr Williams's Library MS. 24.50.

Kishlansky - M. Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army, 1979.

Liu - T. Liu, 'The Founding of the London Provincial Assembly, 1645-47', in Guildhall Studies in London History, III (April 1978), pp. 109-34.

LJ - Journals of the House of Lords.

Mercurius Aulicus - facsimile reprint of Mercurius Aulicus in The English Revolution, III, Newsbooks 1, Oxford Royalist, Vols. 1-4, 1971.

Pearl - V. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution, Oxford, 1961.

PRO - Public Record Office.

Rushworth - J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, 1659-1701.

Sharpe - R.R. Sharpe, London and the Kingdom, Vol. 2, 1894.

Symonds - British Museum Harleian MS. 986, 'Ensignes of the...Citty of London', 1643, attributed to Richard Symonds; partly transcribed in H.A. Dillon, 'On a MS. List of Officers of the London Trained Bands in 1643', in Archaeologia, LII, 1889, pp. 129-44.

Tolmie - M. Tolmie, The Triumph of the Saints, Cambridge, 1977.

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INTRODUCTION

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONDON TRAINED BANDS TO 1641

Ever since Anglo-Saxon days, every English freeman between the ages of 16 and 60 had been required by law to serve in the militia. It is true that the feudal array and the mercenary army predominated in the later middle ages, but the obligation of militia duty remained and was confirmed by the Assize of Arms in 1181, the Statute of Westminster in 1285, and subsequent re-enactments under Edward III, Henry IV and Henry VIII. Every man (with certain exceptions such as nobles and clerics) was obliged to furnish himself with weapons suitable for a person of his economic standing, attend the general muster of the county every three years or when otherwise called upon, and be prepared to fight against invaders or rebels anywhere within the county boundaries (but not elsewhere).¹ These requirements were reinforced and brought up to date by two statutes introduced in 1558 in the last few months of Mary's reign: one proclaimed new penalties for failure to attend musters, and the other laid down a revised scale of arms to be provided. A man possessing £10 worth of goods had to equip himself with a longbow, a sheaf of arrows, a steel cap, and a halberd or bill, while wealthier individuals had to provide pikes, corslets and horses in addition. Towns also had their own assessments for arms, which were stored in churches or gatehouses and could be distributed to the citizens at an hour's notice.²

¹Boynton, pp. 7-8.

²Boynton, pp. 9-10, 22; C.G. Cruikshank, Elizabeth's Army (1966), pp. 4, 17.

Although the men were not paid for their attendance at musters (and thereby lost at least one day's wages from their ordinary employment, not counting any time spent in traveling to the assembly), these military gatherings were occasions of some festivity. The London musters took place at Mile End, where the Lord Mayor and other officials would take charge of the proceedings. After the men, each with his appointed arms and equipment, had gathered at 8 or 9 a.m., a prayer would be offered by a specially appointed minister; then would follow the division of the men into three categories ('choyce men', 'the second sort', and 'unable but to keep the country') and the actual inspection, accompanied by the music of fife and drum and the flourishing of standards. Beer was supplied for the refreshment of the citizens, with more sumptuous fare for the officers and the City authorities. Not only the officers, but some of the men as well, took pride in their martial appearance and bedecked themselves with ribbons and plumes for the musters, and when they marched home at the end of the day's proceedings they apparently felt that they had admirably demonstrated their patriotism and the City's military preparedness.¹

The main purpose of the muster was to ensure that the required equipment was provided and properly maintained, and although the men were divided into grades based on fitness, there was apparently no training given on these occasions. In theory, the men should have been proficient in the use of the bow anyway, since there were a number of laws on the books calling for regular archery practice and laying down penalties for disobedience. In London, there was the added inducement of the City's yearly competition in Finsbury Fields

¹Boynton, pp. 18, 26-8.

during the month of August, where prizes were given by the Lord Mayor to the best shots in various classes. But the need for frequent legislation enforcing the use of the bow was itself a sign of the decline that had long been in progress. Nowadays, wrote William Harrison, Continental troops would mockingly 'turne up their tailes and crie "Shoote, English"' during a lull in battle, whereas in Edward III's time 'the breech of such a varlet should have been nailed to his bum with one arrow, and another feathered in his bowels before he should have turned about to see who shot the first'. Bishop Latimer recalled that even in his own youth 'my poor father was as diligent to teach me to shute, as to learn any other thyng; and so I thincke other men dyd thyr children', but now other and worse amusements had taken the place of archery.¹ John Stow claimed at the end of the century that it was the enclosing of the archery grounds in London which caused the citizens to turn their attention to gambling at bowls or dice, but the bow was in fact on the decline throughout the country and had been for years.²

Elizabeth's government reiterated and added to the laws enforcing archery practice in an effort to stop the rot (and also to maintain public morals by prohibiting the gambling which was taking its place); a mass levy of well-equipped archers was of little military value if the men could not use their bows properly.³ In the meantime, however, other developments were beginning to make it clear that this type of militia would be inadequate even if the men were proficient with the longbow. The government apparently recognised in 1559 that the

¹Boynton, pp. 65-7.

²John Stow, The Survey of London (1970), p. 95.

³Boynton, p. 66.

previous year's statute for arms assessments was already out of date. It was not bows and brigandines that were wanted - these had already been abandoned by England's potential enemies on the Continent - but corslets, pikes, and especially more and better firearms. Fowling-pieces charged with shot had already replaced the bow in the hands of the countryman searching for game, and, imperfect as they were, it was apparent that firearms would be the weapons of the future. 'Spare the bows and arrows', Sir Thomas Gresham repeatedly advised, 'for they are of no force against an armed man'.¹

The other important development in the military art on the Continent was the growth of professionalism; armies were now much better trained than in the past. The military textbooks of imperial Rome were being studied once again, and troops were being taught to wheel by divisions and execute other complicated manoeuvres in accordance with new tactical principles. To train all the men of the English militia in the new methods of warfare was both impossible and unnecessary; what was needed was a select force which could be re-equipped with modern weapons and trained at frequent intervals.²

The need for reform acquired greater urgency after Alva's arrival in the Low Countries in 1567, and fear of a Spanish invasion of England prompted a number of schemes for bringing the militia up to date.³ But it was not until 1572 that the government finally acted, ordering a new muster of all subjects 'from the age of 16 years upward that may be found able to bear armour or to use weapon on horseback or foot; and out of that total and universal number being viewed, mustered and registered, to have a convenient and sufficient

¹Boynton, p. 57.

²Boynton, p. 90.

³Boynton, pp. 60, 91.

number of the most able chosen and collected to be by the reasonable charge of the inhabitants in every shire tried, armed and weaponed, and so consequently taught and trained'. These units of selected men soon came to be referred to as the Trained Bands, and as far as the militia was concerned they were henceforth the ones who mattered.¹

John Stow recorded the way in which this order was put into effect in London:

'The 25 and 26 of March [1572], by the commandement of the Queenes Majestie her Councell, the Citizens of London assembling at their severall Halls, the Masters chose out the most likely and active persons of every their Companies, to the number of 3000, whom they appointed to be Pikemen and shot; the Pikemen were forth-with armed in faire Corslets and other furniture according thereunto; the Gunners had every of them his Caliver, with the furniture, and Murrians on their heads. To these were appointed divers Captains, who, to traine them up in warlike feates, mustred them thrice every weeke, sometimes at the Artillery yard, teaching their Gunners to handle their Peeeces, sometimes at the Miles-end and in Saint Georges field, teaching them to skirmish.'²

The London Trained Bands were thus equipped with modern weapons from the first, and the bows and bills of the previous decade were finally laid aside. Of course, mistakes were made in the early days of training with the unfamiliar firearms: Stow gives an account of a muster at Mile End on 10 April 1572 in which a soldier from the Goldsmiths' Company was mortally wounded by a piece of a ramrod which had been accidentally fired from one of his comrades' guns.³ But the training apparently continued throughout the 1570s, except for a two-year break at the end of the decade when the musters were cancelled because of the plague; in 1580 they were ordered to be started once again, and the Council confirmed the requirement for 2000 'shot' and 1000 pikemen to be trained in London - although the City was not required to train horsemen, as other counties were.

¹ Cruikshank, op. cit., pp. 24-5.

² John Stow, Annales, or a Generall Chronicle of England (1631), p.671.

³ Ibid.

The defenders of the capital were also apparently safeguarded against impressment for foreign service, since the Queen's order to the Lord Mayor in July 1580 for a levy of men for service in Ireland specified that they were not to be chosen from the Trained Bands. It is not certain that this privilege was always adhered to in times of need, since the City guilds were also ordered to muster men for overseas service and the records do not always specify the purpose of a particular muster; for example, the Queen ordered a levy of 2000 pikemen and 2000 shot in March 1585 which was supplied by the City guilds and trained at Mile End and Saint George's Fields, and some of these were certainly sent to the Low Countries, but this levy was probably distinct from the 3000 men of the trained militia bands.¹

In 1586 the London Trained Bands were reorganised on a geographical basis, thereby adopting the pattern which they would retain throughout the rest of their history. Presumably the system of selection by the guilds had been found either inefficient or unfair or both, for it was now discontinued; instead, the selection was to be made by the Aldermen from the householders in their wards. All householders and able-bodied children and servants 'who openly profess and show themselves to love the Gospel and hate Popery' were listed in the ward's register-book, and the 'most able' were selected for training until the required number had been reached - a number which could be varied when necessary by the Council according to the needs of the City's and the nation's defence. Each company of 250 men was allotted a place of rendezvous in the event of an alarm, and the entire force was to be commanded by the Lord Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen and such officers as they should appoint.²

¹Goold Walker, pp. 236-7.

²Ibid.

Fortunately, provision was already being made for the supply of an adequate number of 'substantial' citizens, specially trained to give instruction in the military arts, to serve as officers for the re-organised Trained Bands. Stow records that in 1585,

'certaine gallant, active and forward citizens who had had experience, both at home and abroad, voluntarily enrolled themselves in the [Honourable Artillery] Company and trained up others for the wars, so that within the space of two years there were about three hundred merchants, and others of like quality, very sufficient and skilful, to train and teach common soldiers the management of their pieces, pikes and halberds, to march, countermarch and ring; who, for their perfecting in military affairs and discipline, met every Thursday in the year, practicing all usual points of war, and each man, by turns, bare office, from the Corporal to the Captain.'¹

The HAC thus became the nation's great training-school for infantry officers; many of them would go on to command levies for overseas service, but the most common outlet for their skills was the instruction of the London Trained Bands. Until the crisis of the Civil War, few if any of the officers in the City's Trained Bands were appointed without having previously undergone training at the Artillery Garden.

The first list of the companies of the London Trained Bands dates from Armada year and shows that the number of men had been increased to 6000 during this emergency.² The standard unit was now the company of 50 pikemen and 100 'shot' armed with calivers, and three of the City's wards - Aldersgate, Candlewick and Walbrook - each supplied exactly one company. The other wards each produced more than one company, either by amalgamating the extra men with those of adjoining wards, or, in the case of very large and populous wards like Cripplegate and Faringdon Without, by forming two or more companies on their own. In this way, the 25 City wards produced a

¹Stow, Annales, p. 744.

²Goold Walker, pp. 269-72, quoting BM Royal MS 18 A LXVI ff. 20-1.

total of 40 companies. The captains were mainly freemen of one of the twelve great livery companies, with the Haberdashers predominating, and most of them were described as 'merchants' as well; among them were Martin Bond, who would serve as a Trained Band captain until his death in 1643,¹ and Baptist Hicks, who later earned a fortune as a silk-merchant, was created Viscount Campden, and established charities in Kensington which exist to this day.²

The 1588 list groups the 40 companies into four regiments - North, South, East and West - but the ensigns of the various companies do not follow any common regimental patterns. Instead, each one is different, having the St George cross for England either in chief (across the top third of the full width of the flag) or overall, with the rest of the flag composed of panes, waves or diamonds in various colours, including 'carnation' and 'maidenhair' and well as the normal heraldic tinctures. Nor are any colonels or other regimental officers named for the City units in this list; perhaps at this time there was no permanent regimental structure, and the four geographical groupings were merely an attempt to combine the 40 companies into more manageable units for training purposes.

In May 1588 the training was taking place twice weekly, and a Spanish observer noted that the 6000 men 'are certainly very good troops considering they are recruits, and are well armed'.³ They formed the majority of the London troops at the great camp at Tilbury in July and August during the height of the Armada crisis, but it seems that the army commander, the Earl of Leicester, did not have a high opinion of the citizens' military abilities. The government

¹Monument in St Helen's Bishopsgate.

²Dictionary of National Biography.

³Boynton, p. 154.

was proposing to take over the appointment of captains for the national militia in this emergency, in order to ensure that experienced men were in charge, but this plan was not well received either in London or elsewhere. 'For your Londoners', Leicester wrote, 'I se as the matter stands, there servyce will be lytle except they have their owne captains, & having them I look for none at all by them when we shall mete the enymy. I know what burgers be well enough.'¹ It is not clear whether Leicester was referring to the London Trained Bands, the other 4000 men newly levied in the City but not incorporated into the Trained Bands, or both. But the combination of the citizens' pride in their military skill and the defence of their privileges, together with the sarcastic belittling of them by outside observers, was to characterise the London Trained Bands until well into the Civil War.

The Londoners were not put to the test in Armada year, and after the crisis had passed their numbers were reduced again. In 1599, instead of six thousand, the Trained Bands numbered only 3375 men in 15 companies; the ward of Cripplegate now produced less than one company of 150 men instead of the three companies of 1588, and Faringdon Without only had two instead of five. In this second listing there is no mention of any grouping into regiments, and the relatively small number of companies makes it unlikely that any such grouping was needed. Of the 15 captains, all except two had commanded City companies 11 years previously, though not always in the same area of London; at least four of them had charge of companies in quite different wards from the ones they had served in 1588.² It seems likely that the captains were chosen on the basis

¹Boynton, p. 105.

²BM Royal MS 18 A LXVI, ff. 22-3; Goold Walker, pp. 313-5.

of their skill and experience in the Artillery Garden, regardless of where they lived in the City, and it was therefore not expected that they should have their own homes in the areas from which they drew their men.

The first service of the London Trained Bands against rebels within the City took place in 1601, during the Earl of Essex's ill-planned attempt to seize power. Essex had supposedly been assured of the support of Sheriff Thomas Smyth and 1000 men of the Trained Bands - Smyth himself commanded the 300 pikes and shot of Billingsgate and Broad Street wards - and he and his followers marched from Essex House in the Strand through the City to Smyth's home in Fenchurch Street, only to find that the promised support had evaporated. Meanwhile, Essex had been proclaimed a traitor, and on returning to Ludgate he found his way barred by the Trained Bands; he ordered his followers to charge, and two or three of them were killed in the skirmish which ensued. Essex managed to escape to his home but was surrounded and captured shortly afterwards, and Sheriff Smyth, too, was arrested and imprisoned in the Tower - although he was eventually acquitted of treason and released.¹

The accession of James VI of Scotland to the throne of England, which removed the threat of invasion from the north, also coincided with a lull in military activity on the Continent. This, together with the pacific diplomatic programme of the new king, led to a neglect of the militia over the next decade,² and it was not until 1614 that the Privy Council sent an order to the Lord Mayor commanding him to muster the Trained Bands and to reform any abuses which might

¹Goold Walker, pp. 344-5.

²Boynton, p. 209.

be revealed during the inspection. The Lord Mayor was directed

'to observe that perfect notice be taken and Enrollment made of such trayned Numbers as in her late Majesties tyme were put into Companies by the name of Trayned Bands, which we require your Lordship may be viewed and made compleate, both by supplying the Roomes of such Captaines, Souldiers and other persons as are either dead, insufficient or removed out of that Citty since the mustering of former tymes, with sufficient and apt men to be chosen in their places of such householders and other substanciall persons as shall be fitt for the same, as also by causing the defects of the Armour, weapons and other Furniture to be sufficiently repaired, amended and provided. And that the said Bands, being made compleate and furnished, may be trayned and exercised from tyme to tyme in places convenient.'¹

The new muster took place in the autumn; the numbers in the Trained Bands were again increased to 6000 and there were 20 captains appointed to lead them. 'These twenty Captains', it was noted, 'performed all things with such expedition, bounty and bravery, as, except in the year '88, the like was never before; and such of them as were not formerly of the Martial Society and Practice of the Artillery Garden were then admitted.'² However, the 'defects of the weapons' cited in the Council's order were not so easily amended, and a further order was sent to the Lord Mayor on 30 November to ensure that this was done quickly:

'Although we know you have in some measure performed these directions, yet foreasmuch as we are informed that such hath been the decay of Arms and furniture in these times of peace and since His Majesty's happy Government, as there was not furniture sufficient either in private men's custody or in the halls of Companies, or what otherwise could be found, to Arme six thousand men in such manner as is requisite, and that when they came into the fields to be mustered and trained they wanted for the most part divers pieces of their furniture, and were not disposed or ordered in any martiall or fitting manner upon their training, we have thought it very expedient...to give order for such provision of arms as the said number of six thousand men lately enrolled may be thoroughly furnished and made complete without either borrowing of one another or taking any arms from the Halls, but that every soldier may be furnished with arms of his own.'³

¹Goold Walker, pp. 344-5.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 366-7.

The defects in the arms of the Trained Bands had, indeed, already been noted and satirised in Beaumont and Fletcher's play The Knight of the Burning Pestle, probably written in 1610-11. In Act V, scene 1, Ralph's mother demands a dramatic representation of a muster:

'Ralph, I would have thee call all the youths together in battle-ray, with drums, and guns, and flags, and march to Mile-End in pompous fashion, and there exhort your soldiers to be merry and wise, and to keep their beards from burning, Ralph; and then skirmish, and let your flags fly, and cry "Kill, kill, kill!" My husband shall lend you his jerkin, Ralph, and there's a scarf.'

Ralph's father then recalls his own service at Mile End:

'I was there myself a pikeman once, in the hottest of the day, wench; had my feather shot sheer away, the fringe of my pike burnt off with powder, my pate broken with a scouring-stick....Oh, wench, an thou hadst but seen little Ned of Aldgate, Drum-Ned, how he made it roar again, and laid on like a tyrant, and then struck softly till the ward came up, and then thundered again, and together we go!'

But Ralph's muster in scene 2 reveals that George Greengoose, a poulterer, has no powder horn, but keeps his powder in a twist of paper; another soldier has lost the spout of his flask; a third has given his slow-match to the drummer to light his tobacco-pipe and thereby lost it. Their drill, too, is inadequate, and one soldier has to be warned not to set his neighbour's powder alight through careless handling of his match.

Beaumont and Fletcher's portrayal of the shopkeepers' attempt to 'measure out honour by the ell, and prowess by the pound' was deliberately satirical, but a more objective account of a muster of the City forces in 1615 also points to inadequate drilling. Richard Niccols's poem 'London's Artillery' recalls that on 8 August,

'When London twice ten ensigns did display,
Beneath whose colours in her streets dispread,
And by the conduct of her own sonnes led,
Those foot-bands which twice thirteen tribes did yield
Deckt in bright armes did march into the field,
Where either side the other did oppose,
Troope charging troope, like true friends turned foes,
Wanting but order in that feigned fight,
Through want of space to do the war-god right...'

Niccols also noted that

'the soldiers, for their arms and furniture, both for service and show, were well and rightly appointed, imitating the old Romans in their garnish of feathers, which, as it is a sight brave and terrible to the enemy, so is it goodly and delightful to friendsIn their demeanour I noted these two defects, ignorance of order and neglect of their Captain's command; the knowledge of the first cannot be had without time and practice, nor respect of the last (except in the more ingenious man) without more authority to enforce it...it may be said of the late Muster that they were more rash and turbulent than discreet and well advised, and less instructed and trained than well furnished and appointed.'¹

Obviously the defects in weaponry had been overcome during the previous year, but there is no indication that there had been any revival of frequent and regular training of the companies as yet.

In the following year the Privy Council ordered that the twenty City companies should be grouped into four regiments of five companies each, as they had been in 1588, and this time four knights were appointed as colonels. The Lord Mayor's order to one of them, Sir John Lowe of the East Regiment, incidentally shows that young men, even if they should happen to be householders, were not to be trusted in the Trained Bands: the muster was to be made up of 'the sufficientest and ablest men of middle age as near as may be' in order to prevent any dangers arising from 'the insolent and giddy misgovernment of base and young people'.²

During the 1620s and 1630s the Trained Bands were called out on holidays such as Shrove Tuesday and May Day to prevent disorders by unruly apprentices, and they were also involved in ceremonial parades during visits to London by ambassadors and foreign royalty. Weapons reforms were also introduced: calivers or 'small shot' were abandoned in favour of the heavier and more powerful muskets, and

¹Goold Walker, 1939, pp. 4-5.

²Ibid., pp. 3-4.

there was an interesting proposal to increase the firepower of the Trained Bands by combining the pike with the bow, thereby giving the pikeman a missile weapon to supplement the defensive strength of his pike and transform him into a 'Double-Armed Man'.¹ Careful attention to the weaponry of the Trained Bands throughout the country was an important part of Charles I's programme for creating an 'Exact Militia' after his accession in 1625, and London was the testing-ground for new ideas such as this.

The second main requirement of Charles I's attempted reform was, once again, frequent and regular drill of the troops, and the Privy Council expended a great deal of effort in trying to enforce the observance of musters and training sessions in the counties, with varying degrees of success. On the whole, William Barriffe was exaggerating when he stated that drill was 'a thing much to be desired in our Trained Bands, though small hope of amendment, seeing that our Souldiers are scarce called forth to exercise either Posture or Motion once in foure or five years'; most counties did better than this.² But there is no record of frequent and compulsory drill for men of the London Trained Bands during this period. The annual muster in April was often referred to as the annual training day, and perhaps this was all that the authorities felt they could enforce.

Voluntary instruction in the military arts was another matter, and there was a great expansion in facilities for this during the early seventeenth century. The Honourable Artillery Company was

¹Ibid., pp. 7-8; Boynton, pp. 238, 262.

²Ibid., pp. 244, 248; William Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), p. 2.

continuing its work of training volunteers at the Old Artillery Garden (where Spitalfields Market now stands), and in 1611 a new society, the Military Company, had been established under the patronage of Henry, Prince of Wales, for similar purposes, moving in 1635 to a new home near Leicester Fields in Westminster (the site of the present Gerrard Street). The same year saw the birth of the Martial Yard of Southwark at Horselydown; one of the instigators of this society was Captain Francis Grove of the Southwark Trained Bands. Another group was flourishing in Cripplegate under two officers of the London Trained Bands, and William Barriffe tells us something about the way it operated: the musters took place in the summer months only, at 7 a.m. on Thursdays, in order to 'provide no hindrance to men's more necessary callings, but rather call them earlier to their business affairs', and the members 'neither beat Drumme, display Ensigne, nor discharge Musket, but onely exercise their Postures, Motions and formes of Battell, with false fire in their pannes'.¹

The vogue for military training in these voluntary societies was encouraged by the Privy Council, since they would provide the well-drilled leaders needed for the 'Exact Militia'. On the other hand, it appears that the HAC became one of the centres of opposition to royal policy during the 1630s - if we can trust the accusations of a royalist pamphleteer writing in 1643 and attempting to prove that 'the beginning...of this accursed horrid Rebellion is principally to be ascribed to [the] rebellious City [of London]':

'You may well remember when the puritans here did as much abominate the Military Yard or Artillery Garden as Paris Garden itself: they would not mingle with the prophane: but, at last, when it was instilled into them that the blessed reformation

¹Goold Walker, 1938, pp. 363-4; 1939, pp. 8-9.

intended could not be effected but by the sword, these places were instantly filled with few or none but men of that faction. We were wont, you know, to make very merry at their training; some of them in two yeares practice could not be brought to discharge a musket without winking. We did little imagine then that they were ever likely to grow formidable to the state, or advance to that strength, as to be able to give the king battle; but after a while they began to affect, yea, and compasse the chief offices of command; so that, when any prime commanders dyed, new men were elected, wholly devoted to that faction, and it became a generall emulation amongst them, who should buy the most and the best armes.'¹

A number of future leaders of the parliamentary and puritan opposition to the Crown had enrolled in the HAC before 1630, and some of them had held the office of treasurer, the only post open to election by the members themselves at that time.² Royal control over the Company was tightened in 1630, but five years later it obtained permission for a large increase in membership: the numbers of new members admitted in 1630-4 had been 16, 64, 12, 18 and 16, but in 1635 there were 74 in the month of July alone and 350 for the whole year. More than 30 of these new members would be appointed officers of the London Trained Bands by the parliamentary Militia Committee in 1642. Royal permission for the enlargement of the HAC's membership was linked with the campaign for an improved militia, and the month of July 1635 also saw renewed mustering by the four regiments of the Trained Bands and the appointment of seven new captains to fill vacant places. Whether there was an organised campaign to promote puritan enrollments and create a power-base for opposition to royal policy cannot, however, be determined.

A more definite sign of conflict between the King and the City in 1635 concerned the appointment of a muster-master. Such an

¹ A Letter from Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus (Oxford, 1643), reprinted in Somers Tracts (1750), I, p. 582.

² Pearl, pp. 171-2.

³ G.A. Raikes (ed.), The Ancient Vellum Book of the Honourable Artillery Company (1890).

official was never popular, since his duty was to ensure that the required musters and training were correctly performed by those liable for service, reporting any defects to the Privy Council, and his salary was paid by a tax on either the householders or the Trained Bands themselves.¹ When, therefore, the King nominated Captain John Fisher as Muster-Master of the City in September 1635, the Corporation tried to defend its privileges by pointing out that 'the Alderman, his deputy and Common Council in every ward, accompanied by the Captain of each Band, have ever performed the office of Muster-Master within the City' and declined to confirm the appointment. This dispute continued for several years; the King eventually appointed Fisher himself in December 1637, but the Corporation refused to admit him to office or pay his salary until threatened by the Council in 1638. Even then, Fisher had to appeal to the Earl Marshal to order a muster of the City forces in 1639 so that he could ensure that the defects he had noted in the previous year had now been corrected. In particular, he wanted to see that the arms had been marked to prevent borrowing by men from other units when they were due for inspection, and he wanted to confirm that anyone who was unable to serve in person had appointed a 'good householder' to take his place.²

The King apparently succeeded in establishing Fisher as Muster-Master, but a second attempt to over-ride the City's privileges failed. In February 1639 he ordered the Lord Mayor to 'cause to be forthwith selected out of the Trained Bands in our City of London 3000 of the most able men' for the campaign against the Scots. This, of course, went against the old tradition that the Trained Bands

¹Boynton, pp. 224-5.

²Goold Walker, 1939, pp. 40-1.

could not be compelled to serve outside their own counties, and there was certainly no desire to serve voluntarily in this unpopular campaign. In the end, the King was forced to accept a 'free gift' of £10,000 from the City instead, and the London Trained Bands remained at home; the money was eventually paid in July, some weeks after the treaty ending the campaign had been signed.¹

A year later, when the King was again raising troops for a second campaign against the Scots, the situation had changed. This time, the order for 4000 troops from the City specified that they were not to be taken from the Trained Bands, 'which you are still to keep entire'; the danger from rioters in the capital was more immediate than the Scottish threat. There were 'tumultuous assemblies' in Lambeth, Southwark and Blackheath on May Day to protest against Archbishop Laud's policies, and the Lord Mayor was warned to have the Trained Bands in readiness to prevent a recurrence. Further riots were not long in coming: on 15 May the King wrote to inform the Lord Mayor that 'there are divers rebellious and insolent persons tumultuously assembled' on the South Bank, and he demanded 'that you raise and send forth, well armed and furnished with powder and shot, 1000 able and well-affected persons...of the trained bands of our City of London, to suppress, destroy, and apprehend all such persons'. But the actions of the King and Council were unpopular within the City as well as outside, and the Trained Bands were slow and inefficient in dispersing the rioters. An Essex man voiced the hopes of many when he stated that 'the train band had been sent for in London, but he thought the soldiers would fall on those that took the bishops' part'.²

¹Ibid.

²CSPD 1640, pp. 162, 167, 248; CSPD 1640-1, p. 126; Pearl, p. 108.

In September 1640 there was a proposal to increase the City's Trained Bands from 6000 to 12,000, perhaps because of the threat posed by the Scottish victory at Newburn and occupation of Northumberland, but nothing came of this; the government's unpopularity in the City forced Secretary of State Windebank to doubt the wisdom of 'suffering any considerable forces...to be drawn together at this present, unless the City were in better temper'.¹ At the end of the year, on hearing of tumults and disorders in the City, the King could still direct the Lord Mayor that 'as many Trained Bands as fitting be raised and orders given to Captains and Officers to suppress all tumults, and, if resistance is offered, to slay and kill such as shall persist, by shooting of bullets or otherwise'.² But the tension between Crown and City was greatly increased in May 1641 during the debates on the attainder of Strafford, when there were mobs at Westminster demanding his death and rumours of a planned coup d'etat by the still-undisbanded army raised by the King for the Second Bishops' War. During one heated debate in the Commons early in the month, a board cracked in the gallery under the weight of two of the Members, making a sound like a shot, whereupon another Member shouted that he could smell gunpowder. Fearing a repetition of the Gunpowder Plot, some Members fled the House and called for the City's Trained Bands, who stood to arms and marched as far as Covent Garden before learning that the alarm was a false one.³

¹ CSPD 1640-1, p. 11; Pearl, p. 104.

² Goold Walker, 1939, p. 42.

³ S.R. Gardiner, History of England...1603-1642 (1884), IX, p. 359.

By the summer of 1641, the Lord Mayor knew that the Trained Bands could not be relied upon to preserve order during political demonstrations. They were, after all, citizens themselves, and shared the widespread feeling of grievance against the government - and now the protestors were being supported by the leadership in Parliament. One citizen went so far as to state that 'it was Parliament time now, and the Lord Mayor was but their slave'.¹ Despite the efforts of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and most of the Common Council to support the government at this time, the intensity of the citizens' opposition to Strafford, Laud, ship-money, papists, monopolies, protections, customs duties, and other features of Royal policy prompted Clarendon to label the City as 'the sink of all the ill-humours of the Kingdom'.² These grievances were not confined to the poor, but were shared by 'substantial' householders and liverymen as well; there is no reason why the soldiers and even the officers of the Trained Bands should have thought differently from their neighbours.³

¹Pearl, pp. 119-20.

²Quoted in Pearl, p. 1.

³Pearl, p. 109.

CHAPTER I

THE RADICAL COUP AND THE BIRTH OF THE MILITIA COMMITTEE

The first dispute between the King and the Long Parliament over the control of the London Trained Bands, presaging the larger conflict over the militia as a whole, took place at the end of 1641. The story is well known. Parliament, alarmed by the rowdy demonstrations of soldiers from the disbanded army demanding their pay, ordered a guard to be set about the Houses during the recess in September - October 1641. When Parliament sat again on 20 October the tumults continued, and so did the guards; then the news of the outbreak of rebellion in Ireland and rumours of plots at home made the need for a guard appear even greater. When the King returned to the capital on 25 November, however, he was determined to reassert his rights to control the militia and to disperse the armed force which his opponents had established within a short distance of his own palace; he therefore dismissed the guards. In response to strong protests from the House of Commons, however, he relented and allowed them to continue - but under the command of the courtier Earl of Dorset rather than the puritan Earl of Essex. The Commons, thus outflanked, finally decided that they would rather do without a guard after all.

In recent years, this outline of events (which is accurate as far as it goes) has been embellished with dramatic details. C.V. Wedgwood, describing the reassembly of Parliament on 20 October, claims that 'the London trained bands guarded the House against possible violence'.¹ Of the events at the end of November, she writes:

'The approaches to the Houses of Parliament had been guarded for the last months by companies from the London Trained Bands

¹C.V. Wedgwood, The King's Peace (1969), p. 472.

commanded by the Earl of Essex - soldiers friendly to the London boys and a commander friendly to John Pym. Charles now replaced this guard with a company picked from the Westminster Trained Bands under the command of the Earl of Dorset. On paper this was represented as a gracious gesture for the safety and honour of Parliament. In fact, it placed in the approaches to the House soldiers who disliked or despised the Londoners and officers who, being Westminster men, were friends and dependents of the Court.'¹

When the London apprentices came to Westminster on 29 November to protest against the Bishops,

'they found to meet them not the Puritan pipe-smoking Earl of Essex and their good neighbours of the London Trained Bands, but the haughty Earl of Dorset and the smart lads of Westminster spoiling for a fight'.²

It makes a good story, but only half of it is true. The Earl of Dorset did indeed replace Essex as commander of the guards, but the Westminster men did not replace the Londoners; it was the Westminster Trained Bands who had guarded the Houses all along, while the London Trained Bands had remained in the City itself throughout these weeks. There are various references to guards from 'the trained bands' around the Houses at this period, and it is true that Essex, as Captain General south of the Trent in the King's absence, was instructed by the Lords to write to the Lord Mayor on 4 November 'to safeguard the said City, as there shall be cause, against all tumults and disorders that shall happen in or about the said City and Liberties of the same, upon any occasion'.³ But it is clear that the guards around the Houses were from Westminster: on 23 October it had been reported that

'great mutinies and disorders were now on foot by the disbanded soldiers, who came in companies to the Parliament House and demanded their pay. The Trained Bands of Westminster attended all day in arms in the Palace Yard till both Houses rose. Afterwards they received directions from the Earl of Essex, Lord Generall in the King's absence, to divide their company in two parts, that one hundred might attend for the day and be relieved by the like number at night'.⁴

¹C.V. Wedgwood, The King's War (1958), pp. 31-2.

²Ibid.

³LJ, IV, p. 423.

⁴The [Old] Parliamentary...History (1762), X, p. 9.

On 10 November the Commons received 'the humble petition of the Liberty of the Duchy [of Lancaster] in the Strand', and this was immediately followed by a report from 'the committee appointed to consider what recompense is fit to be given to the Trained Bands that have the guard of the City of Westminster'. It was noted that the watch had begun on 20 October, and it was suggested that the wages should be paid out of the Westminster poll monies.¹ Other references mention 'the Trained Bands of the County of Middlesex' instead of, or in addition to, the Westminster men proper; this presumably refers to the men of the western suburbs (St Martin's, St Giles's, the Savoy and St Clement Danes, and Holborn) which were outside the boundaries of Westminster and which formed 'the four neighbour companies'.² It seems that the Westminster Trained Bands were too small to undertake all the guard duties on their own, so the other nearby suburban units were also called upon - but not the London Trained Bands.

When the King relented from his plan to dismiss the guards at the end of November, he did not discharge one group of men and appoint another; 'he was pleased that the trained bands should continue four or eight days longer'.³ The only change was in the overall commander; Essex had already surrendered his commission, and the King quite naturally gave the command to the Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex, who was the Earl of Dorset.⁴ The King may indeed have 'smoothly won a key position', as Wedgwood claims,⁵ but not by using force majeure

¹CJ, II, pp. 309-10.

²Ibid.

³The Heads of Severall Proceedings, 22-29 November (E201/1).

⁴Clarendon, I, p. 264.

⁵The King's War, p. 32.

against Parliament; he kept in place the guard which Parliament had appointed, and from his point of view it would have been extraordinary if he had not given the command to the Lord Lieutenant on the expiry of Essex's authority. The Commons could not complain about the presence of the Westminster and Middlesex men around the Houses of Parliament, since they had appointed them in the first place and presumably had no reason to distrust them. What was important was who was to give them their orders; the Commons apparently hoped that the King would take the unusual step of giving this authority to Essex, even though his commission had automatically expired on the King's return to the capital.

Events now moved quickly. Dorset was appointed on Saturday 27 November, and of course there was no sitting of Parliament on Sunday. On Monday night, however, 'some hundreds of the citizens came down with swords and staves, and accosted some of the Members to desire their votes for the putting down of Bishops....the Lord Dorset came forth and caused the guard to thrust them out of the Court of Requests'.¹ It has never been proved whether this and subsequent demonstrations by the citizens were orchestrated by the Parliamentary leaders, especially the radical City MP John Venn, but the protests were not unwelcome, and Sir Simonds D'Ewes certainly took the Londoners' side: 'I do not conceive this act of the Londoners can be properly styled a "tumultuous" coming hither, nor did they deserve such usage as they found....I cannot allow [Dorset's] late act of violence...for him to bid the musketeers discharge upon so many citizens and the pikemen run them through, we may well consider how dangerous effects it might have produced'.² On Tuesday 30 November

¹W.H. Coates, The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes (1942), p. 211

²Ibid., pp. 225-6.

the Commons dismissed the guards, explaining to the King that they would 'rather run any hazard than admit of a precedent so dangerous' as to have a guard under the command of anyone not chosen by themselves.¹

It is not difficult to see why Wedgwood reached the conclusion that the Westminster men replaced the London Trained Bands at the end of November. Many of the references mention only a guard of trained bands under Essex during October and November, and we know that he wrote to the Lord Mayor about the safety of the City on 4 November. At the end of December, after renewed tumults, the Commons would specifically petition for 'a sufficient guard out of the City of London, commanded by the Earl of Essex'.² There was also the fact that there had been no trouble between demonstrators and guards before 27 November, whereas there was a clash immediately after the King had made his own dispositions. (The reason for this is not because the guards under Essex had been Londoners sympathetic to the protestors, however; the earlier demonstrators had been discharged soldiers demanding pay, and it was only on 29 November that the puritans appeared once again at Westminster to demand the exclusion of the bishops.) But the most important reason for the historical misunderstanding over the identity of the guards is Clarendon's account of the King's action:

'Upon the King's return from Scotland, he discharged the Guards that attended upon the Houses. Whereupon the House of Commons (for the Lords refused to join with them) petitioned the King... that they might continue such a guard about them as they thought fit....[the King] thereupon directed the Train-bands of Westminster and Middlesex (which consisted of the most substantial householders, and were under known officers) to attend.'³

¹CJ, II, p. 328.

²Ibid., p. 366.

³Clarendon, I, p. 264.

Clarendon did not identify the source of the earlier guard, but his comments have suggested that, by contrast, they were 'insubstantial' men under untrustworthy officers. Perhaps Clarendon believed this himself, writing some years after the event and relying on the records which he possessed. But the Parliamentary records make it clear that the Westminster and Middlesex men had been on duty all along, and were trusted by both King and Commons to obey the orders of the person who was put in command of them. (As for Wedgwood's 'smart lads of Westminster', Clarendon's confirmation that they were 'substantial householders' and presumably, like their City counterparts, 'as near to middle age as may be', makes it more likely that they were 'smart dads'. The commonly held idea that the soldiers of the trained bands were young men and apprentices will be discussed in a later chapter.)

The Commons' dismissal of the guards on 30 November was not the end of the matter, and the trained bands of Westminster and Middlesex continued as pawns in the manoeuvring of King and Parliament throughout December. On 10 December a new guard appeared around the Houses, and it was discovered that they were men from St Clement Danes and the Savoy, sent down to Westminster by the Justices of the Peace in accordance with a writ from the King in anticipation of a rumoured riot. (This guard, consisting of halberdiers rather than musketeers and pikemen, was in fact a 'strong guard' and not technically a company of the trained bands.) The guard was immediately dismissed by Parliament, and one of the Justices was sent to the Tower for this breach of privilege.¹ On 16 December, however, the Commons themselves ordered that the Westminster Trained Bands should attend on the

¹CJ, II, p. 338; LJ, IV, p. 469.

following Wednesday, when a solemn fast would be observed and a sermon preached.¹ Then on 27 December the Privy Council, in turn, ordered them to attend about the Palace of Whitehall 'for a defence against tumultuous risings', and they continued to man the courts of guard at Whitehall until the King's withdrawal from the capital on 10 January.²

Throughout the troubled days of December, the London Trained Bands were kept busy in trying to maintain order within the City itself. On 13 December there was a riot in Newgate, and the prisoners gained temporary control until the Trained Bands arrived and forced them to surrender.³ On the fast day, 22 December, a special watch was kept during the City's observance while the Westminster men guarded the Houses of Parliament.⁴ On 28 December the King once again tried to stop the Westminster tumults at their source by ordering the Lord Mayor to call out his Trained Bands and put down disorders in the City.⁵ By the end of the month it was reported that 'the Trained Bands keep watch everywhere' and that 'the citizens for the most part shut up their shops, and all gentlemen provide themselves with arms as in a time of open hostility'.⁶ With the Westminster and Middlesex men guarding Whitehall on the King's orders, John Pym suggested in the Commons on 30 December that the London Trained Bands should be sent for to guard Parliament, but this motion was at first defeated, and one of the main reasons given in Sir Simonds D'Ewes's speech

¹Diurnall Occurrences, 13-20 December (E201/3).

²Ibid., 10-17 January 1641/2 (E201/8); CSPD 1641-3, pp. 216, 241.

³Ibid., p. 201.

⁴Diurnall Occurrences, 13-20 December.

⁵CSPD 1641-3, p. 214.

⁶Ibid., p. 213.

against it is instructive: 'The Cittizens are not all the sonnes of one mother nor of one minde and wee knowe not how in such a case they may bee divided amongst themselves and if wee should send to them and not succcede it were much better for us not to sende'.¹

D'Ewes noted that he was 'very much troubled' by Pym's motion, 'because I feared that the remedie which hee had proposed would bee almost of as dangerous consequence as the designe pretended' - the design being a rumoured plot to invade the Houses and attack the Members.²

Later in the day, however, Pym tried again, claiming new reasons. The bishops, who had been prevented by the mob outside from taking their places in the House of Lords, had protested that in such circumstances the Parliament could hardly be called a 'free' and legally valid one. Pym and his followers responded not only by packing the twelve protesting bishops off to the Tower in record time, but also by carrying a motion to petition the King for a guard from the City to be commanded by Essex. This motion was a watered-down version of Pym's earlier proposal that the Commons should communicate directly with the City, but the House of Lords nevertheless refused to support the petition. On the evening of 31 December 1641, shortly before rising for the weekend, the Commons sent Denzil Holles and seven other MPS to petition the King in the name of the Commons alone for a guard from the London Trained Bands, and 'the King told them that if it were delivered to him in writing hee would consider of it'.³

¹Coates, op. cit., pp. 334n., 366.

²Ibid., p. 366.

³Gardiner, History of England, X, p. 122; Coates, op. cit., pp. 368, 372-3; CJ, II, p. 366.

Towards the end of December 1641, while these momentous events were taking place in and around Westminster, there were also important changes in the government of the City of London. The annual ward meetings of the freemen to elect Common Councilmen for the ensuing year took place on 21 December, but this time many of the wards disregarded the tradition of confirming long-serving and 'able' men in office. Instead, the King's opponents among the aldermen and other prominent citizens made use of the 'fears and jealousies' of these troubled days, according to a later Royalist pamphleteer, to

'instill into their fellow-citizens how much it concerned them to make choyce of "godly" men (so they miscall themselves) and such as would oppose the popish party, under which notion they comprehend all such as stand well-affected to the government established, whether ecclesiastical or civill. They accuse the old Common Councilmen as men not zelous for religion, ready to comply with the Court for loanes of monies, and, which was worse, many had not only set their hands to, but were active in promoting the intended petition for episcopacy and the Booke of Common Prayer. These objections...so prevailed with these silly men (who thought all to be in danger, unlesse the government were put into new hands) that, in most wards, the old Common Councilmen were turned out, and new chosen in, wholly devoted to the puritan faction'.¹

The exact number of 'new men' elected in December has not been established, but several of the King's most prominent supporters in the City were certainly voted out and replaced by men who would prove to be staunch supporters of the Parliamentary cause in the coming months.²

The 'new men' would traditionally have taken their places in Common Council on the Monday after Epiphany (6 January), but events were moving too swiftly for such legal niceties to be observed when the City's official stance in support of King or Parliament was at stake. On 31 December the King ordered the Lord Mayor to call a

¹ A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, pp. 588-9.

² Pearl, pp. 132-7.

Common Council meeting and sent a representative to inform the members of the late tumults at Westminster, asking them to take steps to prevent their recurrence. The 'new men' attended this meeting, led by the prominent puritan John Fowke, and mixed in with the current members. A few of the Royalist Common Councilmen noticed this and wanted to raise the matter as a point of order, but the matter was hushed up out of respect for the King's representative and because the only business to be decided was Common Council's answer to the King's message. This premature acceptance of the 'new men' by Common Council was to have far-reaching consequences, however, for the next meeting would, under their leadership, effectively vote for a coup d'etat in the City.¹

The King, having 'considered of' the Commons' request for a guard from the London Trained Bands under the Earl of Essex, sent his reply on Monday 3 January when the House reassembled at Westminster; he 'denied their requests, as conceiving there was no need thereof'.² That same afternoon he began his long-awaited counterattack when the attorney-general accused the five leaders of the opposition in the Commons, together with Lord Mandeville, of high treason. The Commons voted that night to send an order on their own authority to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council to put the Trained Bands in readiness, and the King responded around midnight by sending a warrant to the Lord Mayor forbidding the use of the Trained Bands except by royal directive, and then gave authority for them to be used to disperse any further tumults, by shooting if necessary. The Royalist Lord Mayor was therefore able in good conscience to call out the

¹ A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, p. 589.

² Diurnall Occurrences, 3-10 January (E201/7).

Trained Bands on Tuesday 4 January in accordance with the King's warrant, while simultaneously appearing to comply with the order of the Commons. That day, 'in divers parts of the City and Burrough of Southwarke they kept their shops shut and stood on their Guard, fearing some insurrection'.¹ But two important questions remained unanswered: whose authority were the Trained Bands ultimately operating under, and who were the potential 'rebels' they were guarding the City against?

Answers to these questions were being prepared at Guildhall on Tuesday morning. Although the Trained Bands had always been called out only on the Lord Mayor's direct order, the Commons had now gone over his head by sending their message to the Aldermen and Common Councilmen as well; the leaders of the Commons were well aware of the Lord Mayor's Royalist opinions. And when Common Council assembled to deal with the Commons' message on 4 January, we can be sure that the 'new men' - the recently elected but not-yet-installed members - were present, in view of their known attendance on 31 December and 5 January and the nature of the decision which Common Council now made. A committee of twelve Common Councilmen and six Aldermen was chosen to undertake measures for the safety of the City.² Of the Common Councilmen elected to this Committee of Safety, at least two were 'new men',³ and all the others had already proved themselves to be outspoken opponents of royal policy. Three of the six Aldermen were also allied to the Parliamentary cause; of the three 'lukewarm' Aldermen, one would resign a fortnight later and the other two would

¹Coates, op. cit., p. 376; Gardiner, History of England, X, p. 134; Diurnall Occurrences, 3-10 January.

²Pearl, pp. 139-40; Common Council Journal 40 f. 11.

³John Fowke and Alexander Normington. A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, p. 589.

be expelled in September.¹ Presumably the Royalist members of Common Council wanted nothing to do with such a committee as this; in any case, whether through their apathy or through their being outvoted at the 'packed' meeting on 4 January, Common Council had now committed itself to armed resistance to the 'malignant party', and had chosen its most vociferous supporters of Parliament to supervise that resistance.

The vote of Common Council which established the Committee of Safety did not specify how its powers were to relate to the Lord Mayor's authority over the Trained Bands, but it was obvious that a conflict must arise sooner rather than later. That afternoon the King went in person to the House of Commons in his attempt to arrest the Five Members. Finding that they had fled to the City, he ordered the Lord Mayor to summon a Common Council meeting on the following day and went himself to demand the accused men. The newly elected and irregularly admitted John Fowke, now a member of the Committee of Safety as well, made a 'saucy, Insolent speech' in reply,² and when the King left Guildhall it was the Committee of Safety which prepared a draft response to the King's address. This consisted of a petition listing the grievances of the Parliamentary and puritan party and supporting the accused men, and it was accepted by Common Council - a clear sign that the radicals represented on the Committee were now in control.³

¹Sir Nicholas Rainton, Sir John Gayre, Sir Jacob Garrard. Common Council Journal 40.

²A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, p. 589.

³Sharpe, p. 158; Pearl, pp. 143-4.

On Thursday 6 January, when the Commons met (as a committee of the whole House) at Merchant Taylors' Hall in the City, they were met and welcomed by a committee of Common Council 'consisting of the most eminent persons...for their disaffection to the Government of Church and State' who had appointed a guard of 'substantial Citizens in Arms' to protect the Commons.¹ There can be little doubt that the City deputation consisted of the new Committee of Safety, but the guard on Merchant Taylors' Hall is not specifically stated to have been provided by the Trained Bands. It seems likely that the guard was made up of volunteers who were 'well affected' to Parliament; the Lord Mayor's authority over the Trained Bands had not yet been challenged. That challenge, however, was not long in coming. Between 9 and 10 p.m. that night, as the tense and fearful citizens lay worrying what the King's next move would be, someone informed the watchmen at Ludgate that Royalist supporters were plotting to seize the City that night.² (This rumour appears to have been the result of the accidental discharge of a carbine by a trooper enlisted for the Irish campaign, together with the noise produced by a party of roistering and duelling courtiers at a tavern in Covent Garden³ - although a later Royalist writer claimed that the rumour was spread by the Parliamentary leaders themselves 'to see what party they had in the City'.⁴) Acting on this news, 'divers persons' demanded that the Lord Mayor call out the Trained Bands to meet the Royalist threat, but he refused to do so, having received no proof of any such danger. His orders

¹Clarendon, I, p. 285. (D'Ewes and Rushworth claim that the meeting took place at Guildhall in the morning and at Grocers' Hall in the afternoon rather than at Merchant Taylors' Hall.)

²Coates, op. cit., p. 392.

³Diurnall Occurences, 3-10 January; The Rebellion in Coven Garden (1641/2)

⁴A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, pp. 587-8.

went unheeded;¹ there was 'great bouncing at every man's door to be up in their arms presently and to stand on their guard....So the gates were shut and the cullisses let down, and the chains put across the corners of our streets, and every man ready on his arms'.² The fear in the City was so great that several pregnant women reportedly miscarried and the wife of Alderman Thomas Adams died of fright,³ but the Royalist forces did not materialise, and after a few hours everyone returned home.⁴

As far as the King and Privy Council were concerned, the calling out of the Trained Bands against the Lord Mayor's orders was a serious development - a local precedent for Parliament's attempt to wrest control of the national militia from the King. The Council wrote to the Lord Mayor on Saturday 8 January, ordering him to find out who was responsible for the unauthorised raising of the Trained Bands and to reveal the names of those who originally importuned him to call them out.⁵ At this point the Commons immediately interjected, and within a matter of hours they had passed a series of motions of great consequence. It was resolved that the citizens' action had been in accordance with their duty; that commissions of lieutenancy granted by the King to administer the militia forces were illegal; that the Lord Mayor's authority over the London Trained Bands derived from such a commission; that the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council, or a majority of them, could give orders to the Trained

¹CSPD 1641-3, p. 249.

²N. Wallington, Historical Notices (1869), quoted in Pearl, p. 142.

³Ibid.; Percival Boyd's Units: Citizens of London (Society of Genealogists), s.v.

⁴Wallington, quoted in Pearl, p. 142.

⁵CSPD 1641-3, p. 249.

Bands; that the Trained Bands of the City could operate throughout Middlesex; that the Sheriffs of the City could and should provide a guard from the posse comitatus (in effect, from the Trained Bands) for the protection of Parliament, as was usual with lower courts of law; that Philip Skippon, the Captain of the HAC and a professional soldier, should be military commander of the London Trained Bands, subject not to the Lord Mayor but to a majority of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council; and that a committee of the Commons should meet with the City's Committee of Safety on Monday morning.¹

By vesting the authority over the Trained Bands in the whole Corporation rather than the Lord Mayor alone, the Commons gave the radical-dominated Common Council a voice in their use. The result of this decision was not clear-cut, however, since the Lord Mayor and most of the Aldermen were opposed to the Commons' proceedings. There was also the question of what 'a majority' of the Corporation meant: did the Lord Mayor and Aldermen vote as houses, or did each of them vote only as individuals on the same basis as a Common Councilman? In any case, Common Council could not even meet without the Lord Mayor's cooperation, since it was he who had authority to summon them. The Commons' control over London's militia was, as yet, incomplete.²

The alternative provision, whereby the Sheriffs could be ordered to provide a guard for Parliament from the Trained Bands, was meanwhile being put into effect. On Saturday 8 January two of the City regiments (along with a number of other Parliamentary supporters among the citizens) escorted Lord Mandeville and the Five Members to Grocers' Hall, where the Commons were sitting as a committee.

¹Ibid.

²Pearl, pp. 144-7.

On Monday, the joint committee of the Commons and the City's Committee of Safety ordered the trained bands of London, Westminster and the adjacent areas to be called to their colours under the command of Skippon, who was given the title of Sergeant-Major-General, and eight companies were to be drawn out for service on the following day,¹ when they escorted the Commons in triumph back to Westminster - the King having fled to Hampton Court the night before, finally discharging the Westminster and Middlesex men from their guard duties in Whitehall.² It is not known whether the latter actually took part in the Parliamentary triumphal parade on 11 January, as they were now free to do, but the eight London companies under Skippon duly escorted Mandeville through the City to the Houses of Parliament while the Five Members went by water, with the Southwark Trained Bands guarding the South Bank.³ Each of the London soldiers had a printed copy of the previous summer's Protestation Oath for reformed religion and the privileges of Parliament (now reprinted and generally distributed) fastened to the top of his pike or stuck into his hat or doublet⁴ - a gesture which was obviously stage-managed rather than spontaneous, and which does not necessarily signify the Trained Bands' unanimous support for Parliament, since only those who had agreed to take the Protestation Oath were allowed to participate in the parade.⁵ But there is no doubt that the Parliamentary party now had a firm grip on the military forces of the capital, and two London regiments were

¹Diurnall Occurrences, 3-10 January; Sharpe, p. 161.

²Diurnall Occurrences, 10-17 January (E201/8).

³Gardiner, History of England, X, p. 150; Coates, op. cit., p. 401.

⁴Clarendon, I, p. 298; Pearl, p. 145.

⁵Coates, op. cit., p. 400.

ordered to guard the Houses of Parliament each day from now on.¹ The King's belated offer to appoint a guard for the Houses from the London Trained Bands under the command of the Royalist Earl of Lindsey was not acted upon;² as far as the capital was concerned, the control of the militia had already passed from King to Parliament.

The House of Commons, having confirmed the decisions made during the past few days while they were sitting as a committee at Grocers' Hall, now began to tighten their control over the London Trained Bands through the twin channels of the Sheriffs and the Corporation. On Thursday 13 January they drastically reduced the Lord Mayor's control over Common Council by ordering him to call a meeting 'as often and at such times as shall be desired by the...Committee [of Safety]'.³ Two days later, they also ordered that the Sheriffs 'shall issue warrants for raising such Trained Bands and other Forces as Philip Skippon, Sergeant Major General, shall from time to time giver order for', and they gave Skippon personal authority to call out the Southwark militia to relieve the City forces as required, although this was modified on 28 January to take account of the Sheriff of Surrey's rights.⁴ In each case, the sheriffs were now at the beck and call of Skippon as far as the calling-out of the Trained Bands was concerned, while the initiative in calling Common Council meetings (and therefore, in effect, determining the agenda) had passed to the most radical Parliamentary supporters on the Council itself.

It was presumably in accordance with the Committee of Safety's

¹Diurnall Occurences, 10-17 January.

²CSPD 1641-3, p. 251.

³CJ, II, p. 376.

⁴CJ, II, pp. 382, 401.

instructions that a meeting of Common Council was held on Wednesday 19 January while the Lords and Commons were meeting together as a joint committee of both Houses at Grocers' Hall. (Clarendon states that this latter adjournment to the City was merely a propaganda move by the Parliamentary leaders, who, 'finding the general mettall somewhat to abate, that they might keep up the apprehension of danger, and the esteem of their Darling the City', once again sought the protection of the Londoners.)¹ The decisions of Common Council on this day reflected the concerns of the Committee of Safety: it was agreed that Skippon should have a pension of £300 per annum for life, or as long as he continued to serve as the City's sergeant-major-general; that each captain in the Trained Bands should have 50 shillings for every day or night on duty for the payment of his officers; that watch-houses with chimneys should be constructed at the end of Broad Street, at Moorgate, at Bishopsgate, and on the wall between the last two; and that the Lord Mayor should issue precepts to the aldermen to draw up new lists of the inhabitants of their wards who were able to bear arms or to pay for them - this last being a preliminary to an increase in the number of men in the City's Trained Bands.² That night, the company which was then on duty guarding the grand committee of Parliament at Grocers' Hall were 'feasted in a most bountifull manner' as a gesture of thanksgiving and support for the change in control over the City's militia.³

That change, however, was still not felt to be complete. Despite

¹Clarendon, I, p. 303.

²Common Council Journal 40 ff. 16, 16b.

³Diurnall Occurences, 17-24 January (E201/10).

the Committee of Safety's new power to force the Lord Mayor to call Common Council meetings, and despite the fact that the meeting on 19 January had passed a number of measures proposed by that Committee, the control over the Trained Bands was still vested in the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council together in accordance with the Commons' vote of 8 January. The following is a Royalist account of how the Parliamentary seizure of military power in the City was perfected through the delegation of this control to the radical Committee of Safety on Saturday 22 January:¹

'There was a common-councell held, in which many things were debated: the court was continued long, untill one of the clock. At last, tired out with long sitting, and willing to rise, Ven,² taking advantage of the present indisposition of the court to sit longer, ready to admit proposalls without any strict scanning... produceth an order from the house of commons, by which they were desired to returne such men's names with whom the city thought fit to intrust the militia of London. The court, surprised with so unexpected a message, for the present not piercing into the reason for it, nor...imagining that the men whose names they returned should have absolute power to execute any thing of themselves, but only as a committee, to consult, and prepare, and report to the common-councell, as the limited power of all committees is... ordered that the names of the committee for the posture of defence should be sent to the house in returne to their order'.³

When it later became clear that the Commons did not intend the Committee of Safety (known henceforth as the Militia Committee) to 'consult, prepare and report' but to take direct control, there were second thoughts and protests among the conservative elements in Common Council and the City as a whole, including a petition to Parliament signed by the Lord Mayor, a majority of the Aldermen, and more than 300 other prominent citizens.⁴ This petition merely

¹The author places this meeting 'before February was tenne dayes old', but the true date is given in Common Council Journal 40 f. 17.

²The radical City MP John Venn.

³A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, pp. 592-3.

⁴Pearl, pp. 147-50.

provided ammunition for Parliament to prosecute the men who had organised it, since the Parliamentary party had no intention of retreating from the great advantage they had gained by the creation of the Militia Committee. That Committee also retained its control over Common Council business and was given new authority to settle disputed elections to the Council itself.¹ According to the same Royalist account, the Committee 'being, by these dishonest practices, made lords of the militia, and being armed with as much power as will serve the most desperate treasonable designs which either Saye or Pym should suggest, they now goe on without checke or controule, and beate downe all before them that stand in their way'.²

While the London militia was thus being brought under Parliamentary control, other measures were being taken to secure the capital's great arsenal and fortress. On 12 January the Commons had ordered the Sheriffs to post a guard around the Tower, drawn from the Trained Bands under Skippon's command.³ The Royalist Lieutenant of the Tower, Sir John Byron, thus found himself blockaded by both land and water; he was also summoned by the House of Lords to give an account of the artillery and other military stores which had been brought into the Tower in late December and early January, but he refused to leave the Tower and go to Westminster until he had received permission from the King.⁴ That permission came on about 20 January, and Byron duly made his report to the Lords, returning just in time to frustrate 'a great conspiracy':

¹Pearl, pp. 138, 146-7.

²A Letter from Mercurius Civicus, p. 594.

³CJ, II, p. 427.

⁴Gardiner, History of England, X, pp. 154-5.

'Captain Skippon towards the evening marched very privately when it was dark to the backside of the Tower, and stayed at the iron gate with his men, which were about 500, where having continued a while with great silence, he sent one into the Tower to the Serjeant who commanded the Hamleters¹ that night, that he should march out of the Tower with his men and come to him. But the Serjeant desired to be excused, because, coming thither by my command, he durst not depart without it. Upon this answer Skippon sent him a second message, that those terms were in vain, for he was sure I should never come into the Tower again as Lieutenant; but since he scrupled to come out of the Tower, he desired him to draw his men up to the iron gate, and upon the shooting of a musket to be ready to assist him. Whilst these things were in agitation I returned from the Parliament, it being almost 10 o'clock at night before I had my dismissal, and so the plot was spoiled, but certainly the design was, in case I had been detained, to have surprised the Tower, and to have put in a Lieutenant of their own'.²

Byron went on to claim that 'were it a time when the laws might be impartially executed, Captain Skippon might be questioned for his life for this attempt', but Parliament passed an ordinance on 12 February approving of Skippon's actions and stating that anyone attempting to arrest him for them was an enemy of the commonwealth.³ By this time, too, the King had given in to Parliament's repeated demands for Byron's removal, backed up by Byron's own pleas for freedom from 'the agony and vexation of that place',⁴ and had consented to Parliament's nomination of the puritan Sir John Conyers to replace him - a decision which Clarendon thought was 'such an instance of his yielding upon Importunity, that from that time they thought themselves even possessed of the whole Militia of the Kingdom'.⁵

The struggle for control of the militia did indeed switch from being a London to being a national issue during the next few months;

¹The men of the Tower Hamlets provided the nightly guards for the Tower.

²CSPE 1641-3, p. 269.

³CJ, II, p. 427.

⁴Clarendon, I, p. 328.

⁵Ibid.

the naming of the Committee of Safety as commissioners of the London militia, the seizure of the Tower, and the dispersal of a small Royalist cavalry force at Kingston upon Thames during the second week of January had eliminated all practical military opposition to Parliament in the capital. Skippon continued to send two companies of the London Trained Bands to Westminster each day to guard the Houses of Parliament (or, as on Shrove Tuesday, 22 February, to guard the Members as they attended sermons at St Margaret's), but by early March the danger had lessened so much that only one company was henceforth required.¹ Skippon himself had been added to the Militia Committee on 12 February at the Commons' request (having only been made a freeman the month before).² The Venetian ambassador reported on 7 March that 'the City of London, whose mayor has always enjoyed the privilege of commanding the trained bands and of executing despotic powers for securing peace and safety, displays great resentment at an innovation practiced by Parliament in despoiling the mayor and aldermen of this advantage, appointing another individual in their confidence to this office',³ but the protests of the Lord Mayor and a number of the aldermen did not affect the powers granted to Skippon and the Militia Committee. Indeed, those powers were spelled out and confirmed in a new ordinance for the London militia on 4 April; the Committee was to raise and train forces, appoint and remove officers, and lead men 'as well within the City as within any other part of this Realme of England or Dominion of Wales, according ...as you shall receive directions from the said Lords and Commons'.⁴

¹ A Continuation of the true Diurnall, 21-28 February (E201/19); CJ, II, p. 463.

² Common Council Journal 40 ff. 20, 13.

³ CSPVen. 1640-2, pp. 2-3.

⁴ Common Council Journal 40 f. 30.

The main concern of the Militia Committee during March and April was the programme to increase the number of men in the Trained Bands. As we have seen, a new listing of the inhabitants was ordered by Common Council on 19 January, and on 12 February it was specified that the Trained Bands should be increased from the current 6000 men to 8000 in forty companies.¹ This required the reorganisation of the four existing regiments into six and the redrawing of the boundaries from which each unit drew its men, as well as the appointment of a number of new officers, and these tasks were accomplished by the Militia Committee early in April. A precept was then issued on 15 April requiring the Aldermen and Common Councilmen in each ward to assist the captains in proceeding with the enrollment of the required number of men for the reorganised Trained Bands, on the basis of the lists of 'able' men which had been drawn up in January. The listing was to begin on Monday 18 April and continue from day to day until the correct numbers had been listed.² Having obtained Parliamentary authorisation on 3 May to 'draw the Trained Bands...into such usual and convenient places within three miles of the said City, as to them ...shall seem fit for the training and exercising of the soldiers',³ the Militia Committee fixed Tuesday 10 May as the date for the first general muster of the reformed Trained Bands, 'and accordingly, on that day, their own new Officer, Sergeant-Major-General Skippon, appear'd in Finsbury Fields, with all the Train'd-bands of London consisting of above eight thousand Soldiers, disposed into six Regiments, under such Captains and Colonels as they had cause to Confide in'.⁴

¹CLRO Letter Book QQ ff. 19, 21.

²Ibid., f. 38b.

³CJ, II, p. 559.

⁴Clarendon, I, p. 416.

CHAPTER II

THE SIX NEW REGIMENTS AND THEIR OFFICERS


The London Trained Bands, as remodelled by the Militia Committee in the spring of 1642, consisted of 40 companies grouped into six regiments. These regiments, the Red, White, Yellow, Blue, Green and Orange, were named after the colours of their ensigns, and the first four of these had seven companies each while the Green and the Orange had only six. Like the former North, South, East and West regiments, the new units were geographically based, with the various wards contributing varying numbers of men according to population and wealth. Since each ward had to produce, on average, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies, the attachment of individual companies to individual wards was rather loose; the real boundaries were between the groups of wards which made up the six regimental areas.

Although none of the official records give details of the boundaries of the regiments, it is possible to determine these from other sources. A declaration of the Militia Committee on 29 September 1642 lists the places where each company was to assemble in case of alarm during the night,¹ and we can assume that these meeting-places were within or very close to the areas which supplied the men involved. An account of a muster of the Trained Bands a year later, probably by Richard Symonds, also gives some information about the 'limitts' of most of the regiments.² Finally, we know where almost all of the captains appointed to command the companies of the reformed Trained Bands lived, and since

¹The Persons to whom the Militia of the Citie of London is Committed... hereby Declare..., 29 September 1642 (broadside) (EL 669 f 6/79).

²

'The Ensignes of the Regiments...' (BM Harl. Ms. 986). Incompletely transcribed by H.A. Dillon in *Archaeologia*, LII (1889), pp. 129-44. The attribution to Symonds is made in C.E. Long's edition of *Symonds' Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army* (1859), and I shall hereafter refer to Harl. 986 as Symonds.



THE REGIMENTAL AREAS OF THE SIX CITY TRAINED BANDS (The White Regiment's outlined in black)
(map based on that in E. Ekwall, Street-Names of the City of London (Oxford, 1954)).

Common Council required on 19 March that 'care be taken to appoint the severall Captaines chosen to such companies as may lie most convenient to their dwellings',¹ this provides further evidence of the company and regimental areas of the re-organised Trained Bands.

The six regiments were ranked according to the precedence of the aldermen who served as their colonels, which meant that the Red Regiment came first in the spring and summer of 1642. The regiment, which had dark red ensigns distinguished by white wavy rays,² was based in the east and south-east of the City. Symonds described 'the limitts of this Regiment' as 'Aldgate, Marke Lane, Tower Street, Billingsgate' - that is, the wards of Aldgate, Tower and Billingsgate. It also included Portsoken ward, which was identical with the parish of St Botolph Aldgate. From 1644 onwards, the survivors of the Red Regiment's ordeal at the first battle of Newbury attended an annual lecture of thanksgiving at St Botolph's on the anniversary of the battle, 20 September.³ The regimental area was one of mixed trades, with a certain concentration of coopers and carpenters near the Tower.⁴ Like the other five areas, it included both poor and wealthy districts: St Botolph's was 'a very large, poverty-stricken out-parish',⁵ while St Dunstan's in the East was 'a great parish of many rich merchants'.⁶

¹CLRO Letter Book QQ f. 37.

²The single wavy ray was not used to distinguish the major's ensigns in the City regiments; each bore one of the regimental devices.

³CSPD 1658-9, p. 138.

⁴J.L. Archer, The Location of London Industry 1603-1640 (University of London MA (History) thesis, 1934), appendix F.

⁵R.W. Herlan, 'Social Articulation and the Configuration of Parochial Poverty in London on the Eve of the Restoration', in Guildhall Studies in London History, II (April 1976), p. 47 n. 21.

⁶V. Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London', in The London Journal, V (1979), p. 29 n. 18.

In general, however, rich and poor were still living in the same areas at this time, and the rigid differentiation of later years had not yet developed. The parish of Allhallows Barking was a typical example of a mainly poor, low-rent parish which nevertheless included many wealthy residents¹ such as Lieutenant Colonel Marmaduke Rawdon and his son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Foster of the Blue Regiment.

The White Regiment's ensigns were distinguished with red diamonds, and Symonds described its 'limitts' as 'Cornhill, Lombard Street, Fanchurch, the upper part of Grace Church Street &c.' It included these areas and everything to the north within the City boundary - that is, the wards of Cornhill, Langbourne, Lime Street, Broad Street, and Bishopsgate. Lombard Street housed the City's greatest concentration of gold- and silversmiths, while the upholsterers were gathered around the Royal Exchange; the area outside Bishopsgate was home to large numbers of weavers, tailors, shoemakers, and glovers as well as some woodworkers.² Like other areas outside the old walls of the City, the parish of St Botolph Bishopsgate was a poor one,³ while those centred around Lombard Street and Cornhill were comparatively wealthy. The White Regiment ranked second after the Red in the spring and summer of 1642, but took precedence when its colonel, Isaac Penington, became Lord Mayor; the ranking of the six regiments varied in this way each year.

The Red and White regiments were both based in the east of the Square Mile, but the next senior unit was located in the west-central area of the City. The Yellow Trained Band, which had colours differentiated

¹
Ibid., p. 7.

²
Archer, op. cit.

³
Herlan, loc. cit.

by black mullets, was described by Symonds as being drawn from 'Cheapside, St Pauls church yard, part of Watling Street, part of Newgate Market with Ludgate, Blackfriars, &c'- that is, the wards of Farrington Within and Castle Baynard; it also included the ward of Aldersgate. There were a number of gold- and silversmiths resident near Goldsmiths' Hall and at the west end of Cheapside, but the riverside parishes of St Andrew by the Wardrobe, St Ann Blackfriars, and St Benet Paul's Wharf were poor ones housing mainly dyers, tailors and embroiderers; the parish of Christ Church, centred around the butchers' shambles in Newgate Market, was also poor.¹ The Yellow Regiment ranked first in 1643-4 during the mayoralty of its colonel, Sir John Wollaston.

The Blue Trained Band, which had colours distinguished with plates (silver or white roundels), was based in the south-central part of the City - an area which Symonds described as 'part of Thames Street beginning at St Magnus Church and reacheth to Bread Street, Dowgate, Walbrooke, Friday street & part of Watling street &c.' This comprised a number of small wards: Bridge Within, Candlewick, Dowgate, Walbrook, Vintry, Cordwainer, Cheap, Bread Street and Queenhithe. As with the southern parishes in the Yellow Regiment's area, the wards of Queenhithe and Bread Street were dominated by clothworkers, dyers, tailors and embroiderers, while there were several gold- and silver-smiths in the wards bordering Cheapside; shoemakers and coopers were scattered throughout the area.² In general, the parishes alongside the Thames were poor while those around Cheapside were wealthy.³

¹
Ibid.

²
Archer, op. cit.

³
Herlan, loc. cit.

Although the Red, White, Yellow and Blue regiments, having seven companies each, were theoretically equal in size, Symonds noted that the Blue Regiment was in fact 'the biggest Regiment of the Trained Bands, 1400 of them at Brainford and Turnham greene' in the autumn of 1642.

The Green Trained Band, which used silver calthrops to distinguish the captains' colours, was drawn from the north-central wards of the City - the wards of Coleman Street, Bassishaw and Cripplegate. Symonds described its limits as 'Coleman Street, the Stocks, Lothbury, Old Jury, part of Cheapside', but he was mistaken as far as the Stocks Market was concerned; this was part of the Blue Regiment's area. The part of Cheapside which he referred to was indeed a small one on the north side between Wood Street and Milk Street, while the rest of this thoroughfare was divided between the Blue and Yellow regiments. The Green Regiment's area was one of mixed trades, with many tailors and clothworkers in Cripplegate Ward, and as usual the parishes outside the old City walls were poor while those near the centre of the City were wealthy.¹

The junior regiment of the London Trained Bands in 1642 was the Orange, which was based in the west of the City in the large ward of Farringdon Without. Like the Green Regiment it had only six companies, and its colours were distinguished with silver or white trefoils. There is little information about the trades which dominated the ward, but most of the parishes within it were poor except for St Dunstan's in the West, which was part of the rich legal quarter surrounding the Temple.²

¹Archer, op. cit.; Herlan, loc. cit.

²Ibid.; Pearl, Change and Stability, p. 29, n. 18.

The doubling of the number of companies in the Trained Bands from 20 to 40 required the selection of a number of new captains in the spring of 1642, and may also have provided an opportunity to purge any unreliable officers from the former regiments. The Militia Committee announced to Common Council on 19 March that they had nominated 55 men, 'whereof twenty were Captaines heretofore, to th'end that out of them and such others as this Court shall think fitt, forty may be chosen for Captaines'.¹ From this it would appear that the Committee itself did not intend to eliminate any of the existing captains, but left it to Common Council to make the final choice. The Council, however, both on 19 March and again on 4 April,² refused to intervene in the selection of the officers, leaving it entirely in the hands of the Militia Committee. The Committee therefore chose the four radical aldermen among its own membership, together with two others - the wealthy Thomas Adams and the radical MP Isaac Penington - as colonels of the six regiments, ignoring the two 'lukewarm' aldermen who were members of the Committee.³ Of the 34 other captains chosen by the Committee, we cannot tell how many had been among the 20 former captains, although they certainly included a number of men with long training and service in senior positions in the HAC.

There are two printed lists of the officers of the reformed Trained Bands in 1642, although neither is precisely dated. One of these⁴ is a simple list of colonels and captains, including two or three men who soon resigned for various reasons, and apparently dates from April;

¹
CLRO Letter Book QQ f. 37.

²
Ibid.

³
Sir John Gayer and Sir Jacob Garrard, who resigned from the Committee in September.

⁴
A List of the Names of the severall Colonells (broadside)
(GL Proclamations April 1642).

the other, a better-printed list which also contains the names of the lieutenants and ensigns,¹ was produced somewhat later but before the previously mentioned list at the end of September specifying alarm-places for the individual companies.² These lists of the 'forty captains' (a term which includes the senior officers as well as the 'mere' captains) can be supplemented by information from the membership roll of the Honourable Artillery Company, showing the year in which each man began his training there,³ the list of inhabitants of each City parish in 1638,⁴ the list of financially 'able' men in each ward drawn up for taxation purposes in 1640,⁵ and Percival Boyd's notes at the Society of Genealogists, which contain details of family relationships, membership of City guilds and livery companies, and dates of election to Common Council or other City offices.⁶ Symonds also gives information concerning the homes and trades of many of the officers in the following year.⁷ All these sources are brought together in Appendix 1 to give a picture of the type of men who were chosen to lead the Trained Bands on the eve of the Civil War.

¹The Names, Dignities and Places of all the Colonels... (broadside) (BL 669 f 6/10).

²See p. 49, n. 1. This list gives a still further stage in the development of the officer corps.

³Raikes, The Ancient Vellum Book.

⁴T.C. Dale, The Inhabitants of London in 1638 (1931).

⁵W.J. Harvey, List of the Principal Inhabitants of the City of London in 1640 (Shalfleet Manor, Isle of Wight, 1969).

⁶Percival Boyd's Units: Citizens of London (at Society of Genealogists).

⁷See p. 49, n. 2.

As a group, the forty captains were among the commercial leaders of the City. Of the 34 whose guild memberships are recorded, all but three (70% of the total) were members of one of the 12 great livery companies: there were 8 Grocers, 5 Drapers, 4 Merchant Taylors, 3 each from the Mercers' and Vintners' companies, 2 Clothworkers, 2 Haberdashers, and one each from the Salters', Fishmongers', Skinners', and Goldsmiths' companies (there were no Ironmongers). Sixteen of them (40%) were also described as merchants, of whom Marmaduke Rawdon and Isaac Penington were members of the Levant Company, Rowland Wilson was¹ a member of the Guinea Company, and 7 others (18% of the total number of captains) were active in the American trade, which was associated with political and religious radicalism.² The captains appear to have been wealthy men, as one would suspect on the basis of these commercial interests; half of their names appear in the incomplete lists of 'able' inhabitants liable for taxation in 1640, and many of the rest either paid comparatively high rents in 1638 or subscribed money in the Irish Adventures of 1642. Only two are noted as perhaps being in financial difficulties: George Langham wrote in 1643 that his estate was 'of late years...much diminished',³ and Edmund Harvey was described as 'a poor silkman',⁴ although he was to do very well out of the war.

¹ Randall Mainwaring, Tucker, Thomson, Underwood, Warner, Owen Rowe, and Gower.

² R. Brenner, Commercial Change and Political Conflict: The Merchant Community in Civil War London (Princeton PhD thesis, 1970) (copy in University College London library).

³ Will in PRO, 13 Rivers 1644-5 f. 100.

⁴ by Clement Walker, quoted in D. Brunton and D.H. Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament (1954), p. 65.

Of course, the Trained Band captains were not only prominent in commerce; they were destined for high military and civic office as well. Five of them died or deserted to the King by 1644; of the remaining 35, no less than 26 (74%) attained the rank of colonel in either the Trained Bands or the army by 1647, and the remaining nine included four future lieutenant-colonels.¹ The 35 survivors also included 7 future Lord Mayors,² 16 current or future aldermen,³ 6 current or future MPs,⁴ and 3 men who would be knighted after the Restoration.⁵ Only Captain William Geere seems not to have attained some higher office - and he had left his captaincy by September 1643 anyway, possibly for reasons of health. This privileged circle of civic leaders was also a relatively close-knit one with many family or trading links between the captains: Edmund Foster was Marmaduke Rawdon's son-in-law; William Tucker was William Thomson's brother-in-law; George Langham had Edmund Harvey as a son-in-law; Rowland Wilson Jr was related by marriage to three other captains, Samuel Carleton and the brothers Owen and Francis Rowe. The City's dominant American trading partnership included not only the brothers-in-law Tucker and Thomson but also John Warner, Randall Mainwaring, and three others who would become Trained Band officers during the following two years.

1

Besides Cuthbert and Carleton, these were Francis Rowe (who held this rank while serving as Scoutmaster of the City) and Thomas Buxton, who was promoted by 1645.

2

Richard Browne added this to his other honours in 1660.

3

In addition to those shown in the table, they were Turner, Tichborne, Wilson and Browne. But the future aldermen all gained their positions in the radically changed circumstances of 1650-3.

4

Penington and Venn were already serving, and Harvey, Tichborne, Wilson and Browne were later elected.

5

Bunce, Chamberlain and Browne.

The forty captains were married men with families,¹ but their ages seem to have varied quite widely. The colonels appear to have been men in their 50s, and the lieutenant-colonels in their 40s and 50s (although Marmaduke Rawdon was 61). But among the majors, Randall Mainwaring was 54 while Samuel Carleton was 33; Chamberlain, a senior captain, was 43 while Turner was 33; Tucker, a second captain, was 53 and Harrison was at least 50, while the other second captains appear to have been in their early 40s. The third and fourth captains were men in their 30s, except for Robert Tichborne, who was about 25.² The precedence of the captains, who are listed in order of seniority in one of the lists of officers,³ did not reflect their ages but their years of service in the Artillery Garden and the desire of the Militia Committee to appoint captains living near the meeting-places of their companies wherever possible. This required a careful juggling of appointments by the Committee and was not always successful, especially with the three senior posts in each regiment, which were filled by men with well-established claims for precedence. Lieutenant Colonel George Langham of the White Regiment, for example, lived in Garlick Hill although his company was to assemble at Bishopsgate; fortunately, his own lieutenant Timothy Crusoe⁴ lived in St Helen's parish and was able to deputise for him. With the 'mere' captains it was easier to assign men to companies near their homes, although even here there were anomalies.

1

Marriages are recorded or can be assumed for all except Davis, Tucker and Robert Mainwaring, although the dates of many are unknown.

2

Face the 10 April 1643 edition of Mercurius Aulicus, which referred to him as 'a young fellow of 22 years old'.

3

The Names, Dignities and Places...

4

Ibid.

So much for the officers of the Trained Bands; what about the men? We would not expect to find as much information about the common soldiers, but the fortunate survival of a single muster roll for a single company of the Blue Trained Band,¹ when collated with the appropriate parish registers and assessment records,² sheds considerable light on who the soldiers were and how they were organised. The roll dates from November 1644 and concerns the company of Lieutenant Colonel (by then) Edward Bellamy; although called a muster roll, it is principally a list of householders responsible for providing men for the company rather than a list of soldiers as mustered in arms. After listing the company officers, it goes on to give 'the Role of the first Precinque, Dowgate Ward', showing that the first person on the list, Mr James Man, was responsible for providing two soldiers, who are named as Thomas Powell and Jacob Evans. Next, Widow Ashely and Widow Dugdale together must provide one soldier. Mr Richardson had to furnish one man. The fifth soldier, Christopher Mannering, was to be supported half by Edward Whitte, and a quarter each by John Hardy and Andrew Grimly. Other householders similarly had to supply 1/3, 1/2, 2/3 or a whole soldier to make a total of 22 men in this precinct, which was in the parish of All Hallows the Great. The second precinct (32 men) and the third (10 men) were in All Hallows the Less, while the fourth (11 men) was in St Lawrence Pountny; in each case, the precinct list is headed by the name of the Common Councilman and ends with that of the parish constable. The systematic

¹PRO SP 28 121A part 5 ff. 677b-682.

²Registers of St Martin Orgar (Harl. Soc. Regs. LXVIII), All Hallows the Less (GL Ms 5160/1), St Lawrence Pountny (GL Ms 7670), St Magnus (GL Ms 11361), St Michael Crooked Lane (GL Ms 11367); Dale, op. cit.

approach to the raising of the soldiers is seen most clearly in the list of sponsors of the 16 men in Lieutenant Colonel Bellamy's own precinct, which was in Thames Street in the parish of St Magnus. The first five or six persons listed all lived on the north side of Thames Street, and the rest on the south side; presumably the Common Councilmen and officers made their assessment on a house-by-house basis, taking the houses in order along each street of each precinct.

Unfortunately, there are only eleven cases where the list gives the name of the man who served on behalf of the householder or householders named in the precinct assessment.¹ It may be that, in the other cases, the householder himself (or one of them) actually served in person; we cannot tell. It seems likely that they would have hired men to serve for them if possible, since the principle of substitution was well accepted; there are several references to the problems created on campaigns by the preponderance of hired men in the ranks. The householders were, after all, tradesmen with families; in the fourth precinct in the parish of St Lawrence Pountney, the 15 persons responsible for supplying soldiers included three clothworkers, two merchants, a wine cooper, a clerk, a silk dyer, a threadman, and a plasterer; the twelve family men had baptised a total of 55 children, and more were on the way. Of the 11 named soldiers in Bellamy's company, one served on behalf of his father; none of the others appear in the parish registers or tax assessments, which suggests that they were propertyless and probably unmarried hirelings. This sample is admittedly a small one, but if it is representative then it goes some way towards explaining the problems of discipline and morale in the Trained Bands in the later months of the Civil War.

CHAPTER III

PREPARING FOR WAR

The first general muster of the reformed Trained Bands in Finsbury Fields on 10 May 1642 was planned to be an event of great national significance. For the radical Militia Committee, it was designed to demonstrate the City's wholehearted support for the Parliamentary cause and its willingness to take up arms in the defence of the cause; for the Parliamentary leaders, it would also prove that the newly passed Militia Ordinance was being put into effect and would give a lead for the counties to follow. As Clarendon explained it, although the leadership 'had before sufficient evidence of the inclinations of the mean and common people to them, and reasonable assurance that those in authority would hardly be able to contain them, yet till this day they had no instance of the concurrence of the City in an act expressly unlawful'.¹ Accordingly, the muster was to take the form of a public celebration attended by thousands of citizens and by many members of both Houses - the latter being accommodated in a specially erected tent and entertained by the City at enormous cost (£1000 according to Clarendon;² £368 according to the City accounts³).

The muster duly took place without mishap, at least in the sense that none of the 8000 men of the Trained Bands sustained injuries during the skirmishing. The occasion was nevertheless marred by an unfortunate incident which was to provide valuable material for Royalist satirists during the Civil War. It seems that Alderman Thomas Atkins, the colonel of the Red Trained Band, proudly sitting

¹Clarendon, I, p. 416.

²Ibid.

³CLRO MS. 86.5.

his horse at the head of his newly enlarged regiment, was surprised by a sudden discharge of musketry. A manuscript sheet of verses entered into the State Papers under the date 16 May takes up the story:

'I sing the strange adventure and sad fate
Which did befall a colonel of late,
A portly squire, a war-like hardy wight,
And pity 'tis you cannot call him knight...
Before the worthies and the rest beside,
Who saw how he his courser did bestride,
Wielding his truncheon like a weaver's beam -
And yet beshit himself in every seam!
I cannot say how fair he was i'the cradle,
But sure I am that he was foul i'the saddle.
For feats of arms none could come near him then,
He smelt so strong, and when eight thousand men
Discharg'd their muskets, he discharged too.
...is this the prince
Of the six City colonels? In good time
Then say that shitten luck is good, and I
Will put it to the vote of chivalry
Whether all be not likely well to jump
I'the new Militia when a turd is trump.'¹

A year and a half later, Mercurius Aulicus would refer to the time when Atkins 'was troubled with a yearning in his bowels'.² The aldermanic colonels of the London Trained Bands were, of course, appointed for political rather than military reasons, and perhaps it is not surprising that neither Atkins nor any of the other aldermen ever actually led their regiments on campaign during the war.

In general, however, the 'triumphant muster'³ of 10 May was a great success, and a week later a delegation from both Houses went to Common Council to return thanks to the City for this demonstration.⁴ It also had the desired effect of encouraging the 'well-affected' in

¹CSPD 1641-3, p. 323.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 28 September 1643; cf. Pearl, p. 312, n. 28.

³Clarendon, I, p. 416.

⁴Sharpe, p. 166.

the counties to put the Militia Ordinance into effect, and during the following weeks the preparations for war continued on both sides. The King's formation of a bodyguard at York led to Parliament's agreement on 10 June to propositions for bringing in money and plate to maintain a cavalry force. The London Trained Bands, meanwhile, remained responsible for guarding the Houses of Parliament, and an attempt was made on 13 June to identify defaulters; the Lords ordered a list to be drawn up of those citizens who 'find their own arms, or are appointed to wear other men's arms, and either refuse or do not attend the Parliament Houses or the several trainings'.¹ On 24 June, Parliament ordered the Militia Committee to take charge of the arms and ammunition recently brought to the City from Hull and to store them in Leadenhall, Blackwell Hall, Guildhall, Apothecaries' Hall, Leathersellers' Hall, or other places as they thought fit.² Early in July the Commons debated various proposals for raising volunteers for the service of Parliament, and on 12 July both Houses finally voted to create an army to be commanded by the Earl of Essex and resolved 'to live and die with him'.

The citizens of London responded with enthusiasm to the appeal for volunteers, and Common Council was ordered to appoint commissioners to assist Essex in the enlistments at the New Artillery Garden near Finsbury Fields on Tuesday 26 July. According to one newsbook, 5000 citizens were listed on that day and 3000 apprentices two days later, after the Lords had declared that they would automatically receive their freedoms on discharge from the army at the end of the conflict.³

¹LJ, V, p. 130.

²CJ, II, p. 641.

³A Perfect Diurnal of the Passages in Parliament, 25 July-1 August (E202/28).

On the following Wednesday the Houses adjourned to watch the exercising of some of the new troops of horse in Tothill Fields, while one of the Trained Bands mustered for training in Finsbury Fields.¹ The military enthusiasm of the citizens extended even to the children, for on 4 August 'a company of boys came with a drum to the Abbey in Westminster, and in the middle of divine service, the organs then playing, very irreverently came into the church and... fell a-dancing with their hats on'.²

Other measures were meanwhile being undertaken by the Trained Bands to secure the City from attack. London and its suburbs were ordered to be searched for suspicious persons,³ resulting in the following report to the House of Commons on 17 August:

'At the house of the Queen's picturer in London hath been seen several parties of about forty persons at a time, and the house by the Trained Bands being begirt and entered, they privately conveyed themselves away, and narrow search being made about the house, they found a private way down into a vault under the ground, in which they might go a quarter of a mile, leading them to the Thames-side where they might privately take boat and escape'.⁴

A week later,

'report was made to the House of Commons that in the house of one Mr Molleins in Baldwin's Gardens near Gray's Inn Lane, being searched by some of the Trained Bands, was found ammunition for 20 men, 2 great pieces of ordnance, one culverin, one great murdering-piece, and four small brass murdering-pieces'.⁵

Within each parish of the City, posts and chains were ordered to be set up or repaired to barricade the streets in case of enemy attack.⁶

¹Ibid., 1-8 August (E202/32).

²Ibid.

³Ibid. (E202/31).

⁴An Exact and True Diurnall, 15-22 August (E202/38).

⁵Ibid., 22-29 August (E202/39).

⁶A Perfect Diurnal, 12-19 September (E240/3).

The newly raised regiments of the Parliamentary army needed officers to command them, and an obvious source of supply was the Honourable Artillery Company - the most active members of which were already serving in the Trained Bands. Colonel Denzil Holles recruited two Trained Band lieutenants¹ to serve as captains over the apprentice butchers and dyers who were to make up his regiment, and one of them soon rose to become lieutenant-colonel after the cashiering of the 'goddam blade' who originally held that post.² Colonel John Hampden similarly obtained the services of a Trained Band lieutenant³ as one of his captains, and also acquired Captain-Lieutenant William Barriffe, already the author of a celebrated drill book, as his major.⁴ It might appear surprising that only these four Trained Band subalterns joined the regular army in the late summer; the explanation probably lies in the widely held belief that Essex's army would make short work of the Cavaliers and the war would be over by Christmas.

Attitudes among the London officers soon changed as news of the Royalist army's size and its movement towards the capital became known. By the middle of September, Captain Richard Browne of the Orange Regiment was raising a force of dragoons for the Parliamentary army, and he soon appointed his lieutenant, Nathaniel Whetham, as a captain in this new regiment, of which he himself became colonel.⁵

¹George Hurlock of the Blue Regiment and William Burles of the Yellow (PRO SP 28 4 f. 110).

²PRO SP 28 5 f. 24; N. Wharton, 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer', in Archaeologia, XXXV (1854), p. 313.

³Robert Farrington of the Yellow Regiment (PRO SP 28 2A part 2 f. 259).

⁴PRO SP 28 2B part 1 f. 330; W. Barriffe, Military Discipline, or the Yong Artillery Man (1635).

⁵England's Memorable Accidents, 12-19 September (E240/2); PRO SP 28 4 f. 223.

In the following month, Parliament resolved to raise a second army specifically to guard the capital; the Earl of Warwick was named commander-in-chief and a number of new regiments were quickly recruited in London and Essex. This time, the officers of the London Trained Bands eagerly accepted commissions as captains in the new units. Lieutenant-Colonel John Venn of the Yellow Regiment was named a colonel in Warwick's army, and he took with him Captain Thomas Buxton of the Orange Regiment, Captain-Lieutenant Jonathan Gauthorn of the Red, and Lieutenant William Stackhouse of the Green.¹ Philip Skippon, now the Earl of Essex's Sergeant-Major-General, was also asked to raise a regiment in the City, and he called upon Lieutenant Roger Clay and Ensign Ralph Tasker of the Green Regiment, as well as Lieutenant Samuel Turner of the Yellow, to serve among his captains.² Lieutenant-Colonel George Langham of the White Trained Band, on being named to the colonelcy of a regiment in the new army, recruited Captain Samuel Carleton of the Blue Trained Band as his second-in-command, and his captains included the former Lieutenant Timothy Crusoe and Ensign Robert Thomson of the White Regiment, Lieutenant Thomas Jackson of the Green, and Lieutenant Thomas Clarke of the Red.³ Finally, Lieutenant John Fenton of the Yellow Trained Band and Ensign Thomas Pride of the Orange were given captaincies in the new regiment of Colonel Henry Barclay.⁴

The positions left vacant by the departing Trained Band officers could be filled relatively easily through the promotion of subalterns

¹ PRO SP 28 262 part 2 f. 219.

² PRO SP 28 3B part 1 f. 400.

³ PRO SP 28 6 part 2 ff. 215, 294; PRO SP 28 140 part 16.

⁴ PRO SP 28 262 part 3 f. 448.

and the granting of commissions to recent graduates of the Artillery Garden, but there were also vacancies in the 'other ranks'. The Commons heard on 15 September that 'divers Citizens &c. who were well able to maintain Arms are not of body to beare them, and that other some are able in body, but not able to buy them...and that there are divers Gentlemen and others who have been charged to maintain arms, as 1, 2, 3 a man, have refused and are gone to their country houses, leaving behind them neither Arms nor men in their absence to supply their places'.¹ It was therefore ordered that new lists should be prepared of 'the names of the ablest and sufficientest men of all parishes, as well inmates as house-keepers, to carry Arms as shall be appointed them, and to enrole them in the number of the trained bands'.² Service in the City forces was thus no longer to be restricted to householders, and since there was apparently no procedure laid down for determining whether or not a man was able-bodied, the practice of paying substitutes probably became widespread. In the following month, Common Council specified that '12d a day and 12d a night be paid by owners of arms to those poore men who borrow them for service, on presentation of a ticket certifying good service signed by the captain'.³ As we shall see, the Trained Bands contained large numbers of 'hired men' on campaign as well as on guard duties in London, and this was to have important effects on the morale and performance of the London regiments.

¹A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 12-19 September (E240/3).

²Ibid.

³Common Council Journal 40 f. 40b.

Inability to bear arms and absence from the City were not the only reasons for non-attendance at musters, however; some of the citizens were simply unwilling to appear. On 23 September the Lord Mayor and Aldermen noted that 'when they are commanded forth upon the service of this City...a very small number of men inrolled do make their appearance, and some of them appearing do depart from their colours before they be lodged, in contempt and great neglect of the said service';¹ the constables in each ward were accordingly ordered to enforce attendance by the reluctant. In the following month, when Parliament proposed that 50 men from each company should be drawn forth to join with forces from the Home Counties to guard the approaches to the capital, the suggestion was 'for the major part consented unto by every company, onely some few that did make some excuses, and desired to be exempted from going any further than to attend upon their Captains'.² There was no such hesitation on the part of the 40 captains themselves, and in a ceremony at Guildhall on 16 October they 'unanimously entred into a solemne resolution to live and die with the Parliament, and to oblige themselves the more strictly thereunto, they all tooke the Protestation again'.³

The Earl of Essex had meanwhile left the City to take charge of the main Parliamentary army on 9 September, and his departure had been treated as a civic occasion: 'The Lord Generall tooke horse at Temple Barr...guarded with most of the Trained Bands of the City of London,

¹A Warrant...to all the Trained Bands of London (1642) (E118/29).

²Certain Propositions...for the drawing out of fiftie in a Company (17 October 1642) (E123/24).

³England's Memorable Accidents, 17-24 October (E240/45).

in this manner riding from Temple Barre to Ludgate, from thence through Pauls church-yard into Cheapside, and so along to the Royall Exchange, turning downe from thence to Moore-gate and through that towards Islington'.¹ Essex went first to his headquarters at St Albans and then met his forces at Northampton and led them to Worcester, where they waited for the Royalists to move from their own headquarters at Shrewsbury. That move finally came on 12 October, but it was not in the direction of Worcester; instead, the Royalist army began marching straight towards the capital. It was the news of this threat which prompted the proposal to draw out 50 men from each company of the Trained Bands for service in the Home Counties.

Common Council, having considered the proposal and the reaction to it among the men of the Trained Bands, resolved instead that 12 complete companies should be chosen by lot to go out, commanded by their own captains to ensure cohesion and discipline. On 23 October, the day of the battle of Edgehill, the two chosen companies from each of the six Trained Bands² marched out to secure Windsor Castle against the advancing Royalists.³ Their stay at Windsor was short, partly because the local militia forces soon arrived to guard the town and castle, and partly because news soon reached London that Essex's army was on its way back in front of the enemy. On 25 October, therefore, the 12 companies returned to London, bringing

¹Remarkable Passages, 5-12 September (E202/44).

²Mainwaring's and Hooker's from the Red, Player's and Harvey's from the White, Geere's and Tichborne's from the Yellow, Foster's and Blackwell's from the Blue, Forster's and Owen Rowe's from the Green, and Wilson's and Buxton's from the Orange. Common Council Journal 40 f. 40b.

³England's Memorable Accidents, 24-31 October (E240/49).

with them £3000 worth of plate and money 'which they found in the Towne and Castle; the most of it is said to belong to the King and the Cathedral [sic] there'.¹ Four days later, a further change occurred when the new army regiment of Colonel John Venn, recruited in London and captained partly by former Trained Band officers, was sent to Windsor as a permanent garrison.

Other frantic preparations for the defence of the City were also being made during the week following the battle of Edgehill. Courts of guard were ordered to be set up in each parish, and it was laid down that 'a competent number of the Trained Bands and Voluntiers belonging to every Parish shall day and night attend with their Armes in or neere to their Court of Guard, and shall seize and arrest all suspicious persons, Ammunition or Armes passing through their Parishes'.² The sheds lining the outside of the old City walls were ordered to be pulled down, and all horses in the City were to be listed.³ The Trained Bands were to take 'vigilant care of any conspiracy against the City whether by fire or otherwise, and there should be Pieces of Ordnance taken from Tower-hill and be planted in severall places of the City'.⁴ Meanwhile, the citizens were busily constructing trenches and ramparts 'neere all the Roads and highwaies that come to the City, as about St James, St Gyles in the fields, beyond Islington, and about Pancras Church in the fields... and the Saylor are raysing of a Mount and Trenches at Mile-end-green

¹Ibid.

²A Collection of Speciall Passages, 17 October-1 November (E242/2).

³CJ, II, p. 826; LJ, V, p. 416.

⁴England's Memorable Accidents, 24-31 October (E240/49).

neere Stepney, where women of good fashion and others, as also children, labour hard at the worke'.¹ On 25 October 'all the shops in and about London were shut by order from the Parliament, and every man was commanded to forbear his Trade and imployment, that so with the more freedome and diligence they might secure and defend the City and Suburbs.... In obedience to this Order, divers of the Trained Bands watched and walked their rounds in and about London, and many hundreds of people laboured hard at the new fortifications'.² On that Saturday night the City's leading Royalists were rounded up: 'That evening the Trained Bands of London...apprehended divers Malignants in severall wards in London, some of them being Aldermen and other cittizens of good worth and divers of the Malignant Clergy';³ these were imprisoned in Crosby House in Bishopsgate Street.⁴

The King's army moved more slowly than expected on its march towards London and the immediate crisis passed, but 20 companies of the Trained Bands continued to watch the City each night for the next fortnight while Essex hurried back to defend the capital. Colonel Venn's forces in Windsor Castle held off a Royalist attack on 7 November, but five days later the two London-raised infantry regiments of Essex's army - those of Lord Brooke and Denzil Holles - were destroyed by Prince Rupert's forces at Brentford; 'the Trained Bands of the City of London that night stood all upon their guard and secured the Citie and Outworkes, and a great manie of them that night

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³A Collection of Speciall Passages, 17 October-1 November (E242/2).

⁴For list see CSPD 1641-3, p. 403.

and the next morning went out towards Brainford'.¹ Bulstrode

Whitelock takes up the story with his well-known description of the

Trained Bands at Turnham Green on 13 November:

'The City Bands marched forth very chearfully under the Command of Major Generall Skippon, who made short, and encouraging Speeches to his Souldiers, which were to this purpose: "Come my Boys, my brave Boys, let us pray heartily and fight heartily; I will run the same fortunes and hazards with you, remember the Cause is for God, and for the defence of your selves, your wives and children; Come my honest brave Boys, pray heartily and fight heartily, and God will bless us". Thus he went all along with the Souldiers, talking to them, sometimes to one Company, and sometimes to another....the Foot of the Army were in good plight, and well Armed, and were placed in the Body one Regiment of them, and another of the City Band, one by another, and some were left for reserves....when /Essex/ had spoken to them, the Souldiers would throw up their Capps and shout, crying "Hey for old Robin".... The City Cood-wives, and others, mindfull of their Husbands and Friends, sent many Cart loads of Provisions, and Wines, and good things to Turnham-green, with which the Souldiers were refreshed and made merry'.²

In the end, the Royalist army withdrew and left the troops to enjoy their picnic.

Whitelock's account implies that the London Trained Bands were eager and enthusiastic supporters of the Parliamentary cause, but this is not the whole story. He also notes that 'the City were in much trouble, and different Opinions' when the request for support from the Trained Bands came down from Parliament; it was Lord Mayor Pennington and the Militia Committee who succeeded in obtaining a favourable response from Common Council.³ Clarendon later recalled that he had 'heard many knowing Men, and some who were then in the City Regiments, say that if the King had advanced, and charged that Massive body, it had presently given ground, and that the King had

¹ A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages,
12-17 November (E242/24).

² Whitelock, p. 62.

³ Ibid.

so great a Party in every Regiment, that they would have made no resistance'.¹ Parliament also took the precaution of ordering the Lord Mayor 'to disarm all such of the trained Bands or others that should refuse to go out'.² But there are no records to show whether any were in fact disarmed, and the extent of Royalist sympathies among the men of the Trained Bands cannot be proved.

On the Friday after Turnham Green there was a plan to send three regiments of the Trained Bands to Blackheath, where they would join with the Kentish militia to help protect that county from plundering by the King's army. In the event, however, the Royalists retreated into Berkshire and the London forces remained at home.³ They were not called upon to take the field again until the following year's campaigning was well under way, although their guard duties in the City continued throughout the winter and they were occasionally involved in searching the homes of 'malignants' or escorting Royalist prisoners of war into the City. But the events of 1642 had brought important changes in the London Trained Bands: they were now under the control of a Militia Committee comprising some of the City's most radical supporters of Parliament; they were commanded by officers whom the Militia Committee trusted; service was no longer restricted to 'substantial' householders; substitution was accepted; and the Trained Bands could be ordered to march out of the City and fight anywhere in the kingdom. None of them had yet been killed or wounded in battle - but it was now obvious that the war would not be over by Christmas after all.

¹Clarendon, II, p. 58.

²A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages,
12-17 November (E242/14).

³A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 14-21 November
(E242/13).

CHAPTER IV

THE RAISING OF THE AUXILIARIES

The citizens' enthusiasm for the Parliamentary cause waned in the closing weeks of 1642. Contrary to expectation, Essex's army had failed to end the war at a stroke; the continuation of the fighting was causing increasing disruption of trade; and Parliament was introducing new taxes to pay for the army as the voluntary contributions ran out. The attempts of many citizens to remain neutral were countered by an ordinance on 29 November 'for the assessing of all such as have not contributed...proportionable to their estates', authorising Parliamentary commissioners to seize up to 5% of the total estates (not incomes) of defaulters.¹ Anti-war opinion grew rapidly, and on 9 December there was an assembly of 'malignants and neuters' at Guildhall to petition for peace.² Three days later there was a much larger and more serious demonstration, and the militia had to be called out: 'A great part of the Trained Bands were raised to allay the Tumult, at whose appearance the Malignants shutt themselves in Guildhall, and the doores threatned to be blowne open upon them if they refused to submit, so that at length they were enforced to open the doores, and divers of the chiefs of them were seized upon and carried to prison'.³ The threat to blow open the doors had been backed up with two pieces of ordnance, and it was presumably the sight of these which persuaded the 'malignants'

¹ E. Husbands, An Exact Collection...(1643), p. 764.

² A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 5-12 December (E244/8).

³ A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 12-15 December (E244/11).

⁴ The Image of the Malignants Peace (1642) (E244/12).

to surrender. Before doing so, however, they had the pleasure of beating up the unfortunate quartermaster of Colonel John Venn's regiment, the Windsor garrison, who was 'abused by one who came to him, tooke him by the Throate, and coller of the Dublet, shooke him, called him Windsore Reformado, Roundheaded rogue; and divers of the said tumult closed to him, struck up his heeles, violently tooke away his Sword, and...kickt him downe three steps'.¹

Despite the violent behaviour of the peace petitioners, Common Council agreed to ask both the King and Parliament for a cessation of hostilities. Parliament gave permission for a deputation to travel to Oxford with their petition, and on 13 January 1643 a meeting of Common Hall was held, with a Trained Band unit in attendance, to hear the reading of the King's reply. But the royal response gave no hint of compromise: after pointing out that the City government was 'now submitted to the arbitrary power of a few desperate persons of no reputation but for malice and disloyalty', it went on to demand the arrest of Lord Mayor Penington and three other prominent radicals. The King's uncompromising attitude, together with the speeches made in reply by John Pym and the Earl of Manchester, persuaded the citizens to resolve once again to live and die with Parliament.²

Support for the continuation of the war was particularly strong among the officers of the Trained Bands, as they showed three weeks later when Parliament was in the midst of its own debate concerning a cessation of the fighting:

'Some of the Captaines of the Citie came unto the House, and delivered a paper wherein they tooke notice of His Majesties Answere, desired that neither treaty nor Cessation might be

¹Ibid.

²Sharpe, p. 180; Pearl, pp. 256-7.

yeelded to, directing in a manner what they would have done. An insolence which at another time, and from other persons, would have been counted a notable breach of Priviledge....And yet there was some reason, as it seemed at first, to make them take the matter with the lesse disdaine, which was an offer made by those Captaines in the name of the City to raise £100,000 of present money if the cessation were declined and the Treaty dashed'.¹

Following the breakdown of the peace negotiations in February, the City authorities submitted to Parliament a proposal for a new and more substantial series of fortifications around the capital. This plan was approved at the end of the month, and Parliament granted the City a reduction in its weekly assessment for the pay of the army in order to provide money for the construction of the new forts.² Work began in March and continued through May, and once again there was plenty of enthusiastic voluntary labour available; men, women and children all helped in the digging throughout the month of May, often marching out with their own drums and colours after the example of the Trained Bands.³


Building the fortifications was one thing, but they also had to be manned - and they were 11 miles long, the most extensive system of defences in Europe.⁴ Even with the aid of the suburban militias, the Trained Bands could not man these defences day and night without relief, and if they attempted to do so they could never be drawn out from the City to support the army in an emergency. This problem had

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 16 February.

²Sharpe, pp. 182-4. The captains' promise of £100,000 from the City had by now become a loan of £60,000, and even then the City authorities were worried about the lack of security for this loan and the difficulty in collecting the weekly assessment (Ibid.).

³Mercurius Aulicus, 10 May; Mercurius Civicus, 4-11 May (E100/15); Ibid., 25 May-1 June (E104/25); W. Lithgow, The Present Surveigh of London and Englands State (1645), reprinted in Somers Tracts (1310), vol. 4, p. 538.

⁴D. Sturdy, 'The Civil War Defences of London', in The London Archaeologist, Winter 1974-5, p. 334.



MAP OF LONDON AND ENVIRONS, SHOWING THE 1643 FORTIFICATIONS (from The Ordnance Survey Map of 17th-Century England (1930)).

been foreseen in November 1642, when the City had attempted to raise 'another Army to defend and secure themselves from Malignants amongst them, if the Trained Bands should be forced to march out of it to repell the Enemie'.¹ This plan for a reserve army to be commanded by the Earl of Warwick was unsuccessful, however, and most of the regiments raised for it, in London as elsewhere, were simply incorporated into Essex's main army. In March 1643 those regiments could not be spared by Essex, and yet the need for men to defend the London fortifications was greater than ever - and then on 11 March a committee of the House of Commons came to the City to ask for a further supply of men and money for Essex's army as well. Lord Mayor Penington pointed out that there were already difficulties in collecting the promised £60,000 loan because 'men of ability did refuse to lend and they had no means to enforce them'.² As for men, Penington noted that the City had already contributed forces supposedly raised for its own defence to Essex's army and to supply a garrison for Windsor, leaving only one regular army regiment in London for the protection of the City, besides the Trained Bands; nothing could be done to raise more men for Essex.³

In the meantime, a self-appointed group of radicals within the City had been considering the problem of manning the fortifications. Their suggestion was to recruit young men and apprentices as volunteers, serving on a part-time basis, on similar terms to those of their

¹England's Memorable Accidents, 7-14 November 1642 (E242/10).

²Pearl, p. 260.

³It is curious that Penington claimed only one regiment in Essex's army, besides those of John Venn at Windsor and Randall Mainwaring in London, since the army regiments of Henry Barclay, George Langham and Philip Skippon were all apparently raised for the defence of London as part of Warwick's projected army in the autumn of 1642 and all were with Essex in the spring of 1643.

masters and elders in the Trained Bands. As early as 9 March the Royalist journal Mercurius Aulicus, in describing the London defences, had observed that 'for the perfecting of these workes, being vast and great, they have not onely multitudes of people kept at worke of late, but they goe from house to house, to list and perswade all the Apprentices, and others of able bodies, to man those workes, whensoever they shall be called unto it'. The radicals had as yet no official backing for their recruiting efforts, but now they seized the opportunity offered by the Commons' request to the City for more men: on 15 March they announced their willingness to raise 10,000 volunteers at their own expense, to be paid only while on duty, asking only for a small sum to pay for drums and colours for the new units. This offer was gladly accepted by Common Council, and the radical proposers were officially named as a subcommittee of the Militia Committee and authorised to meet at Salters' Hall for the purpose of recruiting the volunteers.¹ Parliament confirmed the Militia Committee's authority to raise the new units, described as 'auxiliaries to the Trained Bands', in an ordinance on 12 April.² It is not clear whether the Houses were aware of the radicals' promise to their volunteers that they would not be liable for service outside the City; Pym admitted in August that he had been aware of this proviso,³ but the ordinance of 12 April did not specify any such limitation. Like the Trained Bands before them, the Auxiliaries would soon learn that 'now they are raised we may dispose of them whither we please without asking their consent'.⁴

¹ Sharpe, p. 186.

² LJ, V, p. 716; CJ, III, p. 40.

³ Mercurius Aulicus, 22 August.

⁴ Ibid. (Mr Solicitor in a Commons debate).

The radicals' promise that the Auxiliaries would be paid 'at their own expense' did not mean that the proposers would personally pay for the services of 10,000 men, but that they would solicit voluntary subscriptions. Mercurius Aulicus on 29 March described the methods involved and their purpose:

'This day it was advertised from London...that they are fallen upon a resolution not to employ any more Gentlemen in the Action, nor to measure men's abilities by their skill in Warre, but their Zeale and interest in the Cause...they are upon a way of charging every House-keeper in the Citie to maintaine one of his Apprentices with Armes, ready on all occasions to defend the Citie, or to go forth against the enemie, these to be trained twice a weeke, many Commanders being chosen, and others nominated for that purpose. By meanes whereof they hope to have an Army of 10,000 men, maintained and armed without their charge.'

Again, on 10 April, Mercurius Aulicus reported,

'It was advertised from London...that they employ Apprentices, such as are fashioned to their ends, to perswade their fellowes, not onely to contribute money, but to give away their shirts, shooes, and stockings for the maintaining and clothing of their Souldiers, practising by some zealous sisters on the affections of their neighbour women to do so also.'

The Subcommittee had been authorised to recruit seven infantry regiments, the counterparts of the six City Trained Bands and one for the Tower Hamlets.¹ These units were armed partly through an appeal to the livery companies and the East India Company for loans of weapons, which were brought into Salters' Hall to await distribution,² and partly by new purchases of arms.³ More significant was the supply of officers for the auxiliary regiments; the radicals who comprised the Subcommittee were especially concerned that the volunteer units should be led by 'known and trusted' men - known, as Mercurius Aulicus noted, for their 'zeale and interest in the Cause' rather than their skill in war or their social status. Unfortunately we do not have a list of

¹PRO SP 28 198 part 1 (2).

²Sharpe, pp. 186-7.

³PRO SP 28 198 part 1 (2).

these officers, but we do know the names of five of the seven colonels of the Auxiliaries in 1643: Thomas Gower, Edward Hooker, Christopher Whichcott, Robert Tichborne, and (in the Tower Hamlets) William Willoughby.¹ All of these were Trained Band captains, holding their new colonelcies in plurality with their existing appointments, and all of them would play leading roles in City affairs in the coming years, although the first two would be strong Presbyterians while the others would be Independents and supporters of the army. The major of the Orange Auxiliaries in 1644 would be Thomas Pride, who had been an ensign in the Trained Bands in 1642, and many other officers of the Auxiliaries were probably chosen from among the 'godly' group of Trained Band subalterns.

The Subcommittee for Volunteers was now busily recruiting young men for service in the ranks of the Auxiliaries, and early in May it proposed to regularise the system of voluntary subscriptions by asking supporters to contribute the value of one meal per week. The proceeds of this collection would go towards the support of the Auxiliaries, who could thereby be brought up to strength and placed on a good financial basis under officers appointed by the Subcommittee without reference to higher authority. In this way, the Subcommittee would control its own military force of 'honest and well-affected persons...under command of known and trusted officers'. But the Militia Committee, alarmed by this threat of an independent military force and peeved by the implied criticism of its own choice of officers for the Trained Bands, denied that the Subcommittee had the right to solicit subscriptions and appoint officers without approval from the Militia Committee itself. The dispute was taken to Common

¹Ibid.

Council and resolved in July in favour of the Militia Committee, although seven nominees from the Subcommittee were added to the membership of the Militia Committee as a sop to the radicals.¹

It is not clear how quickly the ranks of the Auxiliary regiments were filled. A report of a muster on 13 April speaks of 'three Regiments of stout men',² but another report on 30 May mentions 'the Regiment of young men who were lately raised in the City for the guard of it'.³ A third report on 21 July refers to 'the New-Company of young-men lately raised about the Citie'.⁴ By late August the six City Auxiliary regiments were theoretically up to strength and three of them marched out on campaign, but a month later Sir William Waller decided that two of the remaining units were too small to be worth taking with him on a separate expedition.⁵ By October they were all complete.

Information concerning the organisation and composition of the Auxiliaries is provided by the chance survival of the muster rolls of five companies of the Red Auxiliaries in April 1644. On 27 April the regiment was guarding the fortifications in Southwark (where the soldiers arrested 'a French Monsieur')⁶, and rolls were drawn up. These show that the senior officers of the regiment at that time

¹Pearl, pp. 267-8. The seven included Major Richard Turner junior, Lieut. Col. Robert Tichborne, Capt. Thomas Player senior, and Major Samuel Harsnett. All of these were officers in the Auxiliaries, and the first three at least were also officers in the Trained Bands (Common Council Journal 40 f. 67).

²A Perfect Diurnal of the Passages in Parliament, 10-17 April (E247/25).

³Mercurius Civicus, 25 May-1 June (E104/25).

⁴The Speciall Passages Continued, 10-22 July (E61/15).

⁵The Parliament Scout, 22-29 September (E69/12).

⁶Mercurius Civicus, 25 April-2 May 1644 (E45/1).

were Colonel Samuel Harsnett, a Grocer in Bartholomew Lane near the Royal Exchange; Lieut. Col. Henry Lee,¹ who cannot be positively identified; Major John Alsop, a sword-cutler and member of the Blacksmiths' Company living in the parish of St Bride, Fleet Street; and captains John Andrews and Moses Meares, of whom nothing is known. The fact that there may have been only these five companies, with strengths ranging from about 40 up to a maximum of 66 soldiers, shows that the Red Auxiliaries were well under strength at this time.²

The survival of one of these muster rolls together with the corresponding parish register gives us some insight into the sort of men who made up the Auxiliaries. Captain Moses Meares's roll gives the street in which each soldier lived and sometimes the name of his master; among the employers were a Chandler at Holborn Bridge; a carpenter in Cockpit Yard off Shoe Lane; a Chandler in Fetter Lane; a Lorimer in Castel Yard (now Fournival Street), Holborn; and a shoe-maker near Staple Inn. As for the soldiers themselves, Richard Humphreys was aged 20, Stephen Clay was 18, Corporal Abraham Parrett was 28, and Drummer Isaac Tillotson was 22.³ This information confirms that the soldiers in the Auxiliaries were apprentices rather than householders, and also makes it clear that the recruiting areas of the six City Auxiliary regiments did not correspond with those of the Trained Band units flying similar colours and bearing similar names.⁴

¹ Lee's regiment is not stated, but his rank and the date of the roll make it likely that this was the Red Auxiliaries.

² PRO SP 28 121A part 5 ff. 691, 693, 690, 621, 620.

³ Meares's roll, PRO SP 28 121A part 5 f. 620; parish register, St Andrew Holborn, GL Ms 6667/1.

⁴ Meares's company of the Red Auxiliaries was based in Holborn, while the Red Trained Band was raised in the east and southeast of the City.

Another regiment of apprentices active in London deserves special notice here, because it had quite different origins from the Auxiliary units raised in the spring and summer of 1643. Major Randall Mainwaring of the Red Trained Band, a prominent member of the Militia Committee who was chosen as Deputy Lord Mayor to Isaac Penington in August 1642¹ and Sergeant Major General of the City after Skippon's departure to join Essex's army in October,² raised a new regiment for Warwick's projected reserve army in the latter month. On 30 October his regiment was issued with 1200 red coats with white trim,³ and on 3 November the regiment of 1200 men received two weeks' pay, having by then entered into service with the army.⁴ But unlike the other newly raised units, Mainwaring's Redcoats were not sent to join Essex in the field after Warwick's resignation and the breaking up of his reserve army; instead they remained in the capital throughout the winter of 1642-3. Mainwaring, as Sergeant Major General of the City, was responsible for the policing of London, and he regularly used his own Redcoats for this purpose during the winter; the part-timers of the Trained Bands were only called out on special occasions such as the riot at Guildhall in December 1642 by 'malignants and neuters' petitioning for peace. In February the Redcoats were busy plundering the houses of malignants, and Mercurius Aulicus reported on 13 February that they were 'in effect become Masters of the Citie'. On the following Sunday, as the Redcoats were guarding Lambeth Palace, one of them caused an affray by refusing to doff his

¹Pearl, p. 323.

²The Image of the Malignants Peace (1642), quoted in N. Wallington, Historical Notices (1369).

³PRO SP 28 261 part 3 f. 296.

⁴PRO SP 28 262 part 3 f. 468.

hat in St Mary's church; before the day was over, one local citizen had been shot dead by the soldiers.¹ In March they were led by Mainwaring into Southwark to deal with a disturbance in connection with the sequestration of malignants' estates.² They remained on duty in the City until at least January 1644, taking part in the expeditions to Sevenoaks, Gloucester and Newport Pagnell along with the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries, and at the beginning of 1644 they were still being referred to as 'the Regiment of Redcoats belonging to the Citie'.³

The existence of Mainwaring's Redcoats has led to some confusion in contemporary sources. In Richard Symonds's notes on the muster of the City forces in September 1643,⁴ he twice refers to Mainwaring as colonel of the Red Auxiliary regiment. A newsbook reported on 19 August that it was proposed to send 'two Regiments of the Auxilliary forces, and the Regiment of Red Coates' on the Gloucester expedition,⁵ whereas we know that three Auxiliary units - the Red, Blue and Orange - actually marched out a few days later.⁶ Finally, we learn that Mainwaring 'left the command of the Redd Regiment' in January 1644,⁷ leaving that post to be filled by someone else, and we also know that Samuel Harsnett, who held the rank of major in the summer of 1643,⁸ was colonel of the

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 19 February; A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 16-23 February (E246/25).

²Mercurius Aulicus, 21 March.

³The True Informer, 6-13 January 1644 (E81/31).

⁴See p.49. The second reference does not appear in Dillon's transcript.

⁵A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 17-25 August (E65/33).

⁶H. Foster, A True and Exact Relation (1643) (E69/15).

⁷Common Council Journal 40 f. 190b, 13 August 1646.

⁸Common Council Journal 40 f. 67.

Red Auxiliaries by April 1644¹ and was still commanding 'the Red Regiment' in 1647.² Although Trained Band captains certainly held commands in the Auxiliaries as well, it seems unlikely that Mainwaring could simultaneously lead both his army regiment of Redcoats and the Red Auxiliaries, as well as retaining his position in the Red Trained Band (which he certainly still did in September 1643).³ From this evidence it is easy to conclude that the Redcoats and the Red Auxiliaries were one and the same; perhaps the Redcoats, having been recruited from volunteer London apprentices in 1642 and having been assigned to garrison duty in the capital, were renamed in 1643 and absorbed into the Auxiliary structure as part of the militia. But Henry Foster's account of the Gloucester expedition, under the date 31 August, says that the brigade consisted of 'six regiments, viz. Colonell Manwarings Red Regiment, two Regiments of Trained Bands, and three of the Auxiliary'- that is, the Red, Blue and Orange Auxiliaries.⁴ An account of the return of the expedition after the battle of Newbury also lists the same six regiments.⁵ The conclusion must be that Symonds, who was writing after the event and relying on second-hand information, was wrong, and that Mainwaring's Redcoats and the Red Auxiliaries were two distinct units.

¹Muster Roll, 27 April 1644, PRO SP 28 121A part 5 f. 691.

²PRO SP 28 237, 19 July 1647.

³Symonds (see p.49).

⁴Foster, op. cit.

⁵The True Informer, 30 September (E69/14). This describes Mainwaring's as a regiment of horse, which cannot be correct; no cavalry regiment comprised 1200 men, and a mounted unit could not have brought two pikes apiece back from the Kent expedition (The Parliament Scout, 27 July-3 August (E63/13)).

One result of the confusion engendered by Mainwaring's Redcoats has been the growth of legends concerning the 'uniforms' of the London militia forces. Goold Walker, who apparently knew nothing of the origins of Mainwaring's Redcoats in October 1642 as an army unit but was familiar with Symonds's list and knew that the Redcoats were active in the City early in 1643, before the Auxiliaries had been raised, concluded that the Redcoats were the Trained Bands.¹ The modern Company of Pikemen and Musketeers of the Honourable Artillery Company, formed in 1925 and said to be based on the Trained Bands of Civil War years, accordingly wear red uniforms. Peter Young, although writing about the suburban militia regiments rather than the City ones, assumes that they wore coats of the same colour as their ensigns,² as was usual in the regular army. But there is, in fact, no evidence that the Trained Bands wore uniforms of red or any other colour. Clothing warrants for the army regiments still exist, together with warrants for arms to be distributed to both the regular army and the militia, but there are no records of uniforms being issued to the militia. There are also references to the loaning of arms to substitutes serving in place of those liable for duty in the Trained Bands, but no mention of the loan of uniforms. Finally, a Royalist account of the first battle of Newbury records that 'much of the slaughter fell upon the London Trained bands and their Auxiliaries, many of whose Buffe Coates our Souldiers now have';³ there is no record of buff coats being issued, and it is probable that the citizens bought these expensive items themselves. The militia wore their own clothes and had no uniforms.

¹Goold Walker, p. 105.

²M. Toynbee and P. Young, Cropredy Bridge 1644 (Kineton, 1970).

³Mercurius Aulicus, 20 September 1643.

An assembly of Royalists at Sevenoaks in the middle of July 1643 provided the Auxiliaries with an opportunity to show their mettle. Colonel Richard Browne, now a dragoon commander in Essex's army, was ordered to lead Mainwaring's Redcoats and the Green¹ Auxiliaries, together with some cavalry and dragoon detachments, out of the City on 20 July to deal with the rising.² The Royalists retreated to Tonbridge, and on 24 July there was a three-hour skirmish in which the Royalists were driven out of the town, losing 200 prisoners. The Redcoats and the Green Auxiliaries both performed well in the fighting, and they returned home to London on 29 July, 'some of them having two Pikes, others two Swords and some of them long Bills, which they took from the Kentish Malignants'.³ Mercurius Aulicus admitted that Browne's forces had compelled the Kentish Royalists to 'forsake Sevenoke and Tunbridge, and goe into some places of more advantage', but went on to claim that they had regrouped and forced Browne to retreat towards London, 'being followed at the very heeles till he came almost within sight of the towne'.⁴ Whatever the truth of this claim, the Green Auxiliaries had shown that they could fight well alongside the regular forces, and they were the first of the London militia units to draw blood in the Civil War.

¹The Kingdome Weekly Post, 20 December 1643 (E78/28).

²The Kingdome Weekly Intelligencer, 18-25 July (E61/22); The Speciall Passages Continued, 10-22 July (E61/25).

³A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 20-27 July (E61/25); A True and Exact Relation of the Whole Proceedings, 25 July (E64/11); The Parliament Scout, 27 July-3 August (E63/13).

⁴Mercurius Aulicus, 28 July.

CHAPTER V

THE CONTROL OF THE SUBURBS

The ordinance of 29 July 1643 which clarified the subordination of the Subcommittee for Volunteers to the Militia Committee also went one stage further: in response to a petition from Common Council, it stipulated that 'all the Forces raised, and to be raised within the Commands of the Forts and Lines of Communication and parishes adjacent be subordinate to the Committee of the Militia of the City of London next under both Houses of Parliament'.¹ This, of course, was a thoroughly sensible arrangement from a military point of view now that the fortifications were complete. Another point in its favour was the fact that the Subcommittee for Volunteers, as established by Parliamentary ordinance in April, had power to recruit men in the suburbs as well as the City; if these were now to be under the control of the Militia Committee, it clearly made sense for the suburban Trained Bands to be under the same authority. But the question of City rule over the suburbs had been a long-standing source of contention, and the suburbs resented the Militia Committee's rule; in later years they would successfully assert their independence. For the present, the Militia Committee on 8 August established new subcommittees in the three areas outside the City and Liberties but inside the Lines of Communication, giving them authority to control the day-to-day running of their respective Trained Bands and Auxiliaries under the overall command of the City Militia Committee itself.

¹LJ, VI, p. 159.

Southwark

The inhabitants of Southwark - mainly dyers, feltmakers, watermen and leatherworkers¹ - had a reputation for religious and political radicalism which was to be much in evidence during the Civil War years.² During the crisis of January 1642, support was promised on the eve of the return of the Five Members to Parliament from their hiding-place in the City: 'Divers of the Burrough of Southwarke came to offer the Assistance of their trained bands to us too morrow, to come and be our guard at Westminster; wee tolde them that wee hoped that the cittie of London would take care for our guard, but wee accepted ther offer with thankes and desired them to be in the feilds about Lambeth and in Southwarke, in ther armes'.³ When, later in January, Skippon was given authority to place guards from the Trained Bands around the Houses of Parliament, he was advised to 'command forth the two Trained Bands of Southwark...from time to time, as often as occasion shall require, for the more Ease of the Trained Bands of the City of London'.⁴ In August, an ordinance was passed 'that Houses for Courts of Guard, and Posts, Bars, and Chains be forthwith erected and set up in such places of the Borough of Southwarke as shall be thought necessary...and that a competent number of the Train-Band, and Companies of Volunteers, in and belonging to the said Borough shall Day and Night attend with their Arms in or near the said Courts of Guard'.⁵ - this apparently about a

¹Archer, op. cit.; see also the descriptions of subscribers of horses in PRO SP 28 131.

²M. Tolmie, The Triumph of the Saints (Cambridge, 1977), passim.

³Coates, op. cit., p. 401.

⁴CJ, II, p. 401.

⁵CJ, II, pp. 724-5; LJ, V, p. 307.

month before similar precautions were taken in the City. Similarly, the Southwark Trained Bands were called out for service against the Cavaliers even before the City militia's expeditions to Windsor and Turnham Green. Early in November, on the orders of Sir Richard Onslow, the Deputy Lieutenant of Surrey, the Southwark Trained Bands marched out to secure Kingston against the advancing Royalists - but 'the Inhabitants thereof, shewing themselves extreemly malignant against them, would afford them no lodging, nor give them any entertainment, called them Roundheads, and wished rather that the Cavaliers would come amongst them; whereupon they left them to their own Malignant humours'.¹ (The Southwark men were, in fact, relieved by regular troops from Essex's army and thereby extricated from their uncomfortable situation at Kingston.)²

It seems that the Southwark militia were not unanimous in their Roundhead sympathies, for in December the Lords and Commons ordered that those who refused to serve on guard duty should be fined 2s 6d per day.³ In particular, Captain Daniel Moore, a dyer, appears to have been a defaulter; he was questioned in January 1643 for not doing his duty at the forts, and Richard Symonds noted that he was 'not confided in by the Parliament'.⁴ But the citizens of Southwark also had some justification for their unwillingness to serve, even though they were generally strong supporters of the

¹England's Memorable Accidents, 31 October-7 November 1642 (E242/6).

²H.E. Malden, 'The Civil War in Surrey, 1642', in Surrey Archaeological Collections, XXII (1909), p. 203.

³CJ, II, p. 896; LJ, V, p. 505.

⁴CJ, II, p. 946.

Parliamentary cause, as the Commons observed in May 1643: 'Divers of the inhabitants...are poor labouring men, and cannot be tyed to a constant and due Attendance on the Courts of Guard without much prejudice to their families depending on them, unless there be some Allowance paid them for the said Service'.¹ An assessment of £100 per week was therefore made on the inhabitants to provide funds to pay the guards while on duty.

The control of the Southwark militia had been in dispute between the City authorities and the Deputy Lieutenants of Surrey for nearly a century,² and their status was apparently still unclear in January 1642. The Commons' original order to Skippon on 15 January authorised him to issue warrants directly to the captains of the Southwark Trained Bands, but a fortnight later this was amended to stipulate that Skippon should advise the Sheriff of Surrey to issue the warrants instead.³ When the Militia Ordinance was passed in March, Parliament accepted that the Southwark Trained Bands were part of the Surrey forces.⁴ Over the following months, however, new committees of local men were set up to run various aspects of military and fiscal administration in Southwark; there was a committee to search for malignants in August 1642 (which included four current or future officers of the Southwark militia among its membership),⁵ and a committee for assessments in November.⁶ An officer appointed

¹CJ, II, p. 95.

²D.J. Johnson, Southwark and the City (Oxford, 1969), p. 155.

³CJ, II, pp. 382, 401.

⁴Johnson, op. cit.

⁵CJ, II, p. 707.

⁶Johnson, op. cit., p. 156.

by the Commons was given control over the 'outguards and watches' in Southwark, as well as north of the River, in February 1643,¹ and this power was transferred to the City Militia Committee in March.²

Finally, as we have seen, the Militia Committee gained control over the Southwark Trained Bands in July and deputed this control to 'the Subcommittee for the Militia of Southwarke' on 8 August.³ We do not know the names of all the members of the Subcommittee, but they probably included many of those previously appointed to the committees for searches and assessments.

The two immediate concerns of the new Subcommittee were the raising of the assessment of £100 per week authorised by the Commons in June to pay the guards, and ensuring that the Trained Bands were commanded by trustworthy officers. The list of collections under the assesment shows that the Subcommittee's authority extended over Newington Butts, Lambeth, Bermondsey and Rotherhithe as well as Southwark proper.⁴

As for the officers, it appears that only one had to be purged; 'Mr Newbury', ensign to the recalcitrant Captain Daniel Moore and, like him, 'not confided in by the Parliament', was thrown into prison in Winchester House by the colonel of the Trained Bands on 14 August.⁵ Most of the captains were categorised as 'violent Roundheads' in September, several of them living in the radical parish of St Olave's.⁶

¹CJ, II, p. 962.

²Ibid., p. 939.

³PRO SP 28 131 (part). The Subcommittee met in St Olave's vestry (Ordinance for the Weekly Meal, 26 March 1644 (E39/15)).

⁴Ibid.

⁵Symonds.

⁶Ibid.

The Commons' order to Skippon in January 1642 referred to 'the two Trained Bands of Southwark',¹ and Symonds noted in September 1643 that 'there hath beene in the borough of Southwarke two trayned bands the space of 14 years, formerly but one'. This information was slightly out of date, because by that time there was again only one Trained Band regiment, with yellow colours. It seems most likely that the other former regiment, with red colours, had been amalgamated with this, and that the Southwark Auxiliaries with their white ensigns were, like the City Auxiliary regiments, newly raised from volunteer apprentices and other non-householders. Like the City Auxiliaries, too, the Southwark White Auxiliaries obtained several of their officers from the local Trained Bands.

The strength and social composition of the Southwark White Auxiliaries can be determined from the surviving muster rolls of the regiment in April 1644.² Colonel James Houblon, who was also a captain in the Southwark Yellow Trained Band, worked as a dyer in St Olave's Street; his company mustered 109 soldiers and 13 company officers and NCOs, together with the regimental minister, provost-marshal, wagon-master, drum-major, and surgeon with his two mates. Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Sowton's company was the strongest in the regiment, with 119 soldiers and 13 officers; Sowton was a woodmonger in Montague Close and a 'violent Roundhead' who would later become an active Presbyterian. Major William Hobson, a grocer, may have been enrolled in the HAC, although the other Southwark captains were not; his company numbered 91 soldiers and 11 officers. Captain John

¹CJ, II, p. 401.

²PRO SP 28 121A part 3 ff. 339-44, part 4 ff. 567-70; part 5 ff. 646-66. Notes concerning homes, trades and sympathies from Symonds.

Thornton, 'a fell-monger or sheepskin-gatherer', had 79 men and 11 officers in his unit; Captain Luke Bradley, a woolstapler in Bermondsey Street, had 105 soldiers and 11 officers, and Captain Joseph Knapp, of whom nothing is known, had 106 men and the standard 11 officers. It appears that Captain Francis Grove, who had been active with the Southwark forces at Kingston in November 1642, was also now an officer of the Southwark White Auxiliaries,¹ but if so his muster roll has not survived.

A comparison of these muster rolls shows that the companies of the Southwark White Auxiliaries were all under strength compared with the City's average of 150 officers and men, nor was the colonel's company the largest, as it should have been in theory. An examination of Lieutenant-Colonel Sowton's muster roll gives rise to some more interesting conclusions, since a number of the individual soldiers can be identified. Few of the relevant Southwark parish records have survived, and most of the companies therefore cannot even be labelled by area, but fortunately Sowton's men were recruited from his own parish of St Saviour's and their names appear in the parish register.² Among the officers, for example, the lieutenant-colonel himself had a son in 1648 and Ensign Timothy Crouch had one in 1646, while Sergeants Henry Stroud and Nathaniel Sterry and Drummer John Hodgskins, who all worked as coopers, also had children during the 1640s. Daniel Patrick, the other drummer, was himself born in 1627, the son of a brewer's servant, and was therefore about 17 years old at the time of the muster. Among the common soldiers, William Chandler was 19 years old, Henry Purser 16, Andrew Motley 17,

¹See below, p.

²In Greater London Record Office, County Hall.

George Howard, Robert Morgan and Robert Hopkins all 16, and Joseph Foster apparently only 14. The trades of several men can also be identified: they included a gardener, a smith, two cordwainers, two bricklayers, two Spanish leatherdressers, two sawyers, a fisherman, a porter, and no less than 15 watermen. Their trades are known because they had children baptised during the 1640s, so these men had, or would soon have, family responsibilities. The largest single group, the watermen, were probably similar in character to the forthright and independent-minded taxi-drivers who are their nearest equivalent today, as can be seen from their reaction when all the London watermen were ordered by Parliament to assemble in Tothill Fields in September 1643:

'There appeared at the time and place appointed to the number of 6,000 of them, and they were at first perswaded in as faire termes as might be, to List themselves under that noble gentleman Sir William Waller (for they resolved to keep the Trained-bands and Auxiliaries for the defence of the City if they could possibly make him up an Army any other way). To which when answer was returned, that if any Sea-service was to be done (which they knew the season was not fit for), they were ready for it, but for these Land-fights they were neither fit nor proper for them... the Committee thereupon began to use more severe language, threatening to Presse some and to punish others; the Water-men cried out with a dismall clamour, "One and all, one and all" and so went their ways.'¹

The watermen in Sowton's company were, at least in theory, volunteers, as in the other London Auxiliary units, although there may have been considerable moral pressure from the community to encourage men to enlist. They were certainly to see considerable 'land-service' during 1644, although they would ultimately raise their cry of 'One and all' once again when their patience was exhausted.

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 14 September 1643.

Tower Hamlets

The parishes east of the City accommodated two main trade groupings. Those nearest the City boundary housed textile workers - feltmakers in St Katherine's and silkweavers and tailors in Shoreditch and Whitechapel. The 'marine hamlets' of the large parish of Stepney, on the other hand, were devoted to shipbuilding, and it was here that London's shipwrights, carpenters and blacksmiths were particularly concentrated. There were, however, many tailors as well; this was a feature of all the outlying areas. The gunsmiths made their homes near the Tower outside Aldgate.¹

Before the Civil War, the Trained Bands of the Tower Hamlets comprised only 600 men in several independent companies; although these were all under the control of the Lieutenant of the Tower, they were not large enough to make up a regiment. In April 1642 the Commons asked John Venn and two other Members to 'think of some Course that the Hamletters may be in a Readiness to do their service, upon Occasion; and likewise, that they may be trained and exercised accordingly'.² In the following month, the Lieutenant of the Tower was ordered to muster the Trained Bands of the Hamlets with the Middlesex militia; it was still accepted that the Hamletters could only be compelled to march out of their home area on the Lieutenant's order.³ Their training was re-organised on a daily basis in July,⁴ and 50 men were appointed to guard the Tower by turns.⁵ In October,

¹Archer, op. cit.

²CJ, II, p. 512.

³LJ, V, p. 78.

⁴A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 11-18 July (E202/17).

⁵LJ, V, p. 204.

as part of the defences for the City and suburbs, courts of guard were erected at Shoreditch, Whitechapel and Mile End, and 'a competent number of the Trained Bands and Companies of Volunteers in and belonging to the said Parishes' were ordered to man them day and night.¹

It was probably this great increase in guard duties which prompted the men of the Tower Hamlets Trained Bands to petition the Lords on 19 October for some relief. After pointing out that 'the Trained Bands of the Hamlets are six hundred', they stated that 'in this time of Danger, they are desirous to double the Trained Bands and make a Regiment, and desire that the Lieutenant of the Tower may command them, and that they may choose their Officers that command them'. The Lords agreed in principle, but reserved the appointment of officers to the Earl of Holland, Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex.² The inhabitants countered by asking the Commons to recommend their choices of officers to Holland, which they did: the Commons stated on 25 October that the residents of St Katherine's and East Smithfield 'earnestly desired and recommended' Leonard Leonards as their captain, he being 'a man very worthy of that trust'.³

Holland apparently agreed to Leonards's appointment, but did nothing to investigate the suitability of the other existing Hamlets captains, for on 12 January 1643 he complained to the Lords that he had sent a warrant to an unidentified captain 'of the Trained Bands in the Hamlets, who said he cared not for the warrant, and

¹CJ, II, p. 609.

²LJ, V, p. 407.

³CJ, II, p. 823.

would not obey it'.¹ Two days later, the Commons took the initiative by recommending the names of the other captains (besides Leonards) to be appointed in the other Hamlets - Whitechapel, Shoreditch, Hackney, Ratcliff, Wapping and Limehouse - which, together with St Katherine's and East Smithfield, were to form 'a Regiment under the Command of the Lieutenant of the Tower'.² But little was apparently done, for the Commons had to make a further order in May that the seven Hamlet companies were to be listed and formed into a regiment; at the same time, they ordered that Bow, Bromley, Old Ford, Mile End Green, and Bethnal Green were to be added to the Hackney company.³

The Commons on 17 June 1643 asked 'the Committee of the Tower' to consider the listing of soldiers within the Hamlets, and this body, which met at Savage House on Tower Hill,⁴ became a subcommittee under the City Militia Committee on 8 August. But the Tower Hamlets were more directly controlled by the City authorities than were the other suburban areas, partly because, as we have seen, the titular colonel of the Tower Hamlets Trained Band was the Lieutenant of the Tower - and after July 1643 this was none other than the Lord Mayor, Isaac Penington.⁵

¹LJ, V, p. 548.

²CJ, II, p. 926.

³CJ, III, p. 68.

⁴Ordinance for the Weekly Meal, 26 March 1644 (E39/15).

⁵Pearl, p. 274; Common Council Journal 40 f. 67. Penington retained the post of Lieutenant of the Tower until 1645, long after the end of his term as Lord Mayor, but Lieutenant Colonel William Willoughby was always the effective commander of the Tower Hamlets Trained Band.

Muster rolls dating from the spring of 1644 survive for the companies of Colonel William Willoughby (Ratcliff), Lieutenant Colonel Francis Zachary (Whitechapel), Major William Chapman (Limehouse?),¹ Captain Nathaniel Tilley (Shoreditch), Captain Leonard Leonards (East Smithfield and St Katherine's), and Captain Thomas Salmon (Hackney).² The company of Captain Abraham Woodroffe (Wapping) was not mustered at the same time, and no roll exists for this unit. Of the surviving rolls, that of Colonel Willoughby is the most instructive; like the roll of the City Blue Trained Band dating from November 1644, it lists the 'finders' as well as the serving soldiers. In Ratcliff, nearly every soldier was supported by two householders, and in many cases one of the two served in person. The number of men required was 147, of which 70 places were filled by assessed householders, either on their own account or with support from others; 20 were hired men sponsored by from one to three householders; and 57 places were temporarily unfilled because the householders had not announced whether they would be serving in person or hiring substitutes. It seems probable that the property qualification for liability for assessment was lower in the Tower Hamlets than in the City, and that the Ratcliff householders would be less likely to hire substitutes; even so, about 1 in 4 of the soldiers in Colonel Willoughby's company were hirelings.

¹ Chapman's regiment is not identified in the muster roll, but Dr John Adair conjectures that he was in the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Band, as the date of his promotion to lieutenant colonel while serving with Waller corresponds to that of Zachary's promotion to colonel (J. Adair, Cheriton 1644 (Kineton, 1973), p. 219).

²PRO SP 28 121A part 4 ff. 541, 546, 571; part 5 ff. 576, 586, 602.

Westminster

As we have seen, the Westminster Trained Bands guarded the Houses of Parliament in December 1641, originally at the request of the Lords and Commons themselves. In January, however, Parliament replaced them with the London Trained Bands, apparently because the latter were considered more reliable; perhaps the tailors and other mixed tradesmen of Westminster, largely dependent on the Court for their livelihood, were disgruntled when the King fled the capital on 10 January. A delegation from the Westminster men protested their loyalty to Parliament in a petition to the Commons on the following day, complaining that they lay under 'many heavy Fears and Distractions' because of the 'Doubts and Jealousies raised of your Petitioners' Duty and Affection to this Honourable House'.¹ But it was not until 24 January that Endymion Porter, than whom a more devoted Royalist could scarcely be found, was removed from the captaincy of the Trained Band company in St Martin's in the Fields,² and throughout the Civil War there was a general suspicion that the Westminster men lacked sufficient commitment to the Parliamentary cause; Clarendon wrote that 'the Inhabitants of Westminster, St Martin's and Covent-Garden...allways underwent the Imputation of being well affected to the King'.³

The Trained Bands of the western suburbs were nevertheless employed to guard the Houses of Parliament once again, at least after the first few weeks of the year, taking turns with the

¹CJ, II, p. 370.

²Ibid., p. 390.

³Clarendon, II, p. 83.

Londoners. The Westminster men were under the authority of the Deputy Lieutenants and Sheriffs of Middlesex at this time, as were the companies in the unincorporated parishes of St Martin's in the Fields, St Giles's in the Fields, parts of the parishes of St Sepulchre without Newgate and St Andrew Holborn, and the Liberty of the Rolls around Chancery Lane and the Liberty of the Luchy of Lancaster in St Clement Danes and St Mary Savoy. Skippon was given power on 15 January to ask for guards for the Houses of Parliament from either London or Middlesex,¹ and by the middle of February at the latest there were Middlesex forces taking turns on guard duty, probably including those from Westminster itself. There was evidence of a certain lack of enthusiasm, however; Captain Michael Miller, who led one of the Middlesex companies, complained that only 32 of his 300 men answered his summons to guard duty, and those 32 said they would not do so again until the defaulters agreed to do their part. He also accused one of his men of pawning a halberd which had been bought for an officer, and the soldier replied that he had been 'unworthily used' by Miller 'in blows, fearful oaths and very uncivill language'.² Nor were all the untrustworthy officers purged with Endymion Porter in January; it was reported in August that Ensign Abel Wingfield of the company in St Giles's in the Fields had said that 'all that went under the Earl of Essex in this Expedition were traitors', and only then was he 'sent for as a delinquent' by the Commons.³

¹CJ, II, p. 382.

²Goold Walker, op. cit., p. 43; LJ, IV, p. 596.

³CJ, II, p. 726.

In the meantime, the Westminster Trained Bands were being put to work by Parliament in searching the homes of 'malignants' and Roman Catholics. On 16 August the house of a papist named Zones was examined, 'where they seized some Armes, Plate and Money, and apprehended the said Zones'.¹ On 22 August the house of a Mr Viana in Orchard Street near Westminster was entered; although the Trained Bands here 'found nothing worthy their search',² they had more success at Doctor Gibbs's house in Bedford Street, Covent Garden, where they arrested three 'Romish priests'.³

Guard duties in the western suburbs greatly increased after the Commons ordered the setting up of posts, chains and courts of guard on 14 October. The accounts submitted by Lieutenant Michael Barkstead⁴ of the Trained Band in the Liberty of the Duchy in the Strand illustrate the tension during the King's march towards London: from 23 October, the day of the battle of Edgehill, until 21 November, a week after Turnham Green, the company was on duty every day but four, usually in St James's Fields.⁵ On 3 November, while the company from St Martin's in the Fields was guarding the Houses of Parliament, the Commons took the precaution of calling in the lieutenant to ensure that the soldiers had been supplied with powder and bullets, as there had been an alarm the night before.⁶

¹An Exact and True Diurnall, 15-22 August (E202/38).

²Ibid., 22-29 August (E202/39).

³Ibid.

⁴The father, or perhaps brother, of the future regicide and major-general John Barkstead (Woodhead, op. cit.).

⁵PRO SP 23 232 (part); CJ, II, p. 309.

⁶Barkstead's accounts, PRO SP 23 131 (part) f. 5.

On 12 November, two residents of St Giles's in the Fields were ordered to 'put the trained-bands of those parts in a posture of defence and draw them forth', while the Trained Bands then guarding the Houses of Parliament were to move out to Hyde Park Corner as the Royalists had reached Brentford.¹

After 21 November the guards were reduced, and Westminster was comparatively quiet until the following spring. In the meantime, however, new Auxiliary units were being raised here as in the City and other suburbs. The Auxiliary company of Captain Thomas Kequick² was 'the first in Westminster which did publickly stand upp for the parliament', and was active in the searching of the prebendaries' houses around the Abbey in April 1643 and perhaps in guarding the Commons committee which 'purged' St Margaret's of its stained glass and monuments.³ In late May there was an altercation between John Flood, captain of another company of the Westminster Auxiliaries, and Captain Oliver Vaughan of the Finsbury company of the Middlesex Trained Bands. Vaughan complained that on 24 May Flood 'did three times that Day with his Company cross the Petitioner's Company, and divided them, and animated his Company to fight; and the said Flood drew his sword against the soldiers, and bid his soldiers now stand for their lives, and threw clods of earth, and abused the said

¹CJ, II, p. 846.

²Not 'Requincke' (Adair, Cheriton, pp. 210, 220; Toynbee and Young, Cropredy Bridge, p. 83). Dr Ian Roy informs me that it is a Cornish name. There is one Kekewich and one Kekwick in the current London telephone directory.

³PRO SP 23 34 part 1 ff. 197, 201; 39 part 5 ff. 553, 563; Mercurius Aulicus, 9 April, 25 April.

Vaughan with base reviling speeches, to the Disheartening of his Soldiers'.¹ We do not know the nature of the dispute between Flood and Vaughan, but it may have been political. Not only were the volunteer Auxiliaries generally regarded as more committed to the Parliamentary cause than the conscript Trained Bands, but Kequick's company was actually called upon to disarm 'the Malignants of the Trayne band' at an unspecified date.²

In August 1643, the militia companies of the western suburbs were brought under the control of the City Militia Committee, which appointed a subcommittee to administer the units of Trained Bands and Auxiliaries in Westminster and those parts of Middlesex lying inside the lines of communication to the north and west of the City. The subcommittee's area of authority thus included not only Westminster, the Duchy Liberty, St Martin's, St Giles's, Holborn and the Rolls Liberty, and parts of St Sepulchre's and St Andrew's Holborn, but also the parishes to the north, including St Giles's Cripplegate, Clerkenwell, Finsbury and Islington. The companies in these areas were amalgamated with the Westminster Trained Bands and Auxiliaries, and the subcommittee, although sometimes known as that of Westminster, was usually referred to by the name of its meeting-place in the Savoy.³

The appointment of the Subcommittee of the Savoy may have led to a purge of officers. Lieutenant Barkstead's captain, Sir Thomas Fisher, returned his commission on 7 August and was not re-appointed;

¹LJ, VI, p. 64.

²PRO SP 28 39 part 5 f. 558.

³PRO E 179 253/12.

Captain Robert Cecil, named by the Commons to fill Endymion Porter's place in the St Martin's company in January 1642, was replaced by his lieutenant in the autumn of 1643.¹ Fisher and Cecil were both captains in the Westminster Red² Trained Bands; there are no records of any changes in the officers of the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries³ at this time. During 1643 the latter were commanded by Colonel Heriot Washbourne,⁴ formerly the fourth captain of the City Red Trained Band.⁵ Washbourne was a 46-year-old sugarbaker and member of the Mercers' Company who had joined the HAC in 1632, and he lived in the parish of St Helen's Bishopsgate at the eastern end of the City; it seems surprising that he was placed in command of the Westminster Auxiliaries in view of the distance of his home from his command. But he was to prove a dedicated and active soldier during the Civil War, and perhaps there was no officer available in Westminster who

¹PRO SP 28 131 (part), f. 4b; PRO E 179 253/12 f. 17.

²Symonds illustrates their colours in his MS, but they are not given in Dillon's article.

³The colour of the Westminster Auxiliaries' ensigns has been the subject of some confusion. Goold Walker (op. cit., pp. 140, 208 et seq.) claimed that they were blue with white wavy rays, but quoted no evidence. One newsbook (Mercurius Civicus, 9-16 May 1644 (E47/27) referred to 'the red Regiment of Westminster under the command of Colonell Prince'. This was simply a case of confusion with the Westminster Red Trained Band, although Peter Young took it to mean that Colonel Prince's Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries wore red coats (Toynbee and Young, Cropredy Bridge, p. 11). As noted above, the militia (as opposed to regular army units like Colonel Randall Mainwaring's Redcoats) did not wear uniforms. The Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries are referred to by that name in The Weekly Account, 17-25 April 1644 (E43/23); R. Coe, An Exact Dyarie... (1644) (E2/20); Mercurius Civicus, 15-22 August 1644 (E7/3).

⁴Captain Henry Turner's accounts, PRO SP 23 34 part 1 ff. 103-4.

⁵BL 669 f 6/79. He replaced Captain James Bunce on the latter's election as alderman.

had the right combination of military training and political reliability to serve as colonel of the Auxiliaries in 1643. By the following year he had been replaced by Colonel James Prince, a Westminster man, and muster rolls exist for Prince's company and those of Lieutenant Colonel George Crompton, Major John Leigh, and captains Thomas Kequick, John King, Henry Turner and John Flood.¹ Turner's company was probably the one recruited in Bloomsbury and St Giles's,² but the areas of the other companies cannot be determined. Several of them were well under strength, as in the other suburban Auxiliary units: Prince's own company had only 79 soldiers, Flood's had 74, and King's only 58 during a campaign in May 1644. Crompton's roll specifies the weapons borne by his individual soldiers, and this shows that 2/3 of them were pikemen and only 1/3 musketeers, although up-to-date military theory called for these proportions to be reversed.

There are no surviving muster rolls for the Westminster Red Trained Band; instead, there are equally useful lists of defaulters - accounts of 'fines of severall persons that refused to goe out in person, or send out men to serve for them in the late Expedition to Bazing and Alton' in October 1643 and a similar campaign to Newbury in the following year.³ These company-by-company lists show that widows and

¹PRO SP 28 121A part 4 ff. 550, 537, 539, 549; part 5 ff. 590, 592, 594.

²Turner lived in Little Alley in St Giles's parish (army assessments, PRO SP 28 164 part 1), and monies for the wives and children of the men in his company were received and distributed by Major Walter Eigg of the Westminster Red Trained Band, who also lived in the parish (*ibid.*).

³PRO E 179 253/12 ff. 13-23.

aliens¹ were not exempt from providing men for the Trained Band. A comparison of the names in these lists with the appropriate parish registers and tax assessments² shows that the company commanded by Colonel Sir James Harrington was raised, as noted elsewhere, 'without Temple Bar and parts adjacent'.³ Lieutenant Colonel Hopson, of whom nothing is known and who had left his command by October 1644,⁴ drew his men from an area which cannot be identified. Major Taylor, who became lieutenant colonel after Hopson's departure, commanded the company based on the parishes of St Clement Danes and St Mary Savoy. Captain Thomas Fawconbergh or Falconbridge of the Tally Office⁵ led the St Margaret's company, while Captain Thomas Constable, who lived on the south side of King Street, Covent Garden, and had a shop in the New Exchange in the Strand,⁶ commanded the company in St Martin's in the Fields. Captain Walter Bigg or Biggs led the St Giles's company, and Captain George Warren of Bow Lane, a Draper, who lived in Shire Lane⁷ where the Law Courts now stand, drew his company from that area and the streets around what is now Gray's Inn Road. Captain Howse's company area cannot be identified, but may have been in Clerkenwell.

¹'Monsieur le Feaver' was a defaulter in Harrington's own area.

²Harl. Soc. Regs. XXXIII (St Paul's Covent Garden), LXVI (St Martin's in the Fields), LXXXVIII (St Margaret's); A.M. Burke, Memorials of St Margaret's Church Westminster (1914); T.C. Dale, 'The Inhabitants of Westminster in the Reign of Charles I' (typescript, BL 09915 t 12).

³Symonds.

⁴PRO E 179 253/12 f. 27.

⁵Symonds.

⁶PRO SP 28 165 part 4 f. 361; SP 28 166 (unfoliated).

⁷Symonds.

The City Horse

In addition to the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries of the City and Suburbs, the Militia Committee controlled its own force of cavalry. Beginning on 11 October 1642, subscriptions were accepted for six troops of horse to be raised 'cheifly for the defence of the City', and there still survives a complete list of all the horses, their values, and the names, trades and addresses of the subscribers from that date until July 1643.¹ As with the Auxiliaries, most of the captains of these units already held commissions in the Trained Bands; the six original captains of the City Horse were Skippon, Richard Browne (first captain of the Orange Trained Band), Edmund Harvey (third captain of the White), Robert Mainwaring (third captain of the Green and brother of Randall), Heriot Washbourne (fourth captain of the Red and later colonel of the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries), and a Captain Buller about whom we know nothing.² But Skippon and Browne³ were soon called to greater tasks in Essex's army and left their City troops (although both would maintain close links with the London forces throughout the war), and Harvey became the senior captain of the six before the end of 1642.

During the winter of 1642-3, whenever Colonel Randall Mainwaring (the City's Sergeant Major General, replacing Skippon) needed cavalry to back up his own regiment of Redcoats in their police duties, he called upon Harvey's troop of horse. The troop dispersed

¹PRO SP 23 131 (part).

²For the cornets of the City Horse see Bodleian Library Ms Rawl. D 942 and Dr Williams's Library Ms Modern Folio 5.

³Browne was made colonel of the dragoons raised in the City for Warwick's army in November (CSPD 1641-3, p. 407) and later transferred to Essex's army.

an assembly of 'malignants and neuters' at Guildhall on 9 December,¹ helped end the occupation by peace petitioners there three days later,² prevented a suspicious meeting of apprentices in Covent Garden on New Year's Day,³ and (with the aid of one of the other troops) guarded Guildhall during the reading of the King's reply to the peace propositions on 14 January.⁴ Captain Washbourne's troop performed scouting duties at Lambeth in March 1643.⁵ But it is not clear whether the troopers of the City Horse were full-time soldiers like Mainwaring's Redcoats or part-timers like the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries, although their frequent duties and extended campaigns in the autumn of 1643 and afterwards make the former more likely.

Harvey's position was reinforced during the spring of 1643 when the six City troops were organised into a regiment under his command as colonel.⁶ One of the troops, however, was still unmounted by the summer,⁷ despite the appeal for subscriptions and the seizure by Harvey's forces of money, plate, horses and arms

¹ A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 5-12 December (E244/8).

² The Image of the Malignants' Peace (1642)(E244/12).

³ A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 2-9 January 1643 (E244/45).

⁴ Mercurius Aulicus, 16 January.

⁵ LJ, V, pp. 654, 667.

⁶ Sometime before the beginning of June (CSPD 1641-3, p. 466).

⁷ The one originally led by Capt. Buller, who had been replaced in March by Capt. Peter Willett (PRO SP 28 131 (part), 'Horses and Armes listed...[for] the Cittye of London', ff. 13b, 15 et seq., SP 28 147 (Harvey's troop's accounts), ff. 61-7).

from papists and malignants,¹ and he therefore had only five troops available for use in July against the Royalists in Surrey. With these, together with some additional dragoons, he left London on 20 July and marched towards Guildford while Browne led his infantry force into Kent.² While Harvey was at Farnham Castle on 26 July he learned of a rumour that 2000 Royalist horse had arrived at Guildford, and he announced his intention of falling upon them there.³ Nothing apparently came of this, and by the end of the month Harvey's regiment was at Basing House, where it was repulsed by the timely arrival of some Royalist foot from Oxford;⁴ the regiment returned to London soon afterwards.⁵

Despite the difficulty in finding suitable horses for the sixth troop of Harvey's regiment, the Militia Committee obtained permission from the Commons in August 1643 to raise a second City cavalry regiment. The horses were obtained through a new subscription campaign, and five shillings per week was paid to the owners. The new regiment was commanded by Richard Turner junior, who had achieved the rank of major in the Yellow Trained Band by April 1643,⁶

¹CSPD 1641-3, p. 466.

²Mercurius Civicus, 13-20 July (E61/11).

³Ibid., 20-28 July (E64/4).

⁴Mercurius Aulicus, 3 August.

⁵A party of Col. Harvey's regiment' plundered a house in Chancery Lane on 15 August (Mercurius Rusticus, 23 September).

⁶Broadside, Die Martis, 25 April 1643 (Supply of horse and foot for Waller) (Guildhall Library Broadside 190 g 13 (54)).

but his junior officers were apparently not taken from the Trained Bands.¹ Turner's regiment was to serve alongside Harvey's in the autumn of 1643, but would be posted to the Committee for the West in the following spring for service in Waller's army.²

There was a further attempt to raise new horse in the City in the spring of 1644, this time through a modification of the system of public subscriptions. In April 1644, the newsbooks announced that 'the well affected Maidens in and about the City of London...are now collecting what quantity of money they possibly can amongst themselves for the raising and setting forth of a Regiment of Horse... for which purpose they have already gathered severall large summes in divers Parishes'.³ Particularly notable was the support given by the girls of St Dunstan's in the West, 'though by some thought otherwise disposed'⁴ - perhaps the residents of this relatively wealthy and fashionable parish were suspected of Royalist sympathies. There were also substantial contributions from the parishes of St Giles's Cripplegate, St Mary Magdalene Milk Street, St Thomas the Apostle, St Michael Crooked Lane, and St Margaret Moses.⁵ But there was not enough support to raise a complete regiment, and the plans

¹These were Major Salway and Captains George Thompson, Hooker, Timothy Whiting, Ghest, Beale, and Story (PRO SP 28 132 part 1, 'Accompt of the raysing...Colonell Richard Turner his Regiment of horse'; Adair, Cheriton, p. 178).

²Ibid.

³Mercurius Civicus, 11-13 April 1644 (E43/10).

⁴Ibid.

⁵PRO SP 28 15 f. 43.

had to be revised to provide for the furnishing of only a single troop, to be led by John Blackwell junior, formerly an ensign in the Blue Trained Band and more recently a cornet in Harvey's City Horse,¹ to which the new troop was assigned. Blackwell, a Grocer living in Bow Lane, bought the first 10 horses for 'the Maiden Troop' at Smithfield on 12 April, and throughout April and May he was busy buying pistols, saddles, armour and carbines² and commissioning the painting of the troop's cornet depicting the City and flaming hearts representing the maidens' zeal for the Cause.³ By 25 May Blackwell had 49 men plus the appropriate officers in the Maiden Troop, and the new unit took its place in Harvey's regiment in time for the beginning of a new campaign in the West.⁴

In August 1643 the Maiden Troop had not yet been born, but the London Militia Committee controlled a sizable army by Civil War standards: six City and three suburban Trained Bands, a similar number of Auxiliary regiments, and (on loan from Essex's army) Mainwaring's Redcoats - a total of 19 infantry regiments - and two regiments of horse.⁵ Aside from the stand at Turnham Green and the minor expeditions into Kent and Surrey, this Parliamentary reserve army had hitherto been confined to police and guard duties; all that was going to change during the autumn of 1643.

¹Since at least 13 December 1643 (PRO SP 28 131 (part)(Accounts of Harvey's Regiment), f. 3).

²CSPD 1644, p. 109; PRO SP 28 14 ff. 80, 83, 99; SP 28 15 f. 47.

³PRO SP 28 22 part 2 f. 279; Lr Williams's Library Ms Modern Folio 5.

⁴PRO SP 28 15 f. 51; SP 28 131 (part) (Accounts of Harvey's Regiment), f. 2b.

⁵There were also the gunners in the forts on the lines of communication, commanded by the Committee for Fortifications which was itself responsible to the Militia Committee, but the gunners were never drawn forth on campaign. See Mercurius Civicus, 11-17 August 1643 (E65/15).

CHAPTER VI
GLOUCESTER AND NEWBURY

During the spring and early summer of 1643, while the Auxiliaries were being raised and the Militia Committee was consolidating its hold on the suburban militias, the City Trained Bands had not been inactive. There was a minor purge among the captains in March, when Marmaduke Rawdon and Edmund Foster were 'dissered for their Malignancy',¹ and shortly afterwards fled to join the King at Oxford. The work on the fortifications went forward rapidly, with the volunteer labourers being escorted to the trenches 'with the City Drummes and Colours'.² The Trained Bands stood guard when Cheapside Cross was pulled down on the orders of Common Council on 2 May, and individual officers also demonstrated their iconoclastic Puritan zeal at this time: Walter Lee, a haberdasher on Ludgate Hill who had become a captain in the Yellow Trained Band during the winter, broke the windows in Westminster Abbey,³ while Captain Richard Hunt of the Red Trained Band pulled down the cross on the steeple of St Mary Woolchurch and defaced the monuments inside.⁴ At the end of May, when Edmund Waller's plot to betray the City to the Royalists was uncovered, the Trained Bands and the Auxiliaries were called out to seize the plotters and guard the prisons, and on 4 July they attended

¹A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 10-17 April (E247/25). Both were named in the King's Commission of Array, which was to have been published had Waller's Plot borne fruit (D. Lloyd, Memoires of the Lives... (1668), p. 634).

²Mercurius Civicus, 13-25 May (E104/3).

³Symonds.

⁴Mercurius Aulicus, 5 October.

at the execution of the two ringleaders.¹

The grouping of all the London area militia forces under the Militia Committee by Parliament on 29 July was a victory for the radicals in the City and Parliament, for it brought into being a sizable army which might succeed where that of the relatively moderate and ineffective Earl of Essex had failed. Sir William Waller was named as the commander of this army on the same date, and it was hoped that other units would also be raised and added to it. But Essex was still the Lord General, and over the following month the terms of Waller's new commission from Essex were in dispute. By 29 August, when Waller finally received his 'large' commission for an independent command, the London militia were already on the march - with Essex.²


During the early weeks of August, the Lord General had been considering the pleas of Colonel Edward Massey, the Parliamentary governor of Gloucester, for relief from the besieging Royalists. Essex decided to redeem his somewhat tarnished military reputation by leading a relief force in person, and he turned to the City for support, asking the citizens 'to send three or four of their Train'd-band Regiments, or Auxiliaries, to Fight with the Enemy at that distance, rather than to expect him at their own Walls, were they must be assured to see him as soon as Gloucester should be reduced'.³

A delegation from both Houses of Parliament attended a Common Council meeting on 19 August to back up the request for support, and the City fathers agreed to send out two regiments of the Trained Bands and three

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 7 June, 6 July; A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 25 May-1 June (E104/26).

²J. Adair, Roundhead General (1969), pp. 101-4.

³Clarendon, II, p. 264.



CENTRAL SOUTHERN ENGLAND (based on The Ordnance Survey Map of 17th-Century England (1930)).

of the Auxiliaries, to be chosen by lot;¹ at the same time, an order was issued 'commanding all persons whatsoever within the City of London and the Suburbs, and whatsoever is encompassed within the new intrenchments, to shut up their shops, and to continue them so shut up till either Gloucester be relieved...or further order taken'.² It was hoped that this would make the citizens in the Trained Bands more willing to march out, since they would not thereby lose trade to those who stayed behind.

The regiments chosen by lot to take part in the expedition were the Red and Blue Trained Bands, from the eastern and southern areas of the City, and the Red, Blue and Orange Auxiliaries, together with Colonel Mainwaring's Redcoats. We are fortunate in having a day-by-day account of the campaign, written by Sergeant Henry Foster of the Red Trained Band,³ and this gives us much valuable information about the events and the attitudes of the men taking part.

Foster's True Relation begins inauspiciously: 'Upon Wednesday the 23 of August, our red Regiment of the Train'd Bands marched into the new Artillery ground, and from thence that night wee marched to Brainford, and came thither about one a clocke in the morning; from whence the next day many of our Citizens, who seemed very forward and willing at the first to march with us, yet upon some pretences and faire excuses returned home againe, hiring others to goe in their roome; others returned home againe the same night before they came to Brainford'. The officers of the regiments taking part had already

¹A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 17-25 August (L65/33); Mercurius Aulicus, 21 August.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 26 August.

³H. Foster, A True and Exact Relation of the Marchings...(1643) (T69/15), reprinted in G.A. Raikes, History of the Honourable Artillery Company (1878), vol. 1, pp. 113-28.

been instructed to report the names of men 'who neither march themselves nor appoint other sufficient men to goe in their roome',¹ so it is clear that not all the men of the Trained Bands were willing or able to go on campaign, and that the principle of substitution was thoroughly accepted. Morale must also have suffered on Saturday night 26 August, while the Red Trained Band was quartered at Chalfont in Buckinghamshire; here one of Lieutenant Colonel Thompson's soldiers 'was accidentally slaine by shooting off a musket by one of his fellow Souldiers'. On the other hand, there were occasional encouragements: at Cheshunt on 23 August the Red Trained Band 'were well accomodated for Beere, having great plenty', and on 1 September they rejoiced at the sight of the 15,000 men of Essex's army marching together near Brackley in Oxfordshire.

This conjunction of the City militia with Essex's regular regiments was not, it appears, an unmixed blessing. Mercurius Aulicus heard that 'the old Souldiers were not pleased with the zealous company of the new Auxiliaries, and that there were great differences and distractions raised amongst them from the time of their first comming to the Army, the Souldiers sensibly perceiving that all the confidence of successe was generally reposed in the courage of the City-zelots'.² The Royalist Aulicus could be relied upon to make the most of any quarrels among the Roundheads, but there is no reason to doubt that some jealousy did exist among the experienced soldiers towards the young, enthusiastic, proud and inexperienced City-bred Auxiliaries in particular.

¹A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 17-25 August (Æ65/33).

²Mercurius Aulicus, 31 August.

The fortunes of the City brigade, as related by Foster, rapidly grew worse after 1 September. That night, while quartered near Aynho, the Red Trained Band were 'very much scanted of Victualls', and on Sunday 3 September they marched all day without food or drink. Arriving at the village of Oddington near Stow on the Wold, the Red Trained Band were forced to continue half a mile beyond the quarters of the rest of the City brigade in order to find some quarters of their own, and they were thus left in the van of the army without any cavalry protection. 'We were no sooner in our quarters, and set downe our armes, intending a little to refresh ourselves, but presently there was an Alarme beaten up, and wee being the frontier Regiment nearest the enemy were presently all drawn up into a Body, and stood upon our guard all that night; we were in great distraction, having not any horse to send out as Scouts...our Regiment stood in the open field all night, having neither bread nor water to refresh ourselves, having also marched the day before without any sustenance, neither durst we kindle any fire though it was a very cold night.'

On Monday morning the Red Trained Band managed to obtain some provisions, but soon there was another alarm and the regiment drew out to an open field atop a nearby hill. Here they were quickly surrounded on three sides by squadrons of Royalist cavalry: 'We stood and faced one another for the space of halfe an houre, then 6 or 7 of our men who had horses rod up to them and came within lesse then musket shot, flourishing their swords, daring them...we had lyned the hedges with musketeers, which they perceiving did not move towards our body, but only stood and faced us. Then some of the Auxiliary forces came up to us, and whose coming we gave a great shout, and then by and by after we saw my Lord General's forces comming down the hill'. Essex's arrival finally compelled the Royalists to retreat, but it had been a close-run thing, as Foster acknowledged: 'Their intent was to have

compassed us in on every side, but the Lord prevented them; they might have spoiled our whole Regiment had they in the morning come down upon us when we were taking a little food to refresh our selves, the enemy being then but half a mile off...I hope the mercy of that day will not bee forgotten'. Once again, the only casualty to the Red Trained Band had been self-inflicted: 'We lost but one man, who was slaine by our owne Cannon through his owne negligence, and another sore burnt and hurt by the same Peece'. And once again, they had to endure a night of hunger and hard lodging: 'Wee marched after them till twelve of the clocke at night; we lay all in the open field upon the plowd-land, without straw, having neither bread nor water'. Nevertheless, 'God enabled our Souldiers to undergoe it cheerfully; there was not one feeble sicke person amongst us but was able to march with us the day following'.

Worse was to come. On Tuesday 5 September the Red Trained Band were assigned to the guard of the baggage train, and during the evening the army attempted to move down the steep western face of Prestbury Hill. Although most of Essex's forces had reached the bottom of the hill by nightfall, the baggage train met with disaster in attempting the descent in the dark, and therefore remained at the top until morning. As a result, the Red Trained Band 'were constrained to lye all night upon the top of this mountaine, it being a most terrible tempestuous night of winde and raine as ever men lay out in, we having neither hedge nor tree for shelter, nor any sustenance of food, or fire'. Foster adds that 'we had by this time marched sixe daies with very little provision...our soldiers in their marching this day would run halfe a mile or a mile before, where they heard any water was'. Obviously the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries, like the regular

soldiers, did not have water-bottles.¹ At home, water was freely available at the Aldgate and Billingsgate conduits, but life on campaign was proving to be very different for the men of the Red Trained Band: 'Such straits and hardship our Citizens formerly knew not, yet the Lord that called us out to doe his worke enabled us to undergoe such hardnesse as hee brought us to'.

The discomfiture of the Red Trained Band on Prestbury Hill was compounded at midnight, when there were two alarms 'in the midst of all the storme and raine, which together with the darknesse of the night made it so much the more dreadfull, which also caused a great distraction among our Souldiers, every one standing upon his guard and fearing his fellow Souldier to bee his enemy...one young man of the Colonel's company was shot in this confusion upon this hill, whose death will be much lamented by his Parents and Friends, from whom he received a Letter but a few dayes before to returne home'.

Such letters were, it seems, quite common, for the Royalist Mercurius Aulicus reported that a number of them were intercepted during this week. He quotes from an example written by Susan Owen, wife of John Owen of Lieutenant Colonel Francis West's company of the Blue Trained Band: 'Most tender and deare heart...I am afraid the Cavaleers will kill thee or death will deprive thee of me, being full of greif for you...why could not you come home with Master Murfey on Saturday? Could not you venture as well as he? ...There is none of our Neighbours with you that hath a wife but Master Fletcher and Master Norwood and your selfe; every body can come but you...pitty me for God's sake and come home'.² Perhaps it is just as well that

¹C.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (1962), p. 238.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 9 September.

this batch of letters did not get through to the men of the Trained Bands, who already had sufficient inducements to want to return home. But it appears that most of the married men of the Trained Bands had either hired substitutes at the outset or (like Master Murph^r) returned home early, and even some of the bachelors like the young man killed on Prestbury Hill were being encouraged by their parents and friends to abandon the campaign. Presumably these deserters, who may themselves have been hired men, did not provide substitutes.

On Wednesday morning 6 September the men of the Red Trained Band finally descended Prestbury Hill, 'being wet to the very skin, but could get little or no refreshing, every house being so full of Souldiers'. Two or three hours later there was another alarm and the men were formed up in a nearby field, where 'our souldiers began to complaine pitifull^y, being even worn out and quite spent for want of some refreshing, some complaining they had not eat or drunke in two dayes, some longer time'. The alarm passed without incident, and the Trained Bands later marched on to a village near Gloucester 'where our Souldiers had some reasonable accomodation and refreshment'. The following evening at 7 p.m. they were ordered to march, 'but it being a ver^y darke night, and our men worne out and spent with their former marching, they refused to goe; but the next morning being Friday Sept. 8 we did'. The Royalist siege of Gloucester having been raised at Essex's approach, the Trained Bands marched in on Friday with the rest of the Parliamentary army; 'we found very loving respect and entertainment in this city, they being very joyful of our coming'.

On Sunday 10 September the bulk of the arm^y, including the Red Trained Band, marched to Tewkesbury in order to allow the citizens of Gloucester to replenish their supplies of corn and other provisions,

although two of the London regiments were reportedly left in Gloucester under the command of Colonel Randall Mainwaring.¹ At Tewkesbury the Lord General ordered a bridge to be constructed across the Severn, as if he was intending to march on Royalist-held Worcester; this was duly reported by the Royalist scouts, and the King made appropriate dispositions of his forces to protect Worcester. Then, on Friday night 15 September, Essex suddenly led his entire force in the opposite direction, reaching Cirencester at 3 a.m. and gaining a day's march on the Royalists in a race back towards London. The small Royalist garrison in Cirencester quickly surrendered, and the Parliamentarians moved on to Cricklade, Swindon and Aldbourne near Hungerford with Prince Rupert's cavalry in pursuit. Foster has few complaints about this part of the campaign, since there had been ample provisions available at Tewkesbury and Cirencester, but on Sunday night 17 September at 'a little poore village called Chisledon' the Red Trained Band 'could get no accomodation either for meat or drink but what we brought with us in our snapsacks; most of us quartred in the open field, it being a very cold frosty night'.

The skirmish at Aldbourne Chase, where Rupert's horse overtook the Parliamentarians on Monday 18 September, was entirely a cavalry affair, with the Roundhead infantry watching events in the valley from the surrounding hilltops. Foster reports that 'our foot were not ingaged at all in this fight, except two Regiments only', but he did observe the actions of Colonel Harvey's City Horse, who were also taking part in this campaign. Harvey's troops 'drew up in a body & gave the enemy a very feirce charge, which was performed with

¹Certain Informations, 11-18 September (E67/22).

as brave courage and valour as ever men did'; nevertheless, they were repulsed by the Royalist horse, and Captain Peter Willett (who had taken command of one of Harvey's troops in March) 'received a shot from the enemy, of which wound he is since dead'. As night fell, both sides drew off their forces, the Roundheads marching to Hungerford for the night. Foster reports that 'we were much distressed for want of sleep, as also of other sustenance; it was a night of much raine, we were wet to the skin'.

On Tuesday both armies continued the race towards Newbury, and by nightfall the Parliamentarians had reached Enborne, a mile and a half from the town; their attempt to enter Newbury itself had been prevented by the timely arrival of Rupert's cavalry. Foster records that 'this night our whole Army quartered in the open field; we had no provision but what little every one had in his Snapsack. We had now marched many dayes and nights with little food, or any sustenance, and little sleep'. Finally, he adds, 'this night the King sent a challenge to the Lord Generall to give him battell the next morning'; the stage was set for the most renowned exploit of the London militia in the Civil War at the First Battle of Newbury.

'The next morning, Septem. 20, very early before day, we had drawn up all our Army in their severall Regiments and marched away by break of day'. The Red and Blue Trained Bands were given the right flank and posted 'in open campania' on Wash Common, while the Auxiliaries and Mainwaring's Redcoats stayed with the rest of Essex's infantry to secure Bigg's Hill in the centre. An advance party was already skirmishing with the Royalists while the Red and Blue regiments were still moving into position, 'which we hearing, put us to a running march till we sweat again, hastening to their releife and succour'. Foster describes what the Red Trained Band found on

arriving at Wash Common:

'The enemy had there planted 8 pieces of Ordnance, and stood in a great body of Horse and Foot, wee being placed right opposite against them, and far lesse then twice Musket shot distance from them. They began their battery against us with their great Guns, above halfe and houre before we could get any of our Guns up to us; our Gunner dealt veryill with us, delaying to come up to us; our noble Colonell Tucker fired one peece of Ordnance against the enemy, and aiming to give fire the second time was shot in the head with a Cannon bullet from the enemy....The enemy's Canon did play most against the red Regiment of trained Bands; they did some execution amongst us at the first, and were somewhat dreadful when mens bowels and brains flew in our faces, but blessed bee God that gave us courage, so that we kept our ground, and after a while feared them not; our Oranance did very good execution upon them, for we stood at so neer a distance upon a plain field that we could not lightly misse one another.'

Meanwhile, the other Trained Band regiment was holding the extreme right of the Roundhead position against Rupert's cavalry:

'The blew Regiment of the trained Bands stood upon our right wing and behaved themselves most gallantly. Two regiments of the Kings horse which stood upon their right flanke afar off came fiercely upon them and charged them two or three times, but were beat back with their Muskettiers, who gave them a most desperate charge and made them flie'.

In the centre, the Auxiliaries (augmented by 60 files of musketeers drawn from the Red and Blue Trained Bands) were taking part in the struggle to retain Bigg's Hill against the Royalist horse. It was probably the Auxiliaries rather than the Trained Bands on the right flank who were encouraged by the Lord General himself during the height of the battle:

'His Excellency the Larle of Essex during this battle behaved himselfe with much resolution and valour, himself in person leading up the City Regiments, and when the enemies horse had broken thorow them and almost routed them, so that many of the Trained Bands [sic], (not being used to martiall affaires, and to come into so great danger) were ready to flie and turne their backs upon the enemy...the souldiers were so animated that they charged upon the enemy with more resolution than ever'.¹

¹Mercurius Civicus, 21-28 September (169/8).

The Red and Blue Trained Bands, having endured their battering by the Royalist guns and cavalry for three hours, were combined together to secure a defensive position on a little hill,

'which we maintained against the enemy halfe an hour; two Regiments of the enemies foot fought against us all this while to gain the hill, but could not. Then two regiments of the enemies horse which stood upon our right Flank came fiercely upon us, and so surrounded us that wee were forced to charge upon them in the front and reere and both Flanks, which was performed by us with a great deal of courage and undauntednesse of spirit, insomuch that wee made a great slaughter among them and forced them to retreat, but presently the two regiments of the enemies foot in this time gained the hill and came upon us before wee could well recover our selves, that we were glad to retreat a little way into the field, till we had rallied up our men and put them into their former posture, and then came on again'.

The fighting swayed back and forth throughout the day and continued after nightfall, with the Parliamentarians slowly gaining ground but unable to achieve an outright victory. After midnight the Royalists withdrew into Newbury, leaving the Roundheads in possession of the battlefield, which admittedly provided little comfort: 'We were in great distresse for water of any accomodation to refresh our poore Souldiers...we were right glad to drink the same water where our horses did drink, wandering up and downe to seek for it'.

As day broke on Thursday 21 September, the London regiments took stock of their losses. Lieutenant Colonel William Tucker of the Red Trained Band, who commanded the regiment during the campaign, had been killed by a cannon-shot early in the day. Captain Richard Hunt, also of the Red Trained Band, who had demonstrated his iconoclastic fervour at St Mary Woolchurch in May, was dead, as was Foster's own captain, George Mosse, a tailor from the parish of St Mary Aldermanbury who had served with the musket detachment in the defence of the central hill and 'received a shot in the back from the enemy, of which wound he is since dead'. Foster records that there were many casualties among the other ranks as well: 'We lost 60 or 70 men in our red Regiment of the trained Bands, besides wounded men, we

having the hottest charge from the enemies Cannon of any regiment in the Army'. Other casualties from the London units included one Bolton, a captain of Auxiliaries who died of his wounds,¹ and John Juxon, formerly an ensign in the White Trained Band but now a captain in Harvey's regiment of City Horse; his mount 'was shott in the forehead by a Cannon bullet & ran with him violently into his Majesties Army, where the horse fell downe dead, & himselfe mortally wounded'.²

What had the London regiments gained in return for these losses? All commentators, Parliamentarian and Royalist alike, agree on this. According to Foster, 'If I should speak anything in the praise and high commendations of these two regiments of the trained Bands, I should rather obscure and darken the glory of that courage and valour God gave them this day; they stood like so many stakes against the shot of the Cannon, quitting themselves like men of undaunted spirits, even our enemies themselves being judges'. Mercurius Aulicus would only admit that 'much of the slaughter fell upon the London Trained Bands and their Auxiliaries...for indeed the Londoners were put upon the worst and hardest service',³ but Clarendon later paid them a warmer tribute:

'The London Train'd-bands and Auxiliary Regiments (of whose inexperience of danger, or any kind of service beyond the easy practice of their postures in the Artillery Garden men had till then too cheap an estimation) behaved themselves to wonder, and were in truth the preservation of that Army that day. For they stood as a Bulwark and Rampire to defend the rest, and, when their wings of Horse were scatter'd and dispersed, kept their ground so steadily that though Prince Rupert himself led up the choice Horse to Charge them, and endured their storm of small

¹PRO SP 28 193 part 1 (2) f. 8; Certain Informations, 25 September-2 October (E69/17).

²Symonds. This account refers to John Juxon, not Thomas of the Green Trained Band, as Symonds had thought at first.

³Mercurius Aulicus, 20 September.

shot, he could make no impression upon their stand of Pikes, but was forced to wheel about; of so Sovereign benefit and use is that readiness, order and dexterity in the use of their Armes, which hath been so much neglected'.¹

Among the Parliamentary accounts, Bulstrode Whitelock states that 'the London Regiments did their parts with much Courage and Gallantry',² while the newsbook The Parliament Scout sorrowfully compared the losses of the two sides:

'It fell out unhappily that the City Regiments contrary to my Lord's direction and intention were first and most desperately ingaged, which was a sad business, the best of an Army being usually kept for the turne of the day...the enemy lost for a long time none but totterdemalion Welch and Irish, whilst we lost Citizens of a City not inferiour to Rome...we had neer 300 wounded also, and that which makes it more sad is they were most of them of our City Regiments'.³

The troubles of the London brigade were not over yet, for during their march towards Reading on 21 September they were attacked by the Royalist cavalry near Aldermaston:

'Our horse which brought up our reere durst not stand to charge the enemy, but fled, running into the narrow lane, routed our own foot, trampling many of them under their horses feet, crying out to them "Away, away, every man for his life, you are all dead men", which caused a most strange confusion amongst us...our foot fired upon the enemies horse very bravely and slew many of them, some report above 100, and not 10 of ours; some that we took prisoners our men were so enraged at them that they knockt out their braines with the butt-end of their Muskets'.

The Parliamentarians finally managed to get away to Theale at 10 p.m. After resting at Reading for three days, the London regiments continued via Maidenhead and Brentford and returned home to the capital on Thursday 28 September:

'most of them (imitating the ancient Romans) went through the City with greene boughs in their hats in signall of victory, and also with all their Colours and Ensignes, which (to their perpetuall honour) they brought away triumphantly notwithstanding the great

¹Clarendon, II, p. 263.

²Whitelock, p. 70.

³The Parliament Scout, 22-29 September (E69/12).

danger they were in in the said fight, for that the great designe of the Cavaliers was to have routed or surprised the City forces and charged more against them then any other of his Excellency's Army'.¹

The Lord Mayor and Aldermen met the brigade at Temple Bar and thousands of citizens lined the streets, while the church bells pealed to welcome the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries back to London.² Despite substitution, desertion, hard marches, lack of food, water and sleep, fatal accidents, and jealousy from the regular soldiers, the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries had demonstrated their courage and military effectiveness in battle and saved the day at Newbury, undaunted by their heavy losses from the Royalist artillery. London saluted its new heroes, while the Red Trained Bands themselves resolved to give thanks to God for their deliverance every 20 September at St Botolph's Aldgate.³

The Royalists at Oxford were meanwhile making their own assessment of the significance of the London militia's performance at Newbury, and here all was despondency. Clarendon reports the mood among the King's officers:

'Since it appear'd that the City was so much united to the Parliament that it supplied their Army with such a body of their Train'd-bands (without which it could never have march'd), with what success could his Majesty have approached London?...and would not the whole Body of Train'd-bands have defended That, when so considerable a part of them could be perswaded to undertake a March of two hundred Miles?⁴

¹The True Informer, 30 September (E69/14).

²Foster, op. cit.; Certain Informations, 25 September-2 October (E69/17).

³CSPD 1653-9, p. 138.

⁴Clarendon, II, p. 278.

The size of the force available to defend the capital was indeed formidable, as had been seen at the general muster in Finsbury Fields on Tuesday 26 September, two days before the brigade with Essex had returned home. A Royalist observer, William Levett, made notes of the muster, recording the officers, colours and numbers of men present in each regiment, and another Royalist, Richard Symonds, copied Levett's manuscript and added numerous additional details from his own knowledge of personalities and events.¹ These two accounts show that the London militia forces, not including the two regiments of City Horse, the suburban Auxiliaries, or Mainwaring's regular Redcoat regiment, numbered no less than 18,000 men.

Levett's and Symonds's manuscripts also allow us to determine the changes among the officers since the autumn of 1642, showing how some new men were quickly rising to prominence.² In the Red Trained Band, Marmaduke Rawdon had departed for Oxford and James Bunce had resigned on being elected an alderman, but Thomas Atkins was apparently still the titular colonel and Randall Mainwaring the lieutenant colonel. Atkins, like the other alderman-colonels, did not go on campaign with the regiment, and Mainwaring had numerous other duties, so William Tucker was acting colonel at the time of his death at Newbury. William Thompson and Edward Hooker still commanded companies in the Red Trained Band, but there was a significant new addition in Captain Laurence Bromfield, who was active in City and parish government and would later achieve prominence in the Yellow Trained Band. Another

¹Dillon, loc. cit. Levett's manuscript is now in the National Army Museum.

²For sources of information on individual officers see p.56.

new officer in the Red Regiment was Captain Richard Hunt, the iconoclastic confectioner who had been killed at Newbury. The captain-lieutenant commanding the colonel's company was Sergeant Henry Foster's own captain, George Mosse, who had been ensign of the company in 1642; like Tucker and Hunt, he had met his death in battle. Unfortunately, we do not know who replaced these three officers in the autumn of 1643.

In the White Trained Band, George Langham had left his company to command a regiment in Essex's army, and Edmund Harvey had gone to lead the City Horse. Thomas Chamberlain, Thomas Player and Christopher Whichcot were still captains in the White Regiment, and there were three new men. Captain William Manby senior had served as a lieutenant in the Red Trained Band in 1642. Captain Joseph Vaughan had not previously held a commission, but would later rise to become colonel; Symonds notes that he was 'displaced', but this seems to be incorrect as the parish records of St Christopher le Stocks label him as a captain in 1643 and 1644 and a major in 1645 and 1646. Captain-Lieutenant Richard Venner (not 'Verner') was variously described as a merchant, a hosier and a barber-surgeon and was active in parish affairs in St Bartholomew Exchange.

The Yellow Trained Band had witnessed the departure of John Venn to command his army regiment garrisoning Windsor Castle, while William Geere had left his post for some unknown reason and Richard Turner had resigned to take command of the second regiment of City Horse. Ralph Harrison, Richard Cuthbert and Robert Tichborne had therefore moved up the ladder in the Yellow Regiment, and again there were three new company commanders. Captain Walter Lee, the breaker of the Abbey windows, had received his commission by April 1643 and would eventually rise to become lieutenant-colonel; Captain Willim Hitchcock

had been a lieutenant in the Yellow Regiment in 1642; Captain-Lieutenant John Brett's attachment to the colonel for whom he deputised is evidenced by the christening of his son in 1655 as Wollaston Brett.

There were a number of changes in the Blue Trained Band, where only the colonel and two other commanders retained their posts. Edmund Foster had fled to Oxford with his father-in-law, Marmaduke Rawdon; Samuel Carleton had joined the army; John Blackwell probably resigned for reasons of health (he was in Bedlam in 1644); Richard Hacket had joined the Royalists and had subsequently been captured at Cirencester during the withdrawal of Essex's forces from Gloucester. Replacing them were Captain Edward Bellamy, a Fishmonger at the Flying Horse near London Bridge who had been captain-lieutenant in 1642; Captain John Booker, the clerk of the bankruptcy court, who had not previously served as an officer in the Blue Regiment; Captain George Dipford, another new man; and Captain William Coleson, who 'with his company carried the Statues in the church of Allhallows to the parliament'. Of the new captain-lieutenant, Edward Clegatt, little is known.

The only change among the officers of the Green Trained Band was in the captain-lieutenant. Nathaniel Hawes, who had held that position in 1642, had left during the following year, and Thomas Juxon was appointed in his place. Juxon had been ensign of the same company in 1642, and was a business partner of Captain Matthew Shepherd, his cousin. Levett mistakenly thought that it was this man, rather than Captain John Juxon of Harvey's City Horse, who had been killed at Newbury; Thomas Juxon in fact survived to become major of the Green Trained Band in 1647 and left a diary of the events in the City that year. Symonds notes that the junior captain in September 1643, Robert Mainwaring, also commanded a troop of horse in Harvey's

regiment and soon quit his post in the Green Trained Band, thereby presumably providing Juxon with his next step up the ladder of seniority. Both Levett and Symonds state that Lieutenant-Colonel Matthew Foster was 'put out' of his place, but he was still described by this rank in the parish records of St Bartholomew Exchange in May 1644, shortly before his death.

The Orange Trained Band had lost Thomas Buxton to Colonel John Venn's army regiment and Richard Browne to a senior position in Essex's army, leaving two vacant places. The first was filled by Captain Richard Wollaston, who had been the captain-lieutenant in 1642 and was related to Sir John, the colonel of the fellow Regiment and soon to be Lord Mayor. The other captaincy was filled by Miles Petty, who had not held a commission the previous year. The new captain-lieutenant was Walter Boswell, an ensign in 1642, whose trade and residence are not known.

In summary, the new captains of 1643 were the same type of men as those appointed in the previous year - established merchants and tradesmen, financially 'able', often subscribing horses for the Parliamentary cause or investing in the Irish adventures. More than half of them had not served as subalterns in the Trained Bands in 1642, but all had spent some years in drill practice in the Artillery Garden. Since the army now had its full complement of officers, these new militia commanders would not be lured away by prospects of promotion outside the Trained Bands, but would stay with their regiments and gradually ascend to the more senior grades; many of them would ultimately serve as commanding officers of their units at some time during the troubled years of 1647-8.

CHAPTER VII

BASING, ALTON AND NEWPORT

While the London brigade with Essex marched to the relief of Gloucester, Sir William Waller was still attempting to form a new army of his own in the capital under the commission which had recently been wrung from the Lord General. Recruits, however, were unexpectedly slow in joining, and Common Council decided on 9 September that the City should be even-handed in the dispute between Waller and Essex; they approved of the Militia Committee's sending out of the regiments with Essex to Gloucester, and asked the Committee to also send out some Auxiliary units to join Waller.¹ Lots were again drawn, and the choice fell on the City's Green Auxiliaries, the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, and the Westminster Red Trained Band.² There were conditions attached to this loan, however: the London units 'must serve onely under their owne Commanders, and be recalled whensoever the Committee for the Militia of London shall think fit'.³ In the event, Essex succeeded in relieving Gloucester and repulsing the Royalists at Newbury without the aid of a second army led by Waller, and the three chosen regiments delayed several weeks before marching out to join him - although the newly raised second regiment of City Horse under Colonel Richard Turner did so in September.⁴

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 73b.

²The Perfect Diurnall, 4-11 September (noted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 22).

³Mercurius Aulicus, 11 September.

⁴Adair, Cheriton, p. 22.

One newsbook¹ states that the reason why Waller did not immediately take up the offer of a loan of men from London was that the Auxiliary units were too small to be useful at the time.

Following the general muster on 26 September and the return of Essex's City brigade to London two days later, plans were quickly drawn up to retake the town of Reading, which had been abandoned by Essex during the withdrawal from Newbury to the capital. To the three regiments assigned for service with Waller were added three others - the City's Green and Orange Trained Bands and the Southwark Yellow Trained Band - together with Mainwaring's Redcoats.² The plan was that the seven regiments should march out on Monday 9 October to Windsor, where they would join the combined armies of Waller and Essex,³ but none of them actually left London until the following week. By that time, news of Lord Hopton's activities in Wiltshire and Hampshire forced a change of plan; the reconquest of Reading was temporarily delayed, and Waller now planned to muster his forces at Farnham while Essex was to move north and fortify Newport Pagnell, each with support from some of the London militia units.⁴

The first regiment to march out were the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries,⁵ and once again we have a day-by-day account of the

¹The Parliament Scout, 22-29 September (E69/12).

²Certain Informations, 9-16 October (E70/29).

³Ibid.

⁴Adair, Roundhead General, pp. 111-2.

⁵Adair (Cheriton, p. 27) and Goold Walker (p. 140) both confused this regiment with the City Yellow Auxiliaries commanded by Colonel Robert Tichborne. No list of officers survives, and Archer's account is the only source of information concerning the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries at this period.

campaign written by one of the officers of the regiment, Lieutenant Elias Archer.¹ This begins on the same note as Sergeant Henry Foster's account of the previous expedition: after marching to Kensington, Hammersmith and Brentford, 'we stayed foure dayes for some of our Companies and Souldiers which staid at London; while we staid there, divers of our men who pretended fairly to march with us went back to London, some hiring others in their roome, others wholly disserted us'. Nor was this problem confined only to one regiment. A Parliamentary newsbook claimed only that 'most of the Trained Bands expressed great willingness' to march out,² while Mercurius Aulicus stated that they came 'so unwillingly out of London' that 'two Regiments...cried "faces about" at Brainford and returned home to London. Nay, in Westminster when the Drums beat to have all men repaire to their Colours on paine of death, not a third part appeared, and of those that did appeare Faulconbridge (their new Officer) was pleased to commit some of them present to prison for crying "One and all" when they refused to march away'.³ To this, another Roundhead propagandist weakly replied 'they do not refuse to march because they would not fight against your Cavaliers, but they desire to stay to keep up trading, that they may the better maintaine the war against you'.⁴ The problem was such that the Militia Committee had to call for community pressure: every parish from which

¹ E. Archer, A True Relation of the Trained-bands (1643)(E101/64), quoted in Adair, Cheriton, *passim*.

² Mercurius Civicus, 12-19 October (E71/21).

³ Mercurius Aulicus, 21 October.

⁴ Mercurius Britanicus, 17-26 October (E72/2).

one of the assigned regiments was drawn

'shall speedily prepare a large Table, to be fixed within the respective Churches, wherein shall be inscribed the names of all such Souldiers that shall voluntarily in person expresse their alacrity and courage in so commendable a service, as a testimony of their good affections and a perpetuall memoriall to the honour of them and their posterity. And if any shall faile to be ready to march away at eight of the clock, he shall forfeit five shillings; if they appeare not by nine of the clocke, then ten shillings; if not ready by twelve of clocke, then their Shops shall be shut up and shall be deprived of Trade and be liable to expulsion out of the Lines of Communication'.¹

Mercurius Aulicus claims that this last penalty was actually enforced:

'When some Citizens were not forth comming upon the beating of the Drumme...the faction barbarously tooke their wives and children, and ...cast them quite out of the line of Communication'.²

One way or another, the London regiments were persuaded to march out during the third week of October. By Wednesday 25 October the City Green Auxiliaries and the Westminster Red Trained Band were quartered at Windsor and Datchet, where they were joined by the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, who had finally mustered their missing companies at Brentford the previous day.³ At the same time, the City's Orange and Green Trained Bands, the Southwark Yellow Trained Band, and Mainwaring's Redcoats, together with Harvey's City Horse, had marched north to St Albans in support of the Lord General.⁴ Leaving them for the moment, we will follow the fortunes of the troops destined for Waller as described in Lieutenant Archer's True Relation.

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 31 October; cf. also E71/17.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 24 October.

³Archer, op. cit.

⁴Mercurius Civicus, 19-26 October (E72/10).

The regiments at Windsor and Datchet were drawn out on Sunday 29 October with the intention of marching to Farnham to join Waller, but by the time the troops had assembled it was too late to begin the march. On Monday they finally left Windsor, reaching Bagshot during the evening and then continuing on to Farnham, where they arrived at 1 or 2 a.m. on Tuesday morning. Here they stayed until Friday, and this time there was plenty of food available: 'While we remained there, we had much provision sent to our Regiment from our neighbours where our Regiment was raised, which was very thankfully received'. On Friday the troops at Farnham marched to Alton, where they were met by the rest of Waller's army, and on Saturday the entire force intended to proceed to Winchester, 'but by the extremity of wet and snow, we were all forced to return to our quarters againe'. These quarters, Archer tells us, were mostly 'Barnes and such like', but the following night brought colder lodging: 'When we came within nine miles of Winchester (or thereabout) in the evening we turned to the right, and that night quartered in the fields neere a Village called Chilton (this was a very cold night and very tedious to many of our men which never were accustomed to such lodging)'.

The wet and snowy weather must indeed have depressed the London citizens in Waller's army, but some of their comrades had already given up and gone home while the brigade was at Farnham. It was reported during the week that 'divers of the Auxiliaries were now and then returning home',¹ and the Commons were forced to order on 2 November 'that Mr Alderman Penyngton and Mr Browne do go to the Committee of the Militia to acquaint them that many of the City forces

¹The Compleate Intelligencer & Resolver, 14 November (E75/32).

that were sent forth with Sir William Waller were returned'.¹ Another newsbook blamed the delay in supplying Waller with powder and shot: 'It were to be wished he had been provided of Ammunition &c., that so he might immediately, upon the resolution taken, have advanced; so had the Auxiliaries been far west by this time, and would not have had the opportunity to step home to see their friends'.² But distance from the capital apparently did not prevent London soldiers from 'stepping home to see their friends', since desertion was to be one of the constant themes in all reports of their actions throughout the war.

By Sunday 5 November, Waller had learned of Royalist plans to cut off his retreat; this forced another change of plan, and Waller determined to attack the garrison of Basing House rather than the Royalist concentration at Winchester.³ Lieutenant Archer takes up the story:

'Munday the sixt, about an houre before day, we marched away towards Basing, and about noone our whole Army was drawne up about halfe a mile from Basing-house; then there was a Forlorne-hope of about 500 musketeers drawne out of our Army and Captain William Archer (my worthy Captain)⁴ appointed for our Regiment, with considerable Captaines and Officers out of other Regiments, who...led on the said Forlorn-hope and continued in fight against the said house till they had spent all the powder and shot they either had, or could at the present be procured. At length they were relieved by a Regiment of Dragoones, who maintained the fight till the edge of the evening'.

¹CJ, III, p. 299.

²The Parliament Scout, 3-10 November (E75/22).

³Adair, Cheriton, p. 35.

⁴The relationship between Lieutenant Elias Archer and Captain William Archer is not known.. William was a Pewterer living in St Dunstan's in the East in 1638, but by 1641 had had 'decayed' and was living in Limehouse. He nevertheless rose again to become Master of the Pewterers' Company in 1653 and was later a vestryman, sidesman and churchwarden for Ratcliff in the parish of St Dunstan's Stepney.

On Tuesday morning the attack was renewed by Waller's own regiment, and fighting continued throughout the day around the farm buildings and outhouses, which were eventually set on fire by the Royalist defenders of Basing House. The London regiments were not called upon to take part in this day's fighting, but stood in reserve on a nearby hill and watched Waller's men being driven out of the farm buildings. Tuesday night was again a cold one, and in the morning Waller received a deputation from the City Green Auxiliaries, Tower Hamlets fellow Auxiliaries, and Westminster Red Trained Bands, 'who were not used to this hardness', as Waller himself noted:

'The officers came to me and made itt their request they might be drawn off, with an intimation that many of the souldieers were hirelings, and their monye being spent, they began to thinke of their returne. The first remonstrance of this kinde was made by the field officers, the second by the captaines and inferiour officers. This was a great surprise to me, but the weakness of my condition without them inforced me to yeeld upon condition they would give me in their desires under their hands, which they did. Upon this, I drew the army into Basing Stoke to refresh itt for two or three dayes.'¹

It was not in fact until Sunday 12 November that Waller was able to lead his forces back to Basing House for a renewed attempt on the Royalist garrison. Waller divided his men into two groups which were to attack simultaneously from different directions; the Londoners were instructed to capture the Royalist earthworks facing Basing Park, while the regular regiments attacked from the village side of the House. In general, Archer tells us, the assault was pursued with vigour:

'We gave a very hot and desperate charge against it on every side, and (in some places) came so neere to the wals that some of our ladders were raised (which ladders were not scaling ladders, for there were then none come to us); moreover we fixed one of our

¹Adair, Cheriton, p. 40.

Petards to a part of the wall, thinking to blow up the wall and so make a breach, but the wall was so thicke and strongly lined and supported with earth and turfe within side that the Petard did no considerable execution. While we were thus close under the wals, the women which were upon the leads of the house threw down stones and bricke, which hurt some of our men; in the meane time, the rest of our Forces continued firing against other parts of the house and performing such other service as it was possible for men to doe in such a desperate attempt, till it was darke night that we could not see their loop-holes (although we were within Pistoll shot of the wals); then we were drawne off into severall grounds and fields neere adjoyning, where we quartered for that night.'

In the midst of this fighting, however, a disaster had taken place among the Westminster Red Trained Bands:

'The said Regement of Trained-bands being designed to set upon the south-west part of the house through the Parke (being upon a plaine levell ground before the wall, without any defence or shelter), whether the fault were in their chiefe Leader at that present, either through want of courag or discretion, I know not, but their Front fired before it was possible they could doe any execution, and for want of intervals to turne away speedily the second and third wranks fired upon them and slew and wounded many of their owne men, which the enemy perceiving fired a Drake or two among them, which did much injury and was a lamentable spectacle; it was told me since by a Captaine in that Regement that they had seventy or eighty men slaine and hurt in that disorder.'

Waller himself thought cowardice among the Westminster Red Trained Bands was largely responsible for the debacle: 'That squadron of the red regiment that should have fallen on upon the Parke side on a worke that flanked us, and where there remained but six musketeirs, the rest beeing runn away, could not be drawn upp, only they fired out of distance, and so fell off againe'.¹ A newsbook claimed that 'had his Westminster Trained band come on, the house had that day been undoubtably taken...but the Westminsterians failed and could not be got on; some lay the fault upone one Captaine White, keeper of my Lord Peters house,² and say he would not go on for fear

¹Ibid., p. 44

² 'Master White of Westminster' was made keeper of the papist Lord Petre's house in Aldersgate Street in January 1643; it was used as a prison for Royalist officers (A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 2-9 January (E244/44)).

of displeasing his prisoners, and that had he been killed, he had lost a place worth £1500 per annum; others say the Souldiers would not go on for fear of hurting his Majestie, whom they expected to come shortly and be their Neighbour again'.¹

Whether or not there was any real basis for the accusation against Captain White, the commitment to the Parliamentary cause of the Westminster Trained Bands had long been under suspicion. As we have seen, the dependence of the Westminster men on trade with Court circles had caused them to be distrusted in December 1641. Even as late as May 1643, a report describing the guards on the Houses of Parliament stated that 'their train-bands here, I mean of Westminster, are not betruſted with neither parliament nor citie, so that the quotidian guard of the parliament come daily out of London'.² This may not have been strictly true, but it shows how suspicion still lingered, as Clarendon also noted.³ But we must observe in passing that one newsbook claims that some of the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries were also to blame at Basing House: 'Many of the Westminster Regiment, and of St Katherine's, &c. were very faulty, especially the officers of those Regiments, whom Sir William could not get to come up so far as to the front of his Horse, where himſelfe ſtood in perſon'.⁴ Lieutenant Archer ſays nothing about any misconduct in his regiment, however.

The only London regiment to come off with credit at Basing were the City Green Auxiliaries; a newsbook reported that 'the trayned band of Westminster fell off from their worke, and left two peeces of

¹The Parliament Scout, 10-17 November (E76/8).

²Lithgow, op. cit., p. 537.

³See p. 102.

⁴The Scottish Dove, 17-24 November (E76/26).

Ordinance and some Petards behind them, which the London Youths of the Auxiliary Regiment bravely fetched off againe without the losse of one man'.¹ A week later it was made known that 'the Green Regiment of Auxiliaries did so good service in the execution at Bazing house, though some others failed, that Sir William Waller hath since advanced Captaine Web² to be a Sergeant Major, and his Lieutenant Master Everet,³ who was valiant in the fight, is to be made a Captain upon the next opportunity'.⁴

Waller himself records what happened at the muster of his forces in the village of Basing on the day following this assault, when he had received reports of the approach of Hopton's Royalist army:

'When the regiments were drawn out, as I was riding about to give orders, I was saluted with a mutinous cry among the citty regiments of "Home, Home". So that I was forced to threaten to pistoll any of them that should use that base language, and an ennemy in the field so neere. With this they were all very well acquietted.'

Waller called a council of war, and the officers voted to fight against Hopton:

'But they were no sooner returned to their regiments, but the mutiny broke out againe, with a protestation those of the citty would not march one foot further. Upon this I was enforced to retire to Farnham were I now am. A great part of those regiments are already gon to London, and the rest threaten to follow immediately, so that I am in a deserted condition.'⁵

But despite his disgust at the conduct of many of the Londoners,

¹Certain Informations, 13-20 November (E76/15). This incident is mistakenly reported as having taken place on the Monday.

²William Webb, a grocer of Bartholomew Lane in the parish of St Michael Cornhill, joined the HAC in 1641 and was a lieutenant in Colonel John Venn's regiment at Windsor in March 1643. He would later become colonel of the Green Auxiliaries.

³Not identified.

⁴Adair, Cheriton, p. 63.

⁵Ibid., pp. 44-5.

Waller was careful not to damn the City forces in general:

'I desire that what I have written concerning the London regiments may not be taken in such a sence as might have a reflection of dishonour either upon the citty unto which I owe all service and respect and particular obligations, or upon all the regiments, for there be many worthy gallant men amongst them. But the truth is, amongst the hirelings which were promiscuously taken upp, I have reason to suspect there were Malignants that putt themselves upon this service only to overthrow itt, and they are the men that have blown these coles.'¹

The main culprits, as during the assault on Basing House, were the Westminster Red Trained Bands. On Saturday 18 November the Commons ordered 'that the Committee for Westminster, sitting at Worcester House, do examine what Soldiers of the Regiment of Westminster are run away from their colours, and to return their names, that their persons may be secured'.² Accordingly, on the following Monday, 'at the beating of the Drumme, those of the Trained Bands that have deserted Sir William Waller's service and are returned to London were commanded upon paine of death to repaire unto the Army, and many houses were searched in the night time for them'.³ Within a few days, it was reported that 'divers of them are imprisoned in Westminster and Clarkenwell for running away from their colours, and likely shall be tried by a Counsell of warre'.⁴

Waller claimed on Sunday 19 November at Farnham that 'the Citie Forces (both Trainbands and Auxiliaries) had returned home', according to Mercurius Aulicus, but this was not strictly true; many of the City Green Auxiliaries and Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, and even

¹Ibid.

²CJ, III, p. 314.

³The Weekl^y Account, 15-22 November (E77/17).

⁴The Scottish Dove, 17-24 November (E76/26).

the Westminster Red Trained Bands, still remained with him at Farnham. Archer reports that on Saturday 18 November 'there came to us much Provision of Victuals and strong waters to our Regiment, which was very thankfully received, although (thanks be to God) we had no great scarcity before'. On Tuesday some of the soldiers decided to add to their provisions by poaching deer from a park near Farnham, but '(being a very thick misty day) the Enemies Scouts came upon them and tooke 9 of them prisoners, all Captaine Levets men'.¹ On the following day, the newly promoted Major Webb of the City Green Auxiliaries reported to his friends that he, 'with some other Companies of the Auxiliaries', expected shortly 'to be sent with our new Forces to relieve Plimmouth'.²

The rank and file of the City regiments had no wish to march to the relief of Plymouth; they wanted to go home. They had not received any pay, and had been paying for their provisions with their own money since they had no talent for foraging - they were 'citizens, civilly bred, and cannot make use of those Means for their supply as other common soldiers do that are used to the war'.³ Their month's tour of duty was due to expire on 29 November, but Waller could not afford to lose them, as he certainly would if no pay was forthcoming. The Militia Committee therefore went to the Commons on his behalf and managed to obtain two grants of £5000 each at the end of November, together with an order that the City regiments should stay at Farnham

¹ William Levett was lieutenant colonel of the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Bands in 1647 (PRO SP 28 46 part 1 f. 34), and he may have been a captain in the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries in 1643. It is unlikely, however, that he was the man of that name who described the ensigns at the muster on 26 September (see page 131).

² The Kingdomes Weekly Post, 22-28 November (E77/9).

³ CJ, III, pp. 315-6.

'till such time as there may be some other supply sent unto Sir William Waller in their stead'.¹ The citizens agreed, with some reluctance, to stay at Farnham for a few more days. On Sunday 3 December, according to Archer, 'newes was brought that Arundell Castle was lost, and divers reports were given out that our whole Army should march thither to redeeme it againe, which report bred some discontent in our London Forces (who then every day expected to be discharged from the service, in respect of our severall occasions constrayning us homewards, and the time being so long expired which was prefixed for our returne)'. They remained at Farnham, expecting every day to be allowed to return home; indeed, it was incorrectly reported by one Parliamentary newsbook that they came back to the City during the first week of December.² But finally, on Tuesday 12 December, 'in the morning most of our Forces were againe drawne into the parke, where our men were mustered, and we remained all day, expecting to be discharged and march homewards on the morrow'.

It was not to be:

'About an houre and halfe before night, Sir William came into the Parke to us, and at the head of every Regiment of our London Brigade, he gave us many thanks for our service past, and told us that according to his promise and our expectation we were to be discharged, & march homewards on the morrow, and said he would not detain us (if we were so bent homewards that we would stay no longer) but withall he told us that yet we could not returne with much honours in respect of the bad success we had in our chieftest service, certifiing us withall, that at the present there was an opportunity which might much availe the States, and bring honour both to God & our selves, if we would but lend him our asistance til the Monday following, engaging himselfe upon his honour and credit, that we should not longer be detained, which we considering gave our full consent to stay, for which he gave us many thanks, in a very joyfull expression advising us presently to prepare for the service because delaies are dangerous'.

¹Mercurius Civicus, 23-30 November (E77/15).

²The Scottish Dove, quoted in Mercurius Aulicus, 23 December.

The danger in delaying the march lay partly in the chance that the Londoners might change their minds. They were therefore given only a short while to return to the town of Farnham 'to refresh and prepare themselves for the service', but Archer reports that 'although they before gave their general consent', many soldiers from the City Brigade 'stayed behinde and went not with their Colours. Neverthelesse we advanced without them and marched all that night'.

In this new expedition, Lieutenant Archer had a counterpart in the Westminster regiment - an anonymous chronicler who was apparently determined to promote the honour and bravery of the much-maligned Westminster Red Trained Bands. His intention is plain from the first paragraph of his Narration of the Great Victory,¹ describing the muster in Farnham Park, 'amongst which were the Regiment of Westminster, whose behaviour and valour in this service is never to be forgotten'. He states that the army began marching shortly before 7 p.m., heading in the direction of Basing House as if to launch another attack there, but at 1 a.m. on Wednesday they suddenly turned south towards the town of Alton, the winter quarters of a brigade of Hopton's army. The surprise was nearly complete, with Waller's forces getting within half a mile of the town before the Royalists were aware of their presence. The Cavalier horse attempted to escape, but were pursued by Waller's cavalry while his regular infantry regiments began fighting their way into Alton from the north and north-west. The London units, meanwhile, supported by the garrison troops of Farnham Castle, attacked on the west, as Archer recalls, with the Westminster Red Trained Bands leading the way:

¹E78/22; quoted extensively in Adair, Cheriton, pp. 65 et seq.

'Then the Red Regiment and the Greene-coats, (which Greene-coats are the four Companies of Farnham Castle) set upon a halfe moone and a brest-worke which the Enemy had managed, and from whence they fired very hot and desperately till the Greene Auxiliaries marched on the other side of a little river into the Towne with their Collours flying and...fired upon them, so that they were forced to forsake the said halfe moone and brest-work, which they had no sooner left but presently the Green-coats and part of the musquetiers of the Red, and our Yellow Regiment entred while the rest of our Regiment marched into the Towne with their Colours flying.'

The Royalists retreated into the church and churchyard,

'all which they kept nere upon two houres very stoutly and (having made scaffolds in the Church to fire out at the windows) fired very thick from every place till divers souldiers of our Regiment and the Red Regiment, who were gotten into the Towne, fired very thick upon the South-east of the Churchyard, and so forced them to forsake that part of the wall, leaving their musquets standing upright, the muzzels whereof appeared above the wall as if some of the men had still lyn their in Ambush, and our men seeing no-body appeare to use those Musquets, concluded that the men were gone, and consulted among themselves to enter two or three files of Musquetiers, promising Richard Guy, one of my Captaines Serjeants (who was the first man that entred the Church-yard) to follow him if he would lead them; whereupon he advanced, and comming to the Church-yard doore and seeing most of the Cavaliers firing at our men from the South and West part of the Church-yard, looked behind him for the men which promised to follow him, and there was only one Musquetier with him. Nevertheless he flourishing his Sword, told them if they would come, the Church-yard was our owne; then Symon Hutchinson, one of Lieutenant Colonell Willoughbies Serjeants,¹ forced the Musqueteers and brought them up himselfe.'

An unknown sergeant of the Westminster Red Trained Bands also brought up some musketeers, and the Royalists were compelled to retreat into the church itself,

'but our men followed them so close with their Halberts, Swords, and Musquet-stocks that they drove them beyond the Church doore and slew about 10 or 12 of them, and forced the rest to a very distracted retreat.'

After further confused and disordered fighting in the churchyard, some of the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries attempted to enter the church

¹William Willoughby was probably, in fact, the colonel of the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries at this time, but was referred to by his rank in the more prestigious Tower Hamlets Red Trained Band, which was nominally commanded by the Lieutenant of the Tower, Isaac Penington. Willoughby was the effective leader of both regiments.

again, 'being led on by Sergeant Major Shambrooke,¹ (a man whose worth and valour Envy cannot staine), who in the entrance received a shot in the thigh whereof he is very ill. Nevertheless our men vigorously entered and slew Colonell Bowles their chiefe Commander....He being slaine, they generally yeelded and desired quarter'.

For Waller, this was a much-needed victory, and for the Westminster Red Trained Bands it was even more, as a Roundhead newsbook pointed out:

'There must not be one thing forgotten, but must be graven in letters of brass and set up in Westminster: that is, that the Westminster Forces, according to declared resolution, did bravely, fighting with great courage and resolution, and that when they were up to the knees in durt, they shot at the enemy as it were upon their knees, and made it appeare that it was rather the indiscretion of some then the cowardise of any part [that] they did not perform at Basing-house'.²

From Alton the London regiments marched back to Farnham with the rest of Waller's army. On Friday 15 December they were mustered once again by Waller, who proposed now to attack Arundel Castle and asked if they would accompany him, 'which most of our men utterly disliked and refused, as conceiving the recovery of that Castle to be a thing not to be affected, time enough for us to be on our march homewards before Christmas'.³ Waller abided by his promise and let them go home, escorting some of the Royalist prisoners from Alton:

'On Wednesday Decemb. 20 the trained Bands which were formerly sent out of London and Westminster unto the Army of Sir William Waller, viz. the red Regiment, under the command of Colonell Sir James

¹William Shambrook may originally have come from Whitechapel (Harl. Soc. Regs. XLII, St Margaret Moses), but now lived in the parish of St Mary Colechurch in the City. He was a well-known and active Separatist (Tolmie, pp. 40-1).

²The Parliament Scout, 8-15 December (E78/19).

³Archer, op. cit., quoted in Adair, Roundhead General, p 129.

Harrington of Westminster,¹ the greene Regiment of Auxiliaries under the command of Colonell Whichcot,² and the yellow Regiment of Auxiliaries,³ all of which have beene upon many hazardous desperate adventures since their going forth, and especially at the siege of Basing-house, returned victoriously into London with about 400 prisoners which they and others of Sir William Waller's Forces had taken at Alton on the Wednesday before: they were met by the Lieutenant of the Tower and Colonel Manwaring and Colonel Zachary⁴ with a Company of Hamlets belonging to the Tower and the City Marshalls, together with divers other gallant citizens, who accompanied them into the Towne in the afternoon'.⁵

The expedition had, in the end, been successful. The City Green Auxiliaries had behaved themselves well throughout the campaign; the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries also did well, and had good officers who were able to compel the musketeers forward at Alton churchyard when they had been reluctant to move; and even the Westminster Red Trained Bands had redeemed themselves to some extent. Excuses were now found for their failure at Basing House; it was reported that 'they offered their lives to [Waller] in any service against men, but were loth to venture against walls; we must excuse them, they being young and raw souldiers'.⁶ Less pardonable was the conduct of those who deserted, and those who had failed to march out in the first place;

¹Harrington, a baronet, lived at Highgate and was married to the daughter of a City alderman. He commanded the London brigade with Waller on this occasion and again in 1644 and was an MP by 1649 (G.E. Aylmer, The State's Servants (1973), p. 66). He should not be confused with James Harrington the Republican theorist.

²See p. 89.

³of the Tower Hamlets.

⁴Francis Zachary of Stepney, a brewer, ranked behind William Willoughby in the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Band was was probably the major at this time, although he performed the function of lieutenant colonel.

⁵Mercurius Civicus, 14-21 December (E79/3).

⁶The Compleate Intelligencer, 21 November (E76/19).

lists were subsequently prepared of those who fell into this last category and fines were collected from them.¹

On 2 January 1644, at Christ Church Newgate Street, a solemn thanksgiving was held 'for the safe returne of the three Regiments againe to London, which had been in pilgrimage with Sir William Waller'.² A few days before this, Mercurius Aulicus had published an intercepted letter sent to one of the Westminster men by his wife during the recent campaign, showing that the pressures to return home had not changed since Susan Owen wrote to her husband during the Gloucester expedition in September:³

'To my very loving husbane, Robert Rodway, a traine soudare in the Red Reggiment, under the command of Captaine Warrin...Most deare and loving husbane, my king love, I remember unto you hoping that you are good helth as I ame at the writting heareof. My little Willie have bene sicke this forknight. I pray you to cum whome ife youe cane cum saffly. I doo marfull that I cannot heere from youe ass well other naybores doo. I doo desiere to heere from youe as soone as youe cane. I pray youe to send me word when youe doo thenke youe shalt returne. You doe not consider I ame a lone woeman. I thought you would never have leave me thusse long togeder. So I rest evere praying for youre savefe returine. Your loving wife Susan Rodway, ever praying for you tell deth I depart.'⁴

Aulicus was, of course, a hostile witness, but it is unlikely that a propagandist would invent such a letter as this if he wanted it to be accepted at face value. Indeed, a recent study has shown that Aulicus did not invent letters or dispatches, and that 'Aulicus's accuracy was at its zenith in 1643, when its punctilious method of citing sources, giving dates and statistics, and its full descriptions of important events at once and deservedly established it as England's

¹See p. 108.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 4 January.

³See p. 122.

⁴Mercurius Aulicus, 28 December.

premier newsbook'.¹ The reliability of Aulicus suffered after the Royalist defeat at Marston Moor, but its reputation for accuracy before that time justifies our trust of its accounts of events in 1643.

During the time when Waller's forces were operating in Surrey and Hampshire, other units from the London militia had been serving with the Lord General north of the Thames. The City's Green Trained Band, the Southwark Yellow Trained Band, Colonel Mainwaring's regular Redcoat regiment, and Colonel Harvey's City Horse marched out to Windsor along with the regiments destined for Waller during the week of 15-21 October, and there they were joined by Colonel Richard Turner's second regiment of City Horse, who had been with Waller since September.²

One regiment assigned to Essex, the City's Orange Trained Band, was not able to leave London until Monday 23 October, when the Lord General had already begun his march northwards, and the regiment therefore marched direct to St Albans and made their rendezvous there with the rest of the Lord General's army on Wednesday.³ The Orange Trained Band was led by Lieutenant Colonel Rowland Wilson junior, whose widow was to marry Bulstrode Whitelock in 1650, and Whitelock gives us a description of Wilson's character and thoughts:

'This Gentleman Colonel Wilson was the only Son of his wealthy Father, heir to a large estate of £2000 per an. in Land, and Partner with his Father in a great personal Estate employed in Merchandize; yet in conscience he held himself obliged to

¹P.W. Thomas, Sir John Berkenhead 1617-1679 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 68, 65.

²Turner had his own problems with desertion: 'Lieutenant Giles Edwards rann away from Windsor with 2 horses', and a trumpeter deserted at St Albans soon afterwards (PRO SP 28 132 part 1, accounts of Turner's regiment).

³Mercurius Civicus, 12-19 October (E71/21), 19-26 October (E72/10).

undertake this Journey, as perswaded that the honour and service of God and the flourishing of the Gospel of Christ and the true Protestant Religion might in some measure be promoted by this service, and that his example in the City of undergoing it might be a means the more to perswade others not to decline it. Upon these grounds he chearfully marched forth with a gallant Regiment of the City, which, as I remember, was called the Orange Regiment This was the condition of this Gentleman, and of many other persons of like quality and fortune in those times, who had such affection for their Religion and the Rights and Liberties of their Countrey, that pro aris et focis they were willing to undergo any hardships or dangers and thought no service too much or too great for their Countrey.¹

From St Albans, 400 of the London infantry and most of the two City cavalry regiments were sent via Dunstable and Brickhill to wrest Newport Pagnell from the small Royalist garrison which was hastily throwing up defences around the town. The approach of this Parliamentary force, which was commanded by the Londoners' old friend Major-General Philip Skippon, so alarmed the Royalists that they withdrew without a fight on Friday 27 October: 'Though the Major [Skippon] was not within ten miles of, nor like to reach that night, yet were the enemies feares so great that they left the place... whether this feare possessed them by reason the London-Musquetiers were there, whose rough dealing with them at Newbery made them not dare to ascend the Banke...we know not'.² On Saturday, 'the Orange Regiment, and some other of our London forces were then quartered in and about Newport-pannell, but expected daily to be drawne forth to pursue the enemy, who (as we heare) is gone towards Oxford'.³

The Trained Bands at Newport did not in fact move for several weeks, but the City Horse under colonels Harvey and Turner were kept busy.

¹Whitelock, p. 72.

²Mercurius Civicus, 26 October-2 November (E74/14); The Parliament Scout, 20-27 October (E73/8), 27 October-3 November (E74/19).

³Mercurius Civicus, as above.

On Wednesday 1 November, 'a party of Horse (under the command of Colonel Harvey) were sent...from Newport-Pagnell to a Towne called Towcester in Northamptonshire, where a great party of the Cavaliers forces lay, who, comming thither in the night, slew the enemies sentinels and unaware fell into their quarters, tooke two colours, one and twenty prisoners, and brought them to Newport-Pagnell...at which place the Greene Regiment do as yet continue, and are strongly fortifying thereof'.¹ On the following day, Harvey's and Turner's Horse with the assistance of a regular cavalry regiment attacked a Royalist concentration at Alderton, south-east of Newport; 'they slew 15 on the ground, took 22 prisoners, and many horses which were left behind...so that a horse-Fayre was kept at Newport that day, and horses sold good cheape for ready money'.²

Saturday 4 November saw an attempt by the Royalist cavalry to recover the initiative:

'About 7 or 8 of the clock a party of the Cavaliers Horse, in all about 1,500, intended to have surprised some of Colonel Harveys Troopes, which lay in a Towne called Owlney in Northants, but they having timely intelligence thereof, by the command of the said Colonell drew out themselves in a full body a little distance from the Towne, and upon the enemies approach discharged violently against their forlorne hope and repelled them, yet at last, through the multitudes of the enemy, they were forced to retire quite thorow the Towne. After which the said Colonell collecting his said forces into a body returned againe to the Town, fell upon the enemy, slew divers of them, and forced them to quit the Towne. It is conceived there were about 40 slaine on both sides, whereof not above 14 were of the Parliament souldiers.'³

Another newsbook claimed, however, that the Parliamentarians lost 40 prisoners as well, and said that 'we have seldome the better in these

¹Mercurius Civicus, 2-9 November (E75/18).

²The Happy Successe of the Parliament's Armie at Newport (1643) (E75/19).

³Mercurius Civicus, as above.

short skirmishes; there is a report that our horsemen ran away (but the horsemen say the foot ran) and left their Officers, or a great many of them'.¹ A week later, 'Colonell Harveyes Regiment of Horse gave the enemy an Allarum in the night at Stony-Stratford, slew the Sentinells, entred the Towne with the losse of some thirty of the Cavalliers, took eighteen prisoners whereof five or six are said to be Commanders, and brought them safe into their Garrison at Newport-Pannell'.²

The London infantry regiments were meanwhile labouring in the trenches around Newport to complete the fortifications originally begun by the Royalists. On Sunday 5 November they 'desired to be prayed for in many parishes in London, which was done accordingly',³ but they were comparatively comfortable in Newport: 'They want no kind of provisions for food or other necessaries for their supplement in this unusuall service', it was reported on 14 November.⁴

The construction of fortifications at Newport was indeed an unusual service for the London militia units, and some of the members of the Militia Committee in London thought that the troops could be better employed elsewhere. The Committee received Waller's letter complaining of the desertions from his own London regiments on 19 November, and the Committee eventually decided to ask Essex to send the units at Newport to Waller to help in the struggle against Hopton's Royalist forces. Essex was not amused, and 'quickly returned them this very answer, that their moneth was almost expired, and then the Citizens would

¹The Parliament Scout, 3-10 November (E75/22).

²The Weekly Account, 8-15 November (E75/10).

³The Kingdomes Weekly Post, 9 November (E75/17).

⁴Mercurius Civicus, 9-16 November (E76/1).

returne home, and that most of them for the present were sicke, not being used to duties, and when those were returned he said he should not have above 2000 Horse and Foot'.¹ This reply prompted the Committee to petition the Commons on the following day, asking both for money and for exemption from further demands for service outside the City:

'Our Forces now abroad want Money; two Regiments of Horse, consisting of 14 Troops, and three Regiments of Foot, under the command of my Lord General; they have been abroad above a Month; besides three Regiments with Sir William Waller...Our City Forces were raised for the Guard of the City, and are Tradesmen, and when they are abroad their Plough lieth still at home, and besides they lose their Employment; and you cannot be ignorant that if the present course be continued it will be a great Wasting of Men. For the preventing whereof, this Remedy is offered: that my Lord General's Army be speedily recruited, and that the City of London may be considered of as a Place that hath much advanced, and is drawn dry; our rich Men are gone because the City is a Place of Taxes and Burdens; Trade is decayed and shops shut up in a great measure; our poor do much increase.'²

Nevertheless, the Committee's spokesman went on to say,

'I should be loth to be misunderstood, that any that hear me should think we begin to be discouraged in the service of the Farliament; though our Difficulties be great, nay, if far greater, we shall in no ways alter our Resolutions, but according to our Covenant do our Endeavours'.³

The Commons agreed to consider the points raised in this petition, but a week later the City's sheriffs and aldermen were again at the bar of the House to 'desire that those City Forces with my Lord General may be called home',⁴ their month having expired. Essex, however, wanted to keep them until the fortifications at Newport and some similar works at St Albans were complete, and the Commons backed up his request; at the end of the month the City fathers agreed

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 19 November

²CJ, III, pp. 315-6.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 323.

'to condescend to the Desires of this House to continue their Forces awhile longer at Newport Pannell'.¹

During the second week of December, according to one Parliamentary newsbook, 'we were in good hope...that the Londoners might have returned, at least they that goe in person upon their owne charge, and that the others, if not sent backe, may be taken on at ordinary pay',² but now there was Cavalier activity in the area which forced them to stay at Newport. On the 18th, both Houses finally passed an ordinance to raise 1200 men from the Eastern Association and Northamptonshire to garrison the town, 'upon whose comming thither, the London Train-Bands who are now in garrison there shall returne unto their homes, and be freed from their service there'.³ First, however, the London infantry were to see some action against the enemy. Shortly before Christmas, Skippon set out with the City's Green and Orange Trained Bands from Newport to Grafton House, a Royalist garrison which was already under siege by Essex's regular forces. On the way there, Skippon's party linked up with a second force from Northampton under the command of Nathaniel Whetham, a former London Trained Bands officer who was now governor of that town, and together they sat down before Grafton House on Friday 22 December. After several skirmishes over the next two days, the Londoners finally entered the house at 2 p.m. on the Sunday, capturing many prisoners and 'all the Armes and Ammunition and great store of plunder, which was the souldiers booty'.⁴ Later they returned to Newport

¹Ibid., p. 325.

²The Parliament Scout, 8-15 December (E78/19).

³Mercurius Civicus, 14-21 December (E79/3).

⁴A True Relation of the Taking of Grafton House (1643)(E79/24); The True Informer, 23-30 December (E79/29); J. Ricraft, A Survey of Englands Champions (1647), p. 83.

Pagnell, where they stayed until 9 January. About 20 sick men arrived home in London on that day,¹ and the rest of the London forces, having been relieved by the new garrison troops furnished by the Eastern Association, left Newport on the 11th. They spent that night at Barnet, and on Friday afternoon 12 January they returned to London,² apparently without fanfare despite their recent victory at Grafton House.

¹The Kingdoms Weekly Post, 10 January (E81/17).

²The True Informer, 6-13 January (E81/31).

CHAPTER VIII

WINTER 1643-4: NEW AUXILIARIES AND THE CHERITON CAMPAIGN

The militia units which had remained in London throughout the autumn and winter of 1643 had not been inactive, for both the Auxiliaries and the Trained Bands had been called upon for frequent guard duties at the extensive new system of fortifications. Courts of guard were provided, however, and these appear to have been substantial houses with a certain standard of comfort. The City spent £2,600 on courts of guard or watch-houses during 1643,¹ and an itemised bill for the one outside the Houses of Parliament lists charges for 'haspes and hinges for the windowes', 'mending the Harth of the Chimney', 'playstering of the house', and 'putting up boardes to avoid the annoyance of the Lords by pissing'.² In at least one case, a poor woman used a court of guard for a lodging and was provided for by the parish.³ But watch-houses with fireplaces required a constant supply of firewood, and the soldiers sometimes made their own arrangements when supplies were not provided. On 7 October the Commons ordered 'that the officers and Soldiers at the Courts of Guard be required not to permit any to cut down Trees or Woods in Hyde Park or Maribone Park but such as are authorized thereunto by Ordinance of Parliament',⁴ and a month later there was a complaint against soldiers at Islington

¹CLRO MS 86.5 f. 1b.

²PRO SP 28 262 f. 75.

³St Michael Queenhithe accounts, Guildhall Library MS 4825/1, ff. 44-5.

⁴CJ, III, p. 267.

'for cutting trees for firewood'.¹

While on duty, the guards were required to ensure that those entering or leaving the lines of communication had passes signed by Randall Mainwaring, the City's deputy Lord Mayor and Major-General. They were also responsible for searching suspicious persons, which sometimes led to difficulties; on 2 November, for example, while Captain Thomas Drinkwater's company of the City Blue Trained Band² was on duty at Hyde Park Corner, the servants of the Earl of Lincoln were searched, and this matter was raised in the House of Lords.³ Other duties were added from time to time; in September, the guards were ordered 'to ensure no Flax, Brimstone or Saltpeter leave the City without licence'.⁴ But the main task of the guards was, of course, to watch for the approach of Royalist forces. On 19 December 'there were seven Cavaliers at Mile End, of whom the trained Bands at the Court of Guard having notice, a party issued out upon them and took five of them; the others fled, and Cheany, one of the five, though twice knocked down, left his cloak and made an escape'.⁵ Sometimes there were mistakes, as on one occasion when Lieutenant Colonel Robert Tichborne was on duty with the City Yellow Auxiliaries:

'This gallant Warriour marched out of the City with his company to defend their Royall Fort at Islington, where the Sentries were set, and all very sollicitous to see the Cavaliers should not approach them. But in the dead of night they espied the enemy standing still in a large field very neare their works with drawn swords, but their Matches purposely hid (they sayd) that they might

¹The Kingdome Weekly Post, 9 November (E75/17).

²Drinkwater was a Salter in the parish of St Matthew Friday Street; he had joined the HAC in 1636 and had been ensign to Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) Francis West in 1642. He became a captain after the first battle of Newbury.

³LJ, VI, pp. 293-4.

⁴Orders of Parliament, 15 September (E69/1).

⁵The Kingdome Weekly Post, 20 December (E78/28).

more handsomely make an assault. Presently their little wise Councell of War was called, where the Question was debated whether or no they should give the enemy an Alarme, but the result was to stand a while in a posture of defence and see the Cavaliers nearer approach. Scouts were instantly sent all about, which added to their horroure and made them confesse that they heard the enemy speake one to another. Thus all night quaking for feare, till the morning light in meere pittie shewed them that their approaching enemies were a few fat Oxen and some 80 sheep feeding in the field, whose colours were blacke and white, and therefore they had good reason to suspect them, being their owne colours were blew and yellow.'¹

During the previous winter, the Auxiliaries had been raised specifically to relieve the Trained Bands from guard duties. That intention had been abandoned long since, and the two types of units had been employed on the same basis - the Auxiliaries going out on campaign, and the Trained Bands continuing to share the guarding of the forts. Since then the system of fortifications had also been greatly enlarged, and even with the help of the suburban militia units the guarding of the lines of communication was a heavy burden. The City Trained Bands therefore petitioned the Militia Committee on 1 December 1643 'to raise three regiments of Foot consisting of 3,600 men, whose only charg shall be to guard...the forts and outworks'.² Soon it was reported that 'the City is taking an accompt of all able bodied men within the Lines of Communication that are fit to do service, over and above the trained bands and Auxiliaries, which serviceable persons shall go out upon occasion while the other guard the City and the Fortifications'.³ Later in December there was a report that 'the Common Councill and Militia of London...are now

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 28 November.

²Common Council Journal 40 f. 80b.

³Certaine Informations, 27 November-4 December (E77/27).

raising of severall new Regiments of Auxiliaries, and have nominated severall men of knowne integrity, experience and fidelity to their Country to bee Commanders and Officers over them, so that most (if not all) persons (resident within the Lines of Communication) that are able or fit by calling or quality to bear Arms may be trained up and be in readinesse to doe service upon any occasion'.¹

In the winter of 1642-3 the radical party in the City had used the raising of the Auxiliaries as an occasion to try to win control of a military force independent of the Militia Committee. This attempt was now to be repeated in almost precisely the same way. Early in January 1644, Common Council began considering how the planned new units of Auxiliaries would be paid, especially in view of the fact that the pay of the existing units had recently had to be reduced.² The Subcommittee for the Auxiliaries proposed that residents within the lines of communication should contribute the value of one meal per week - a sort of graduated tax on expenditure. Common Council at first opposed this, remembering the controversy which the suggestion had generated the previous spring, but finally concluded that this was the only possible solution. A new subcommittee was appointed, sitting at Salters' Hall, which was instructed to draft an ordinance to this effect for presentation to Parliament.³ The subcommittee reported back on 26 January, and its draft was accepted without demur and sent to Westminster. But a week later the Militia Committee brought to the attention of Common Council a list of 68 persons 'alleged to be the Subcommittee at Salters' Hall, but divers of them

¹Mercurius Civicus, 14-21 December (E79/3).

²On 30 December, from £5 per company per day to £2, plus 10 shillings 'in regard of the great expence for fire, candles and links' (Common Council Journal 40 f. 81b).

³Common Council Journal 40 f. 83b.

unknown to the Militia Committee and not appointed by them'.¹ There had been a sudden influx of non-appointed radicals who hoped to be included on the subcommittee when it was eventually given authority by Parliament to collect the proposed weekly meal contributions, and who would then ensure that the monies went to new regiments of men selected for godly zeal. Common Council now agreed that the Militia Committee should have control over membership of the Subcommittee for the Weekly Meal. The Militia Committee also asked for the draft ordinance to be amended so that the monies raised 'may be disposed of for the mainteyning of the Forces already raised and to rayse other forces', instead of going only to the proposed new units, and Common Council also agreed to this change.²

The radicals did not give up immediately. With the support of the Commons committee which was considering the proposed ordinance, a delegation including the future regicide John Bradshaw³ and Heriot Washbourne addressed Common Council on 8 February 'touching the alteration desired by the last Common Council to be made in the draught of the Ordinance for the weeklie meale...alleging that the monies to be raised...were fittest to be in the disposition of the said persons and to such uses as is thereby declared'. However, 'after long debate and mature consideration in full Common Council', it was voted that the alterations should stand.⁴

¹Common Council Journal 40 ff. 88-9.

²Ibid.

³The City had already sent a delegation to the Commons committee on 5 February to inform them that the misunderstandings between the Militia Committee and the Subcommittee were due to 'the carriage and artifice of one man...Mr Bradshawe', who cast aspersions on the Militia Committee (CJ, III, p. 388).

⁴Common Council Journal 40 f. 89b.

It was not until the end of March that Parliament actually passed the ordinance 'for the Contribution of the value of one Meale in the weeke towards the charge of Arming and forming into Regiments the Auxiliarie Forces now in raysing within the City of London and Lines of Communication',¹ and this did not specifically mention the Auxiliaries already raised in 1643. However, the powers of the Militia Committee itself were renewed by another ordinance on 6 April, making it clear that all militia forces within the lines were to be under the control of the Committee;² if new units were raised, there was no question of them being under a separate command.

Following the passing of the weekly meal ordinance, steps were taken to provide arms for the new units. On 8 April, Common Council appointed a committee under Colonel Francis West of the Blue Trained Bands to buy arms on the credit of the forthcoming money, including 3000 muskets, 1000 pikes, 'trophies' (the term consistently used in the City for ensigns), - and 'bowes and Arrowes not exceeding one Company to a Regiment'.³ The account submitted a few days later shows that these instructions were carried out:⁴

	£	S	D
'3000 Muskets and rests @ 15s.	2250		
3000 Bandeleers @ 16d	206	5	4
1000 English Pikes @ 5s 4d	266	13	4
4500 Belts @ 10d	187	10	
1500 Swords @ 5s 6d	412	10	
300 Long Bowes @ 4s 8d	70		
300 sheafe of Arrowes @ 5s	75		
300 Palizadoes and engins @ 2s 2d	32	10	
300 leather cases for the Arrowes	15		
for tropheis for the six Regiments	840		
	<hr/> 4355	8	8

¹Printed on 28 March (E39/15).

²CJ, III, pp. 450-1

³Common Council Journal 40 f. 92.

⁴Ibid.

The idea of raising companies of archers may have been suggested by Essex. During the previous November he had 'given a Commission under his hand and seale unto Thomas Taylor a citizen of London, thereby authorising him to raise a Company of Archers...and to set the same on foot through the free bounty of the well-affected people in and about the City of London'.¹ Donors were asked to bring any serviceable bows and arrows to Bowyers' Hall, which would be the storehouse for the new company,² but there is no evidence that this idea ever got off the ground. On the other hand, the City's military experts may themselves have called to mind the drill sessions of the early 1630s when the bow and pike had been used together in the Artillery Garden, and the 'palizadoes and engins' itemised above may have been part of the special equipment required by the 'Double-Armed Man'.³

The City now had arms for the new units (although the quantities were those appropriate for a force of three regiments, as planned in December 1643, rather than six as suggested by the bill for 'trophies'); but where were the men? The radicals, who were hoping for separate new units in addition to the six City and three suburban Auxiliary regiments raised in 1643, were destined to be disappointed; all the new recruits in the spring of 1644 were used to fill up the depleted companies of these existing regiments, and no new units were in fact created. It is not clear why the Auxiliaries were so short of men at this time, but there were several instances of delay in sending them out during the spring because they were not up to strength.

¹Mercurius Civicus, 2-9 November 1643 (E75/18).

²Ibid., 9-16 November (E76/1).

³See p. 19.

After the existing Auxiliary regiments had been re-recruited, there were no more able-bodied potential soldiers available. At the end of 1643 the recruiting stations for the regular army in the City had been closed, 'there being no more volunteers for this service',¹ and when some citizens proposed in the spring of 1644 to raise a new army if the City's tax burden was removed, it was pointed out that the men could only be found in the prisons or among the non-residents, 'and thus they would have none but rogues and such as were not fit to be trusted....for indeed all inhabitants were already listed in the trained bands and auxiliaries, and they pretended to have a third number, these excepted'.² In the same way, the plans for new Auxiliary units came to nothing, and the newly bought arms (including the bows and arrows) went to the existing Auxiliaries when these were brought up to strength during the spring.

While the City fathers were debating the raising and payment of the Auxiliaries, units of the London militia were spending the winter on active service with Sir William Waller in Sussex. On 13 December 1643, two days before the City Green Auxiliaries, Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, and Westminster Red Trained Bands finally returned to the capital after the victory at Alton, three MPs had been sent to the Militia Committee 'to represent unto them the condition Sir William Waller is now in...and to desire that, if their forces must needs now return, that they will take some care to send some other Forces unto him'.³ The following day there was another delegation from the Commons to the Militia Committee, asking specifically for 'two London

¹CSPVen. 1643-7, pp. 53-4.

²Diary of Thomas Juxon, Dr Williams's Library MS 24.50.

³CJ, III, p. 344.

regiments to march out to Croydon, Kingston and Hampton if the committee found it necessary'.¹ There was no need to draw lots on this occasion, for the City White and Yellow Trained Bands alone had not yet been out on campaign, and at the end of the week

'the House of Peers passed an Ordinance agreed the day before by the Honourable House of Commons to enable the Militia of London to send forth such regiments of the Trained-bands and Auxiliaries ...as they should think fit, for the further reliefe and supply of Sir William Waller, and particularly the White and Yellow Regiments of the Trained-bands...and that the Committee for the Militia shall have power to call the said Forces backe againe at their pleasure, and to proceed against those as shall refuse to goe out.. and that the brave-spirited Citizen and commander Colonell Richard Browne, whose valour was long since expressed at Winchester and other places, is by the said Ordinance appointed to be sergeant-major-general of the said Force'.²

During the evening of Thursday 4 January 'the White Regiment of the Trained-Bands of London marched forth, and lay that night at Wandsworth & Clapham, where the Yellow Regiment...³ were to meet them the next day; they have severall Drakes and other carriages, with store of Ammunition to goe along with them'.⁴ By Monday they were at Kingston, and the intention was that they should 'lie about Kingstone and Hampton Court...for the securing of the river of Thames'.⁵ It is not clear whether this proclaimed intention was a subterfuge to make the troops more willing to march out of the City, but they were certainly informed of a change of plan shortly after their arrival at Kingston: the Militia Committee informed Browne 'since his marching forth, that it would be a good and acceptable service

¹Diary of Laurence Whitacre, BM Add. MS 31116 f. 102, quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 99, n. 4.

²Mercurius Civicus, 21-28 December (E79/18).

³'and the White Auxiliaries of Southwark', but these did not in fact take part.

⁴The True Informer, 30 December-6 January (E81/6).

⁵Mercurius Civicus, 18-25 January (E30/7).

for him to march to Arundell to secure that place'.¹ Although Browne's commission only authorised him to exercise his command in Middlesex and Surrey, he obtained the agreement of the regimental commanders to march south.² The Kentish troop of horse which was escorting the brigade, however, refused to march until specifically ordered to do so by the authorities in London, and there was a delay of two days before the brigade could proceed to Guildford.³ A heavy snowfall kept the brigade at Guildford for several days before they could march to Godalming, and it was not until 29 January that they reached Petworth in Sussex.⁴

The snow which had stopped the London brigade at Guildford also put an end to Waller's activities, and his army went into winter quarters in various towns and villages of West Sussex.⁵ It was therefore decided that the Londoners should remain at Petworth, which they proceeded to fortify, 'and principally the Earl of Northumberland's house there, sergeant major general Browne conceiving it a place convenient for retreat in case the Lord Hoptons powers should fall upon them'.⁶ The Royalists did not in fact approach Petworth, but the brigade nevertheless paid strict attention to military security; letters written on 20 February to friends in London told of the troops' 'good condition, and of their carefulnesse

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. , 4-11 January (E81/22).

⁴Ibid., 25 January-1 February (E31/2).

⁵Adair, Roundhead General, p. 131.

⁶Mercurius Civicus, 1-8 February (E32/4).

in the execution of Martill Discipline, that there is a Corporall to bee shortly tried there by a Councell of Warre for revealing of the watch-word in the night time'.¹

Although the citizens with Browne were reported to be bearing the cold well,² they were naturally anxious to return home, as always; Waller and Parliament, on the other hand, were anxious that they should remain in the field. The Commons voted £2000 to be sent to Browne in February and announced that they did not doubt 'but that you will continue the same good service until those counties be put into a posture of greater safety'.³ A few days later the Militia Committee were 'desired to take Order that the City forces may continue there something longer',⁴ and on 1 March the Commons resolved 'that this House doth hold it fit that the City Regiments under the Command of Major Browne do continue forth until further order'.⁵ A fortnight later, the newly formed joint military council of the Parliamentary and Scots allies, the Committee of Both Kingdoms, wrote to Browne as follows:

'Some of the Committee of the Militia attended us today to desire that the City forces, both horse⁶ and foot, under your command might return home within 14 days at the furthest. We should most willingly concur with their desires to your satisfaction, but that Sir Wm. Waller has a design in hand wherein your assistance will be necessary, which we hope also may be at the end within that time. But in case that should require further time for the effecting thereof, we believe you so tender both of your own honour and of the public safety that you will not for a few days

¹Ibid., 15-22 February (E33/32).

²Mercurius Veridicus, 17 February-5 March (E35/20).

³CSPD 1644, pp. 21-2.

⁴The Weekly Account, 29 February (E34/22).

⁵CJ, III, p. 412.

⁶Turner's City Horse, now led by Colonel George Thompson (PRO SP 28 38 part 3 f. 245).

longer tarrying leave the design imperfect.'¹

The Committee of Both Kingdoms also took steps to ensure that the £1000 still owing to the troops at Petworth was quickly sent down to them.²

Waller planned to muster his army at East Meon late in March and then move westwards towards Hopton's base at Winchester. Browne's London brigade therefore left Petworth for Midhurst on about 20 March, and here they were joined by our former acquaintance, Lieutenant Elias Archer of the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, who had been sent down to record the brigade's progress for publication in the City; it appears that his previous record of the expedition to Basing House and Alton had been well received.

'Upon Thursday the 21 of this instant March (our Brigade being quartered at Midhurst) our Major Generall received Orders from Sir William Waller to advance towards Winchester to a Town called Traford [Treyford], which accordingly he did with incredible speed, almost at an hours warning, and that night arrived there, which we found to be a small village, not above seven or eight houses to quarter all our men; there we met with much hardship, staying for Orders till the Lords day following. Upon Monday the 25 we marcht forwards to joyn with Sir William Wallers main body, which accordingly we did, and that night were appointed to quarter at West-mean [West Meon], three miles distant from the main body, where we found a partee of the Enemies horse when our Quartermasters entred the Town, which occasioned some action, though not much considerable; we onely took a Quartermaster prisoner. The next day, which was Tuesday, we lay still.'³

Wednesday was the day appointed for the general muster at East Meon, and it was also the day on which a Royalist force planned a surprise attack on the vanguard of Waller's army. But one of the Cavaliers records that 'when wee came thither, not a man was to be found. Yett we spy'd a full Regiment with white collours stand in order facing us

¹CSPD 1644, p 53.

²Ibid , p 56.

³E.A., A Fuller Relation of the Victory Obtained at Alsford (1644), quoted extensively in Adair, Cheriton.

upon our left hand about a mile and a halfe from us, but could by noe meanes discover where the Enemy's body lay'.¹ That regiment was in fact the City White Trained Band, and Archer gives the story from their point of view:

'We discovered the Enemy, who took some few of our men that were stragling from their colours, and soon after appeared in a great body upon the hill on the left hand the Town, intending (as some prisoners confessed) to take us at Church, it being the Fast Day; but it pleased God, who foresaw the Plot, to prevent the danger, directing us to keep the Fast the Wednesday before when we lay still at Midhurst, so that we were provided to entertain them, and drew our men into a body neer the town, which done, Orders came to march away, which accordingly we did, in the Forlorn-Hope, expecting the Enemy every hour to fall upon us, so that we were forced to make a stand a mile or more from the town in extreame danger.'

Waller eventually brought up the rest of his army to the support of the White Trained Band, but declined to give battle against the Royalist force; instead, he decided to make for Alresford in an attempt to cut the Royalists off from their base at Winchester. Hopton quickly realised what was happening and marched his men towards Alresford on a parallel course. Before nightfall he had won the race; the Parliamentarians were forced to make their camp near Cheriton, and the London regiments slept under the shelter of the hedges lining the meadows known as Lamborough Fields.²

The general muster during the morning had been the first occasion when all of Waller's horse and foot had assembled together, and one of Waller's cavalry officers, Captain Robert Harley, had an opportunity to view the Londoners. He did not think much of them. Perhaps, like some of Essex's 'old soldiers' during the Gloucester campaign, he resented the special attention which the citizens received from the

¹Walter Slingsby's account, quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 119.

²Adair, Cheriton, pp. 120-2.

Parliamentary leaders and press; more likely he simply disliked 'townies', since his first comment about the Trained Bands is merely the perennial joke about the ignorance of city-dwellers:

'Here you should have seen the Londoners runne to see what manner of thinges cowes were. Some of them would say they had all of them hoornes, and would doe greate mischief with them; then comes one of the wisest of them cryeth "Speake softly". To end the confusion of their opinions they pyled up a counsel of warr, and agreed it was nothing but some kind of looking glasse, and so marched away.'¹

The Londoners were also faint-hearted, according to Harley, for the appearance of the Royalists near Cheriton threw them into a near-panic:

'We marched this day to Cherrytowne where the citicens came within sight of the enemy's foote. You could hear noe other word of commaund then "Stand straite in your files".'

The skirmishing on the following day, Thursday 28 March, was mainly confined to the cavalry, with most of the Londoners watching from the hillside as at Aldbourne Chase in September 1643. That night, Waller received information about a Royalist threat to London from the Midlands, but he nevertheless decided to stand his ground at Cheriton and prepare for battle on Friday morning. As day broke and Captain Harley's cavalry outguards returned from their scouting duties, Harley went to view the state of the Roundhead army: 'I sawe such a cheerfulness in every ones countenance that it promised ether victory or a willingness rather to dye then loose the feild - only the citicens silver lase begunne to looke like copper'. No doubt he meant that the Londoners themselves were of 'base mettle' despite their smart turnout, but his comment also shows that the proud and relatively well-off citizens took some trouble over the clothes they wore on campaign.

¹Harley's letter to his brother Edward, 12 April (HMC Portland MSS, III, pp 106-110; quoted in Adair, Cheriton, pp. 121-2).

Waller's first move was to send a commanded party of 1000 musketeers from the White Trained Band and one of the army regiments to secure Cheriton Wood on the right flank. Hopton, writing about himself, tells how he discovered their presence and what action he took:

'The morning was very misty, so as he could not make a cleere discovery till the sun was neere his two howers up, and then he found that the Enemy was not drawing off, but that they had in the darke of the night possest themselves of a high woody ground that was on the right hand of their owne quarters, and plac'd men and cannon in it, that commanded the hill where Sir Geo: Lisle was... himselfe with his owne foote and horse drew to the left, which was over against that woody ground that the Enemy had newly possest and where they understood themselves (as indeed they were) upon a great advantage under the covert of the wood, and having lin'd the hedges next to us with store of muskettiers. This the Lord Hopton observing...commanded Coll. Appleyeard...to draw out of the foote a commanded party of 1000 muskettiers, which he did, and... advanced towards the Enemy; But the bodyes of our men no sooner appear'd on the topp of the Hill, but the Enemy shewed how well they were prepared for us, and gave fier very thick and sharpe, which our men very gallantly receaved and return'd; But the Lo: Hopton foreseeing that our party could not long hold out upon so great a disadvantage, and observing an opportunity to cast men into the wood upon the flanke of the Enemy, he drew off Lieutenant Coll: Edward Hopton with one division of the commanded muskettiers, and commanded them to run with all possible speede into the wood upon the Enemys flancke, where there was likewise a crosse-hedge to cover them, which they had noe sooner done, and given one volley from thence, but the Enemy fell in disorder and began to runne, and Coll: Appleyeard with his party pursued them and had the execution of a part of them through the wood, and possest himselfe of all theire ground of advantage.'¹

Robert Harley, naturally, was not impressed with the performance of the London musketeers:

'The citisens in the woode were "in woode", but they found the way howe to get out; noe sooner they did see that the bullets would come otherwise then they would have them but they made a foule retreat (I am confident I smelt them) with a faire paire of heeles, which did soe discourage the rest that they all left their charge with a shamefull retreat'.

Another Parliamentarian observer noted that the musketeers had been in Cheriton Wood 'not above halfe an hower before the enemies foot under Collonel Appleyard beat them clearly out and took possession, pursueing our men, whose heells then were their best weapon, to the

¹R.Hopton, Bellum Civile, quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 126.

amazement of our whole army'.¹ But some of the Roundheads in the main body, according to a Royalist eye-witness, did not merely stand amazed at this spectacle: 'This defeite put the Rebels into such a fright that wee could discerne severall companys of thirty, of forty, and more in some, running over the feilds in the reare of theire Army halfe a mile'.² An erstwhile Parliamentarian, writing 3½ years later when the Parliamentary party had been torn apart by political and religious differences, lay the blame for the debacle on some of the officers of the White Trained Band, including Captain Thomas Player, 'that Player that play'd the Coward's part so much at Cheriton', and Captain William Manby senior, 'unworthy base-spirited Manby...that upon the routing of a forlorn Hope at Cherriton cryed and wrung his hands, "What shall he doe, what shall he doe, the day is lost", like a great Booby'.³

On the Parliamentarian left flank above Lamborough Fields, other Londoners and regular soldiers had more success later in the day, as Lieutenant Archer records. The Roundhead horse had been pushed back, but the infantry were slowly moving forward:

'Our foot all the while was ingaged on the left wing to drive the Enemy from the hedges, where our men played their parts gallantly and drove them from hedge to hedge by degrees till they had forced them to the top of the hill, our horse doing little for the space of an hour after their retreat...at which time our Noble Major Generall Brown (who was ever known to be a valiant man, and must be lookt upon as a speciall instrument in the work) Drew off 100 men from the hedges, and in his own person led them on to charge the horse, which they did most gladly and couragiously and forced the enemies horse to wheele about'.

¹Military Memoir of Colonel John Birch, quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 128.

²Slingsby's account, printed in Bellum Civile and quoted in Adair, Cheriton, pp. 129-30.

³See Appendix 6.

The Roundhead horse then returned to the fray and joined their foot atop the hill, by which time the Royalists had begun to withdraw towards Alresford and Basing House, leaving the field to Waller.¹ The day had begun with the prospect of defeat for the Parliamentarians and shame for the Londoners through the retreat of the musketeers in Cheriton Wood, but the perseverance of the musketeers lining the hedges on the left flank had helped turn the tide in Waller's favour and had redeemed the reputation of the City forces. In the end, Bulstrode Whitelock was able to claim that the Londoners 'did very brave service',² a newsbook credited them with 'great and notable service',³ another Roundhead propagandist wrote that they had behaved themselves 'like so many ancient Romane conquerors, who of their voluntary accord went upon the forlorne-hope, beat the enemy with impregnable courage from the hedges which they had lined with store of musketeers...and soon after by Gods providence turned the scale of the daies honour...and put the enemy to rout',⁴ and an officer of the Trained Bands stated that 'our London Regiments, but above any, our Major Generall Brown hath bin a prime means for our present welfare'.⁵

Waller entered Winchester on Saturday 30 March (although he could not wrest the castle from its Royalist garrison), and he then continued west to Stockbridge, Salisbury and Poole before doubling back to Romsey and Winchester. It is not clear how much of this

¹Adair, Cheriton, pp. 134-9.

²Ibid., p. 81.

³The Military Scribe, 26 March-2 April (E40/10).

⁴J. Vicars, Gods Ark Over-Topping the Worlds Waves (1647)(E312).

⁵A Letter from Captain Jones (1644), quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 141.

roundabout campaign Browne's London brigade took part in, but on 6 April they won an easy victory at Bishop's Waltham, not far south of Cheriton:

'They had intelligence that Colonell Whitehead being sate downe before Waltham house with 200 men, there being also neere the like number in the house, so that hearing of the passage of the London Brigade that way, hee sent unto Major-General Brown to desire his ayd in the taking thereof, whereupon the London Brigade marched towards the house and planted their Ordnance against it, but upon the Majors drawing up of his men to make an assault, Propositions were sent forth from those in the house to the Major-General'.¹

After the surrender of the Royalist garrison of Waltham House the Londoners marched away to nearby Wickham, but they were anxious to return home. The Committee of Both Kingdoms, meanwhile, was desperately trying to prevent them from returning. Having received news of the victory at Cheriton, the Committee wrote to the London authorities asking them to persuade Browne's brigade 'to stay some short time for the full pursuance of the same'; they asked the Commons for some money to be sent to Browne 'else those forces will be like to return home'; on 2 April they wrote again to the Militia Committee with a plea 'to use their endeavour, and particularly by sending some of their number, to persuade the City forces with Sir William Waller to tarry yet there for some time'; and on 4 April they wrote to Browne himself:

'We have ordered some additional forces from divers parts to march to you, which shall be with all possible expedition, and we are assured few days will effect it. In the meantime we desire you, both for the reputation of the action and also for the safety of your own retreat, not to withdraw those forces, and are very well assured that in respect of the engagement of your honour and the common safety you will need no other arguments from us but this advertisement, and we desire you to communicate this letter to your officers, of whose good affection to this work and desire to perfect it we doubt not'.²

¹Mercurius Civicus, 4-11 April (E42/8).

²CSPD 1644, pp. 84, 91, 95-6.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms was relying on the fact that Browne's brigade had no cavalry to protect them on their march home, as is clear from the letter to Browne and from another written on 7 April to the Militia Committee asking them 'to stay their forces abroad in regard of their own danger to return, having no horse for their convoy, and for that there are some forces now upon their march for their relief'.¹ But the brigade was in fact already on the march to London, escorted by Colonel George Thompson's (formerly Richard Turner's) second regiment of City Horse, who had left Waller's service 'without and against order'.² The Committee of Both Kingdoms once again pleaded with the Militia Committee to send their forces back to Waller, but refused to intervene directly, stating that they did not 'think fit to give any further order therein, but leave it to the disposition of the Committee for the Militia'.³ The City's privileges still counted for something, especially at a time when the City was being asked to send out a new and larger brigade for a fresh campaign. Waller, without the support of Browne's infantry brigade, was forced to retire to Bishop's Waltham and Farnham, but no action was taken by the authorities against the returning Trained Band regiments; they decided to make the best of it, and greeted Browne's brigade as the heroes of Cheriton on their return to the City on 13 April.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 104.

²Ibid., p. 107. During April, Thompson's regiment was taken into the service of the Western Association and thereby lost its connection with London. Although it was stated that this was done because of the expence of maintaining the regiment (PRO SP 28 132 part 1), it seems unlikely that the City could not afford it; perhaps the transfer was made in order to keep the regiment in the field with Waller and prevent it from deserting to London again.

³Ibid., p. 109.

⁴The True Informer, 6-13 April (E42/20).

CHAPTER IX

SUMMER 1644: MARCHING OUT 'AS ONE MAN'

During April 1644 the Committee of Both Kingdoms was drawing up plans for a general rendezvous of all available forces in the South - Essex's, Waller's, Manchester's, the London militia, and garrison troops - in hope of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion by a mass advance on Oxford. But the more immediate need at the beginning of the month was for some units to replace Browne's returning London regiments and thereby allow Waller to keep his army in being. The Militia Committee agreed on Tuesday 2 April 'that the white Regiment Auxiliaries in Southwarke, and the Regiment of Hamlets belonging to the Tower, with 500 horse raised by the City, should set forth towards Sir Wil. Waller on Friday next',¹ and it was rumoured that Skippon might be appointed to lead this new brigade.² On the following day, the Committee of Both Kingdoms sent a message to the Militia Committee 'to acquaint them with the necessity of their forces going to Sir W. Waller with all expedition, lest the fruit of the victory be lost'.³ But both committees had reckoned without Colonel Edmund Harvey, whose regiment of City Horse were to be the cavalry contingent in the brigade. Harvey simply refused to march, apparently as a result of personal pique, even when it was suggested that he rather than Skippon should be the brigade's commander:⁴ 'He would rather

¹Mercurius Civicus, 28 March-4 April (E40/20).

²The Weekly Account, 3-10 April (E42/3).

³CSPD 1644, p. 92.

⁴Ibid.

carry a musket under His Excellency [Essex] than have any charge under Waller, saying that he was an unfortunate man, and that he had a commission before him to command the counties he then did'.¹ The authorities were unable to change his mind, and the Committee of Both Kingdoms eventually had to ask for cavalry support from Kent to accompany the London infantry units.²

The difficulties in obtaining cavalry for the new brigade undoubtedly contributed to the delay in the setting forth of the infantry, but the Southwark White Auxiliaries and the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Band were ready to march early in the following week. They left London on the afternoon of Tuesday 9 April,³ marching to Kingston, where they stayed for a few days before continuing on to Guildford on the following Monday.⁴ It was planned that they should proceed immediately to Farnham, but they apparently remained in Guildford for a week.⁵ This delay provided a good opportunity for a muster of each company to determine which of the men liable for service were actually present; perhaps the early desertions during previous campaigns had taught the officers not to muster and pay their companies until they were well away from the capital.⁶

During the week in which these two regiments were leaving London and marching to join Waller's forces, the Militia Committee was also trying to get the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries to follow them. It

¹BM Add. MS 24465, quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 145.

²CSPD 1644, p. 103.

³Mercurius Civicus, 4-11 April (E42/8).

⁴A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 11-18 April (E43/12).

⁵Ibid.; Adair, Roundhead General, p. 150.

⁶The muster rolls are discussed above, pp. 95, 101.

was planned that they should march out towards Guildford on Monday 15 April,¹ but there were the usual delays; on Thursday 18 April 'the Regiment of Auxiliaries belonging to Westminster and the Strand, under the command of Colonell James Prince,² were ready to advance (but by reason their Companies were not then full, they are not yet marched forth, but without question will speedily goe forth)'.³ They apparently began their march on Saturday evening,⁴ but they were not mustered at Guildford until 13 May.⁵ The regiment's slow progress through Surrey provided opportunities for several men to desert and return home: in Captain Henry Turner's company, George Robinson disappeared on 22 April, Ralph Hauton and Christopher Chilcoke ran away on 26 April, and Richard Crofts on the 29th, while Captain John King noted that he had paid monies to five of his men 'that diserted their cullers befor the muster'.⁶ No doubt some of the Southwark and Tower Hamlets men already at Guildford were also disappearing, and on 10 May the Lords and Commons passed an ordinance 'in regard that divers of the Auxiliaries in Sir William Wallers Brigade (hired men) doe returne to London to see their freinds without leave of their Captain, that power shall be given to the Sub-committees of London and Westminster by the Militia [Committee], to inflict severe and

¹The True Informer, 6-13 April (E42/20); CJ, III, p. 458.

²Prince had replaced Colonel Heriot Washbourne early in 1644 (PRO SP 28 34 part 1 ff. 103-4).

³The True Informer, 13-20 April (E43/17).

⁴The Weekly Account, 17-25 April (E43/23).

⁵The muster rolls are discussed above, p. 108.

⁶PRO SP 28 17 part 1 ff. 497, 500.

exemplary punishment on such as so offend'.¹

Having sent this new brigade to Waller's support at Guildford, the Militia Committee turned its attention to the plan for a general rendezvous of all available forces in the south for a descent on Oxford. Parliament had voted for the project on 5 April and agreed to send a deputation to a meeting of Common Hall in the City on Tuesday 9 April to explain the idea, and the preachers at the public thanksgiving for the victory at Cheriton were also urged to 'declare the sense of the House' concerning the rendezvous.² At the Common Hall meeting, the citizens were asked to send out all their troops 'as one man', rather than 'to go little by little'.³ The response came on Friday, when Common Council agreed to send out all six of the City Auxiliary regiments:

'three of the which Regiments (if with so much speed they possibly can be raised) are to be at the generall Rendezvous on Friday next, and the other three are to follow after to be as a reserve unto Essex's Army; they are like to bee gallant Regiments indeed, for it is reported that every Regiment is to contain at the least twelve hundred men. This is the event of the Counsell of the Lords and Commons who this week did meet at Guildhall concerning a recruite for the more speedy advance of his Excellency's Army, in which with much forwardnesse the strength and treasure of the City will assist him.'⁴

The day appointed for the rendezvous, Good Friday 19 April, came and went without the appearance of the Auxiliaries, and on the following Thursday three MPs were appointed to go to the Militia Committee 'to hasten the march of the City Forces'.⁵ The delay this

¹The Flying Post, 3-10 May (E47/4).

²A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 4-11 April (E42/7).

³Sharpe, p. 200.

⁴The Weekly Account, 10-17 April (E43/7).

⁵CJ, III, p. 469.

time was due to political difficulties, for the Militia Committee claimed that the recent renewal of its powers by Parliament had left certain matters unclear; a separate ordinance had to be drafted now to ensure that the Committee could call back its forces if necessary and that they would have a major-general of their own.¹ The ordinance was duly passed, and Sir James Harrington (colonel of the Westminster Red Trained Bands, which did not themselves take part in the summer campaign) was sent out to join Waller's army as major-general of his London forces. At the same time, in the middle of May, the City Green, Yellow and Orange Auxiliaries left the capital to link up with Essex, who was now at Reading.² It is not clear whether or not they took their newly issued supplies of bows and arrows with them, but Essex himself had already ensured that he had a good supply of archery equipment, including musket arrows as well as those for the longbow.³

The authorities were meanwhile still trying to persuade Colonel Edmund Harvey to march out with his regiment of City Horse to support Waller, despite Harvey's known antipathy to him. Harvey's men did not leave London with the first two regiments sent to Guildford, nor with the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries, as had been hoped. The Committee of Both Kingdoms continued to write to the Militia Committee demanding that Harvey's regiment be ready to march, and on 7 May the colonel himself was ordered to attend the Committee of Both Kingdoms. On the following day, the committee ordered 'that Colonel Harvey's regiment shall march on Wednesday next to join Sir William Waller's army. This

¹Sharpe, p. 201.

²Mercurius Civicus, 23-30 May (E49/34); The Weekly Account, 23-30 May (E49/36); Goold Walker, p. 208.

³Issue-Book of Ordnance, 1643-4, BM Add. MS 34315 ff. 37, 47-8.

being signified to him, he was allowed time to consider of it till the morrow.'¹ Harvey still refused to march, and on 10 May the Commons ordered the members of the Committee of Both Kingdoms² 'to call the officers of Col. Harvy's Regiment and to confer with them how that Regiment may march, if in case Colonel Harvey still refuse to march in person'.³ Mercurius Aulicus reveals that Harvey had chosen 'rather to lay downe his Commission then serve under Waller',⁴ but a compromise was eventually reached: on 25 May the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to the Militia Committee 'to desire them to despatch Colonel Harvey's regiment of horse to the Lord General' instead.⁵ Waller's army had now made its long-awaited rendezvous with Essex's anyway, and a convoy of cavalry was needed to escort the pay-wagons for Essex's army and the London Auxiliaries with him. After a two-day delay while money was found to pay the outstanding bills for the quartering of the regiment's horses in London,⁶ Harvey's regiment (including the newly raised Maiden Troop)⁷ assembled in the New Artillery Garden and marched out to join the Lord General with £10,000 for his soldiers and £2,500 for the City Green, Yellow and Orange Auxiliaries.⁸ The regimental accounts

¹CSPD 1644, pp. 150, 152.

²Technically, the Committee's expired authority had not yet been renewed.

³CJ, III, p. 488; CSPD 1644, p. 155.

⁴Mercurius Aulicus, 17 May.

⁵CSPD 1644, p. 168.

⁶Ibid.

⁷See pp. 113-4.

⁸The Weekly Account, 23-30 May (E49/36).

reveal the terms of the cavalry's agreement with the Militia

Committee before the march began:

'£2,400 received of the Committy of the Militia of the Citty of London upon Conditions to advance presently with 400 Men at Lest to pay 400 & to pay theould officers & souldiers of the Redgiment 28 dayes pay & if any old souldiers will not advance to leave them to dew punishment & to provide new in there places & to agree with the new souldiers for advance as Cheape as wee Could'.¹

The Southwark White Auxiliaries and the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Bands had moved on from Guildford to join Waller at Farnham by 22 April, but the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries only arrived there just before the army began to march on 17 May.² Once again we have a day-by-day account of Waller's campaign written by a London soldier - in this case by Richard Coe, who served in the East Smithfield and St Katherine's company³ of the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Bands.⁴ Coe records the beginning of the campaign of Waller's army, now assembled at Farnham:

'On friday the 17 we were commanded to march but knew not then whither; that day and all night wee marched; next day being Saturday wee came to Bagshotte where our City Brigade and the Kentish Regiment were quartered in the Parke, where was plenty of mutton, veale and lambe, some venison and good water, but neither bread nor beere for mony but what wee brought with us, which was very little; there wee lay Saturday night and Sunday and on munday had order to march toward Basing house, but came not thither that night, for wee quartered at a place called Bramly house...there wee wanted neither meat nor fireing, but nothing els to bee gotten for love or money'.

¹PRO SP 28 131 (part).

²Mercurius Civicus, 9-16 May (E47/27). The latest dates of arrival at Farnham of the three London regiments are determined by the dates of their officers' first attendance at courts martial there (Adair, Cheriton, p. 216).

³Formerly commanded by Captain Leonard Leonards, but mustered at Guildford and subsequently commanded by his former lieutenant, Christopher Gore (PRO SP 28 121A part 5 f. 602). Coe's name does not appear in the muster list of 16 April, and his account only begins on 13 May; presumably he was late in arriving.

⁴R. Coe, An Exact Diarie, or a Breife Relation (1644) (E2/20).

It was not until Tuesday afternoon that the brigade finally marched up to Basing House, where they were met by the guns of the Royalist garrison. These did no damage, and the Parliamentary cavalry moved into action: 'Our horse went round, faced the house, the enemy charged upon them, slue 2 horse and one man of ours; we saw 2 of their men fall on the brestworkes but no more to our view. There we lay untill evening, and it not being thought convenient to lay seidge to the house wee marched round the parke to Basing stoke.'¹ The Royalists took no chances, however, and burned a number of outbuildings around Basing House in order to deny cover to the brigade should they attempt a siege.

Coe records that the brigade 'lay at Basing stoake 3 nights and had indifferent good quarters for our money', although the townspeople were reluctant to assist them for fear of later reprisals by the Royalists and because they had only that morning paid their weekly assessment of £40 to the garrison. Perhaps it was the resulting lack of provisions for the London brigade which led to a breakdown of discipline which Coe does not record, but which is noted in the court-martial papers of Waller's army:

'Whereas Major Edward Wood once Agitant Gen of the foot to the right honat Sir Willm Waller is now accused for killing one Thomas Pritchard then under the Comand of one Captaine Knapp of the Regiment of Col: Houblon.² In as much as the aforesaid Thomas Pritchard is proved to have been the cheife actor and Incourager of a dangerous mutiny at Basingstoake, not only by forceing a Sentinell and Quarters, but also by resisting and affronting the sayd Major at that tyme enjoyned and sent to suppress the sayd Mutiny....the sayd Major Edward Wood shall stand acquitted.'³

On 24 May the brigade finally left their uncomfortable quarters at Basingstoke and continued their march to Aldermaston.

¹Ibid.

²The Southwark White Auxiliaries.

³Adair, Cheriton, p. 212.

The Earl of Essex, having obtained the reinforcement of the City Green, Yellow and Orange Auxiliaries, was also on the march from Reading, proceeding via Bradfield and Blewbury towards Abingdon. On Saturday 25 May, as Waller's army moved from Aldermaston to the village of Compton, Coe reports that they could see some of Essex's men marching along a parallel route; soon the two armies would make their rendezvous and begin combined operations against Oxford. But any encouragement felt by Coe's comrades on sighting the Lord General's forces was marred by two mishaps on the same day: 'This morning a souldier of my Captains Company...was shot by accident and sent for London; in the after noone an other of our Regiment had the like mischance'.

On Sunday 27 May, Waller's army marched from Compton towards Abingdon, which had recently been abandoned by the Royalists, but Essex's forces had overtaken Waller's and were already quartered in the town; since there was no room for two armies there, Waller's men were forced to stay at the village of Marcham, three miles to the west.¹ The plan now was that the two armies would encircle Oxford from the west and east, and Essex moved first by crossing the Thames at Sandford on 29 May and marching towards Islip. According to Mercurius Aulicus, some of Essex's soldiers were 'so wanton as to leave the body, and come in partees towards the workes, perhaps that they might say to their friends in London that they had seene Oxford'.² On 31 May, Essex attempted to seize the bridge over the Cherwell at Enslow, eight miles north of Oxford:

'Friday night a party were sent forth of his Excellencies owne

¹Toynbee and Young, op. cit., pp. 27-8.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 29 May.

Forces and of the London Auxiliaries to obtaine the passage over Ainslow bridge neere the mill between Islip and Woodstocke, between whom and the enemy there was that night some single bickerings; but about 4 of the clocke the next morning they began to skirmish very fiercely, and so continued for the space of 7 houres, till most of our mens Powder and bullets were spent, and then they were relieved...there were about 40 of his Excellencies forces slaine in the place, whereof Capt. Deane, one of the Captaines of the Auxiliaries, was one'.¹

The Royalists managed to hold onto Enslow Bridge and the other Cherwell crossings which Essex tried to seize during this week, but other skirmishes were meanwhile taking place to the south and west of Oxford. After Essex had left Abingdon on 29 May to begin the encirclement of the Royalist capital from the east, Waller took his place in Abingdon and attempted to seize the Thames crossing at Newbridge, six miles south-west of Oxford. According to Coe, on Saturday 1 June this army

'marched for Newbridge, and being come within a mile or thereabout, 2 files of each company were drawne out for a forlorne hope, Captaine Gore of the hamlets and a Captaine of the Kentish Regiment leading them on, which they did with such willingnesse and courage as deserves to bee remembered and admired, for notwithstanding the enemy had cut off parte of the bridge and made it unpassable, yet our Commanders with a boat or 2 called Punts and some Plankes fell on so bravely that they made them forsake the bridge'.

The loss of Newbridge was a serious blow for the Royalists; soon Waller was mustering his entire army on the Oxford side of the river and moving up to Eynsham, making the encirclement almost complete. As Clarendon recalled, 'it was now high time for the King to provide for his own security, and to escape the danger of being shut up in Oxford'.² The detachments guarding the Cherwell crossings were withdrawn on Sunday 2 June, and on Monday night, having made a feint towards Abingdon to draw Waller back to the south side of the Thames,

¹Mercurius Civicus, 30 May-6 June (E50/18). Captain Deane cannot be identified.

²Clarendon, II, p. 377.

the King escaped the trap by leading a picked force from his army north-west through Yarnton towards Burford. When Essex learned of this, he 'gave command to all his Forces to march presently after, towards Woodstock, which so discouraged many of his Auxiliaries, who longed for nothing more then to see the smoke of their owne Chimneys, that they stole away, and went in great bodies backe againe towards London'.¹ Two days later, Mercurius Aulicus had more information to report concerning these deserters:

'It was confidently affirmed by some who came this day from London to Oxford that they met divers of the Earle of Essex's Souldiers in distracted companies, and sometimes in great bodies, along the road, to the number of 2000 or thereabouts, and that the Souldiers being asked of the Countrey people as they passed thorow the Villages, if they had taken the King, made answer, "No, they had never seene him"; and being demanded whether they had taken Oxford, replied, "No, they had never besieged it"; and being thirdly asked what they had done then, made answer that "They had lost 500 men about the taking of a Bridge and a Mill", which was all the accompt they were able to give of the expedition - some of them adding withall that had they not beene told at their going out that Oxford should be delivered at them on their first approach, and that the King would yeild himselfe to their Generalissimo, they had never stirred a foot from home'.²

Whether or not these desertions and conversations actually took place, Essex's army crossed Enslow Bridge to quarter at Woodstock on 4 June and Chipping Norton the following night, by which time the King and his force of cavalry and mounted musketeers had reached Evesham.³

Waller, too, marched after the King on Tuesday 4 June as soon as he had learned of the escape. Coe tells us that Waller's men 'marched all day and night, and came a little before day nere Witney, where we were quartered under a hedge 3 or 4 houres; it rained extreamey, as it had done for the most part since our advance from Farnham till then'. After this short an uncomfortable respite the men were ordered

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 4 June.

²Ibid., 6 June.

³Toynbee and Young, op. cit., pp. 42-5.

to continue their march to Stow on the Wold, but one of the Southwark soldiers, Christopher Hannibal of Lieutenant Colonel Sowton's company, 'peremptorily refused'; he was tried by court-martial two days later and ordered to be 'layd neck and heeles together at the Maine Guard, and in such forme and manner to continue untill the Army doth March, and during the sayd tyme to be fedd with no other food then bread and water, and upon the marching of the Army as beforesayd, the sayd Christopher Hanniball is to be brought neck and heeles together to the head of the Regiment and there make an humble acknowledgement of his fault to the sayd Leift Coll.'.¹

The army had meanwhile continued to Stow as ordered, where there was a three-day rest while Waller and Essex decided what to do next. For various reasons, including the continuing animosity between the two leaders² and frustration at the failure of the plan to trap the King in Oxford, the joint campaign was now abandoned; Essex announced that he would lead his army to the relief of the besieged garrison at Lyme in Dorset, leaving Waller to chase after the King. This extraordinary decision resulted in the two London brigades operating in two quite different theatres of war, and we must leave Essex's regiments on their march westwards for the moment and concentrate on the fortunes of the suburban units attached to Waller's army.

Waller's first objective was Royalist-held Sudeley Castle, and he led his horse and dragoons there on Friday 7 June to demand its

¹Court martial records, quoted in Adair, Cheriton, p. 207.

²Waller complained to the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 7 June that Essex had not, as arranged, given him a cavalry unit equal to Harvey's City Horse, originally promised to Waller but now serving with the Lord General at Harvey's own insistence (CSPD 1644, p. 217).

surrender; the weather was too bad for the foot and artillery to march. The garrison at Sudeley defied Waller's first summons, however, and on Saturday the rest of the army was brought up into position.¹ Coe reports that Waller 'drew out of every Company certaine Files for a Forlorne hope, marched to the Castle about nine or ten of the clocke, lay just under the Walls, expecting order to fall on', but after an artillery duel the castle was surrendered during the night. A number of prisoners and a good quantity of booty fell into the hands of the Parliamentarians, including 32 pieces of cloth worth a total of £400 which were apparently distributed among the regiments involved; the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries received £30 from the sale of their share.²

The King was now at Worcester, and Waller marched to Evesham on Monday 10 June in pursuit of him. The next fortnight saw an extraordinary game of hide-and-seek through the West Midlands, with Waller's forces chasing the Royalists through Bromsgrove, Stourbridge, Droitwich (which Coe calls 'Saltwich' and where he notes that the soldiers lay in the salt cellars and thereby 'grew so drie that we drunke the Towne drie'), Evesham again, Tewkesbury, Gloucester, and back to Stow on the Wold (although the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Bands, as Coe admitted, lost their way between Gloucester and Cheltenham but managed to catch up later). From Stow the infantry continued on to Shipston on Stour on 25 June, where they rested for two nights while Waller sought reinforcements from the garrisons of Coventry and Warwick as well as intelligence concerning the King's movements.

¹CSPD 1644, p. 219; Toynbee and Young, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²Whitelock, p. 86; Accounts of Westminster Auxiliaries, PRO SP 28 145 ff. 66-70.

In London, meanwhile, the other three City Auxiliary regiments - the Red, White and Blue - were preparing to march out in accordance with Common Council's decision to put all six in the field. Along with the other City and suburban militia units remaining in the capital, they took part in a general training day, this time in Hyde Park rather than Finsbury Fields; this was due to take place on Thursday 23 May, but wet weather forced a week's postponement.¹ Early in June the new Auxiliary brigade was assigned the task of capturing Greenland House on the Thames near Henley, together with other Royalist garrisons, and Richard Browne was given a new commission as major-general of Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Berkshire and of 'the forces raised or to be raised and employed... for reducing of...Oxford, Wallingford, Greenland House, and Banbury'.² Part of the brigade duly left London on Friday 21 June, reaching Hammersmith that evening and intending to continue towards High Wycombe,³ but during the weekend it was learned that the King was intending to move eastwards to threaten the Parliamentary heartland of the Eastern Association; fresh orders were therefore sent to Browne on Monday instructing him to alter his course towards Hertford 'for the defence of that Association'.⁴ Browne therefore marched to Barnet on 25 June, but his report to the Committee of Both Kingdoms shows a certain lack of optimism in view of the extreme weakness of his forces:

'I am now at Barnet with the two regiments, the White and Red Auxiliaries, and six pieces of ordnance. The Blue regiment is

¹Orders to be Observed...(1644)(E49/14).

²CJ, III, p. 522.

³The Weekly Account, 13-25 June (E52/15).

⁴CSPD 1644, p. 268.

not yet come to us, having refused to march without a month's advance. The whole three regiments, if together, will not amount to above 500. The enemy, as I am credibly informed, number 10,000, and as many horse as foot, quartering about Dunstable and Leyton [Leighton Buzzard]...I cannot imagine what we shall do to secure ourselves, having no horse. If the design be thought considerable I desire more strength may be speedily sent us.'¹

Here is proof indeed of the lack of volunteers now available in London; three 'gallant regiments', each supposedly of 1,200 men, were in fact little bigger than single companies, according to Browne. He may have been exaggerating their weakness, for the Red Auxiliaries had mustered about 250 men at the end of April² and it was reported on 1 July that the three Auxiliary regiments with Browne were 'not above 1,000'.³ But the Londoners felt that they had borne more than their fair share of the burden of service on campaign; early in July, one Parliamentary newsbook expressed a hope that the Auxiliaries would soon return,

'some to maintain their wives and children, others, as apprentices, to doe their best to help get money to pay their masters' taxes, which are wekely laid, and at last London shall have a Jubile, and it is but need, for the Ground is so worne out that experience tells there is little to Reap or Gather but weeds and thornes, nay they also are in good measure pulled up'.⁴

At the same time, Mercurius Aulicus reported that a list was presented to the Commons 'wherein 'twas mainifested that above twelve thousand Houses and Shops have been emptied since this time twelve-moneth, and are now to be let'.⁵

¹CSPD 1644, p. 275.

²PRO SP 28 121A part 5 ff. 620-1, 690-3.

³CSPD 1644, pp. 296-7.

⁴The Parliament Scout, 4-11 July (E54/20).

⁵Mercurius Aulicus, 5 July.

A second problem was pay; if the citizen soldiers were to go out on campaign, they did not want to meet their expenses out of their own pockets. The Committee of Both Kingdoms had noted on 24 June that 'those forces will not march without money for a month's pay as was promised them',¹ and the misgivings of the Blue Auxiliaries were quite justified in view of the ensuing dispute between the Committee of Both Kingdoms and the committee for the three associated counties commanded by Browne as to who should pay them.²

Eventually, it seems, the money was found, for Browne reported on 26 June that the Blue Auxiliaries had finally arrived at Barnet.³ He marched at once to St Albans and by Monday 1 July had reached Leighton Buzzard, where he was joined by forces from the counties of Essex and Hertfordshire. He was still annoyed about the lack of support from London, however, complaining that the Militia Committee was not doing enough to recruit the three Auxiliary regiments.⁴ Mercurius Aulicus reported on 3 July that 'the Volunteirs in London for Major General Woodmonger...come in so slowly that his Captaines went to the Committee on Monday night last, desiring liberty to lay downe their Commissions, in regard they saw no hope of Voluntiers'.⁵

Waller, having spent two days at Shipston on Stour to give his infantry a rest from marching in the extremely hot weather, had learned that the King was at Buckingham; on Thursday 27 June he therefore marched towards Banbury. By this time the Royalists had resolved to

¹CSPD 1644, p. 268.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 275.

⁴Ibid , p. 297.

⁵These officers were not necessarily from the City Auxiliaries.

turn and give battle against Waller, and on Friday they marched back to face their pursuers from a position just across the Cherwell from the Parliamentarians. Coe reports that 'our Horse and they faced one the other, the water being betweene them and us, we not willing to venture between them and the Castle, they not daring to come over to us; there we lay all night, but knew not their minds, as they it seemes did ours'.

On Saturday the Royalists waited for Waller to move from his strong position on a hilltop, but he refused to budge and the Royalists therefore began marching northwards along the hills above Cropredy to seek a more advantageous place to give battle. Waller followed a parallel course on the west side of the Cherwell, keeping the Royalists in sight on the opposite side, and about midday he noticed a gap of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles between the King's main force and his rearguard. Seizing this opportunity, he sent a cavalry brigade across Cropredy Bridge, driving off its Royalist defenders and mounting the hill to attack the King's rear; some of the Parliamentarian infantry followed the horse across the bridge, while Waller himself led a second cavalry force in a separate attack across a ford downriver from Cropredy. But the Royalist horse fought with vigour against the attacks of Waller's cavalry, and part of the main body of the King's army quickly arrived on the scene to assist the rearguard. The Roundheads were forced to flee back over the bridge, crying 'the field's lost, the field's lost', but Coe informs us that the pursuing Cavaliers failed to capture the bridge itself:

'By Gods providence and the courage of the Kentish regiment and the Citie Hamlets, we got downe two Drakes to the Bridge and staved them off so bravely, and gave them so good play all day, that ere night they could not brag of their winning; there we lay all night, looking one upon the other (when sleepe would give leave)'.

The stalwart resistance of Coe's comrades is also noted in the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel John Birch of Sir Arthur Heslerigg's infantry regiment, as recorded by his secretary: 'Had not the regiment of Tower Hamlets...at your earnest request stoutly made good the bridge, our whole army had been in great danger'.¹ Another officer recorded that 'the Hamblets very honourably and stoutly made good the Bridge, kept back the enemy, and recovered three peeces of our Ordnance, which we had lost'.²

On Sunday 30 July the two armies remained in position, confronting one another across the Cherwell, but there was no fighting except for a minor incident after nightfall which Coe describes:

'At 10 or 11 a clocke at night a foolish fellow of our Regiment shot off his Musket (the Watch being set), which made an Alarum in the Enemies quarters; they shot at our Forlorne hope, which lay downe by their Workes, and wee shot at them...before day they discharged a peece of Ordnance and gave us an Alarum likewise, we made ourselves ready to entertaine it, but heard no more of them for as soone as day approached we missed them, and they were marched away'.

The Royalists had learned that Browne was now on the march from Leighton Buzzard towards Buckingham and ultimately towards a conjunction with Waller, and this threat impelled the King to march away to the south, then back across the Cherwell and into the Cotswolds once again. Waller reacted cautiously: 'I moved not till I had full assurance from my parties, prisoners and spies that the enemy were fairly gone, lest it might have been but a feint to draw me from my vantage ground'.³ Having learnt that the Royalists really had marched away, he assumed that they would be heading for

¹Military Memoir of Colonel John Birch, quoted in Toynbee and Young, op. cit., p. 132.

²T. Ellis, An Excellent and Full Relation (1644)(E53/18), quoted in Toynbee and Young, op. cit., p. 129. The account of the battle given here is also taken from the latter book, pp. 85-95.

³Toynbee and Young, op. cit., pp. 106-7.

Buckingham, and he sent several messages warning Browne of this threat and advising a rendezvous of his forces with Waller's at Towcester. Waller was already marching east to meet Browne when he was informed that the King had doubled back across the Cherwell and was heading west, but it was now too late to change plans; on Tuesday 2 July, when Waller and Browne met on a common near Towcester, the King was more than 30 miles away at Moreton in Marsh.¹

Waller's attempt at 'king-catching' had failed, but he also had a more immediate problem: his army was on the verge of breaking up. Writing of the march from Cropredy to Towcester, he complained: 'During these two days' march I was extremely plagued by the mutinies of the City brigade, who are grown to that height of disorder that I have no help to retain them, being come to their old song of "Home, home"'.² He managed to keep them together until they had reached Northampton at the weekend, but here Colonel James Houblon and Captain Francis Grove of the Southwark White Auxiliaries died from an unspecified illness which they had contracted at Banbury,³ and the regiment resolved to march home. They claimed that their appointed time of service was expired anyway, and chose to regard Browne's new London brigade as a relief force rather than an independent support. Waller wrote to the Committee of Both Kingdoms to inform them that

'the meeting with Major-General Browne, which I thought would have proved an addition of strength to me, has very much weakened me, for my London regiments immediately looked upon his forces as sent to relieve them, and without waiting for further orders are most departed. Yesterday 400 out of one regiment quitted their colours ... I am confident about 2,000 Londoners have run away from their colours'.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 105, 107.

²CSPD 1644, p. 301.

³Coe, op. cit.

⁴CSPD 1644, p. 324.

This was followed on 8 July by a second letter giving more details:

'The City forces under Sir James Harrington, when they saw the new forces, cried out that their relief was come, and notwithstanding they were paid, away went the White Regiment for London, and many men of the other regiments did the like; besides, those remaining have Sir James's promise to depart at the end of three weeks'.¹

Coe affirms that the entire Southwark regiment returned to London with the bodies of Houblon and Grove, and Waller's court-martial records show that the Southwark officers were absent from 8 July onwards - although the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Band and the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries were still represented.²

Waller was, in fact, comparatively fortunate in that his troops were merely deserting; the behaviour of the Essex and Hertfordshire Trained Bands with Browne was far worse. They had been disbanding since 5 July,³ and two days later Waller noted that they were 'so mutinous and uncommandable that there is no hope of their stay; they likewise are upon their march home again. Yesterday they were like to have killed their Major-General, and they have hurt him in the face; such men are only fit for a gallows here and a hell hereafter.'⁴ Mutiny and desertion by Londoners and others continued to be problems for Waller, and on 2 July in a letter to the Committee of Both Kingdoms he had already announced his conclusion: 'My Lords, I write these particulars to let you know that an army compounded of these men will never go through with their service, and till you have an army merely your own that you may command, it is in a manner impossible to do

¹Ibid., p. 326.

²Adair, Cheriton, pp. 216-9.

³CSPD 1644, p. 309.

⁴Ibid., p. 324.

anything of importance'.¹ This was not an original idea - others had said and would say the same thing² - but Waller's experiences and his conclusion helped pave the way for the creation of the New Model Army during the winter of 1644-5.

For the present, Waller moved first to Buckingham and then to Woodstock with the remains of his army, including the Tower Hamlets and Westminster men. At Woodstock on 17 July one of the Westminster Auxiliaries was punished:

'It is this day ordered by the Councell of Warr that Jo. Defreeze for abuseing and cutting off Phillip Warrington one of his fellowe souldiers under the Comand of Captain Kequicke, & for drunkenesse, he shal be hanged up by the hands untill he stand on Tiptoe neere to the main Guard for the space of a Quarter of an houre, with a payre of handcuffs about his Rists, and then to be cashiered never to returne to the Army againe'.³

The last part of Defreeze's sentence was no hardship, for his comrades wanted to be discharged as well; Waller reported from Abingdon on 20 July that 'the Londoners will not stir one foot further, except it be towards home'.⁴ He thought they could, however, be persuaded to stay at Abingdon for a while longer,⁵ and the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to Sir James Harrington, the commander of Waller's City brigade, on 24 July asking him 'to tarry there for 20 days, until your absence shall be supplied'.⁶ On 29 July, while Harrington was on a visit to London, the Committee informed him that they had asked the

¹Ibid., p. 301.

²Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 31.

³Adair, Cheriton, p. 210 (but for 'Requicke' read 'Kequicke').

⁴CSPD 1644, p. 363.

⁵Ibid., pp. 363-4.

⁶Ibid., p. 374.

City Militia Committee to send out Sir James's own Westminster Red Trained Band and Colonel William Willoughby's Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries to Abingdon by 13 August, 'when you have order to return home'.¹ But there were no new troops forthcoming by 10 August, and the Committee of Both Kingdoms realised that 'the time for the continuance of the City forces expires on Monday, and should they return the rest of Sir William Waller's forces would presently march away to the loss of the town';² they decided 'to acquaint Sir James Harrington and the other commanders of the City forces that notwithstanding a former order this Committee finds it necessary that they stay a fortnight longer, and for their better encouragement £2,000 will be sent speedily'.³ Only £1,000 was in fact sent, but in the meantime the Committee finally succeeded in persuading Browne to lead his own brigade to Abingdon.⁴ Accordingly, on 14 August the Committee ordered 'that Sir James Harrington's brigade be discharged, and have liberty to return home tomorrow',⁵ and on Tuesday 20 August the newsbooks reported that 'the Regiment of the Hamblets of the Tower (which performed excellent service at the skirmish with the Kings forces neer Banbury) and a Regiment of Auxiliaries, which were both with Sir William Waller, are come to London againe in a triumphant manner',⁶ escorted into the City by many of their friends

¹Ibid., p. 384.

²Ibid., p. 419.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 426.

⁵Ibid., p. 427.

⁶The Weekly Account, 14-21 August (E6/32); The Parliament Scout, 15-22 August (E7/4).

and neighbours on horseback.¹ The regiments marched into London 'in a very compleate manner and very full, there being very few lost of both Regiments in all the time of their being forth in service'.²

Following their rendezvous with Waller's army at Towcester, Browne's weak London Auxiliary brigade and his unruly Essex and Hertfordshire forces had moved on to Northampton and then back to Aylesbury. With the threat to the Eastern Association removed by the King's march westwards, Browne was ordered on 9 July to capture Greenland House, as called for in the original plan.³ This task was duly performed on 11 July, prompting one newsbook to claim that 'the London boyes (who are the most heroicke spirits and trusty Trojeans) must have the honour of the most victorious successefull atchievements',⁴ after which the Essex troops returned home and Browne moved on to Reading.⁵ Here he received a request for support from Waller at Abingdon, 'wherein he desires me forthwith to draw my forces that way, the better to accomplish something, which he does not name'; he refused to comply, claiming that such a move would leave Reading exposed to the Royalists.⁶ The Committee of Both Kingdoms, however, supported Waller's plea, but still Browne demurred, pointing out that his main infantry strength consisted merely of 'three broken regiments of London auxiliaries, not above 800 in all'.⁷ A few days later he

¹Ibid.

²Mercurius Civicus, 15-22 August (E7/3).

³CSPD 1644, pp. 330, 334.

⁴Mercurius Civicus, 11-17 July (E2/16).

⁵CSPD 1644, pp. 347, 364.

⁶Ibid., pp. 364-5.

⁷Ibid., p. 369.

disclosed to the Committee of Both Kingdoms his real reason for not wishing to join Waller:

'Your letter directs me to receive orders from Sir Wm. Waller, which I humbly conceive I am not bound to; the ordinance of Parliament authorising me to act as commander-in-chief in these three counties, without reference to any saving Parliament, your Honours, or the Lord General, and without which I should not have undertaken it. I shall therefore expect to give orders to all forces sent hither, and to receive none from any but as I am by the said ordinance commanded.'¹

Browne threatened to resign his commission if Waller was put over him.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms was already trying to persuade the Militia Committee to send out two more regiments to replace Sir James Harrington's brigade with Waller at Abingdon, but nothing could be done in time. To get around the problem of Browne's non-cooperation, therefore, he was ordered to march his men to Aylesbury, while the Aylesbury garrison were to march to Abingdon.² This game of musical chairs was stopped short, however, because Waller himself left his command at Abingdon and returned to London to await new orders from the Committee of Both Kingdoms. The remnants of his forces at Abingdon were therefore placed under Browne's command, satisfying his honour and allowing him to lead his own men there after all. A letter from an officer in one of the City Auxiliary regiments tells what happened:

'On Tuesday last August 13 we removed from Redding and quartered at Great-Marlow, intending the next day to march to Alisbury, but the next morning a Letter came to our renowned Major-General from the Committee of Both Kingdoms, whereby he was required to make his present repaire to Abington, and to take those forces there under his command; accordingly that day he drew back to Henley, and there quartered that night, and on Thursday last advanced from thence towards Abington. In our passage or march by Wallingford Castle, the Cavaliers marched out with one piece of their great Ordnance and made ten or eleven shot at us, yet...we

¹Ibid., p. 382.

²Ibid., p. 418.

had not one man hurt, only one of our Colors torn with the great shot. Our forces are now here reasonable well, though for the present not so conveniently or commodiously quartered as we desire, neither are we as yet informed upon what service or design we shall be next engaged.'¹

But the London forces in Abingdon were to have a long wait before being given a new 'service or design', and we must leave them there for the time being.

The Earl of Essex had meanwhile led his own army, including a London brigade comprising the City Green, Yellow and Orange Auxiliaries together with Colonel Harvey's City Horse, into the West Country. Following his parting with Waller on 6 June, Essex had marched to raise the siege of Lyme on the 15th; he had then continued to Weymouth, which quickly surrendered, and the Yellow Auxiliaries under Colonel John Owen were left to garrison that town² while the army moved on towards Exeter in hope of capturing the Queen, who had moved there for safety while expecting a child. But Henriëtta Maria escaped to France, and the King, having eluded Waller after the skirmish at Cropredy Bridge, led his own army into the West in pursuit of Essex. The Lord General's advance thus became a retreat, and he withdrew his forces into Cornwall; on 1 August the Royalists also crossed the Tamar, breaking down all the bridges behind them to prevent an escape by the Parliamentarians. By late August the Lord General's army was hemmed in between Lostwithiel and Fowey. Essex sent out pleas for relief, and while the Parliamentary fleet under the Earl of Warwick vainly attempted to enter Fowey harbour beneath the Royalist guns, 600 men of the City Yellow Auxiliaries at Weymouth were ordered to march westward. A newsbook records that they duly complied with this

¹Mercurius Civicus, 15-22 August (E7/3).

²Parliament ordered on 26 August that the regiment should receive half of the £2000 originally voted for the forces at Abingdon (CJ, III, p. 607).

order: 'I the rather mention this because the Malignants give out that when that Regiment was desired to march Westward they cryed "Home, Home"'.¹ But it was too late; on 31 August the Roundhead horse fought their way out of the trap and Essex himself escaped by sea, but the infantry and artillery were left behind to surrender to the King. The treaty, signed at Lostwithiel on 6 September by Skippon on behalf of Essex's regular infantry and by Christopher Whichcot, 'a zealous City colonel',² on behalf of the Green and Orange Auxiliaries in the City brigade, promised the infantry a safe-conduct to Poole, but the Royalists took possession of the baggage and artillery, including 'a waggon full of musquet arrowes'³ which Essex had brought from London.

The Roundhead retreat from Cornwall was a sorry spectacle, as a Royalist eye-witness records:

'They all, except here and there an officer, (and seriously I saw not above three or four that looked like a gentleman,) were stricken with such a dismal feare, that as soone as their colour of the regiment was passt, (for every ensigne had a horse and rid on him and was so suffered,) the rout of soldjers of the regiment presst all of a heape like sheep, though not so innocent. So durty and so dejected as was rare to see. None of them, except some few of their officers, that did looke any of us in the face.'⁴

Despite the efforts of the Royalist officers, there was much plundering of the defeated Roundheads by the Royalist soldiers and the local inhabitants on the line of march to Poole,

'especially the Women, who pretended to see their own Cloaths and Goods about them, which they had been plundered of, treated them very rudely, even to stripping of some of the Soldiers'.⁵

¹The Parliament Scout, 29 August-5 September (E8/11).

²Mercurius Aulicus, 7 September.

³R. Symonds, Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army (1859), p. 66.

⁴Ibid., p. 67.

⁵Clarendon, II, p. 405.

This ill-treatment was to form the basis of a petition to Parliament a few months later, in which the participants complained that 'by the sad plunderings and violent usage of the enemy upon their retreat (contrary to the Articles then concluded) they are brought into a very naked and miserable condition, to the great prejudice of the health and future livelihood of themselves and familites, being very poor. The officers have suffered great losses and are constantly disbursing in answer to the cries and solicitations of their poor distressed soldiers, whose meagre countenances and naked bodies sufficiently speak to their past necessities.'¹

The Yellow Auxiliaries did not share in this harrowing withdrawal from Cornwall, since their orders to march from Weymouth came too late for them to be present at the surrender. It is not clear how far they had marched before hearing of the debacle, but on 14 September they were ordered to return to Weymouth, where they would be shipped to join the besieged garrison of Plymouth.² Colonel Edmund Harvey's City Horse were already in the latter town, having fought their way out of Fowey with the rest of Essex's cavalry, but the accounts of Captain John Blackwell's Maiden Troop in Harvey's regiment make sorry reading: 21 horses 'were un-avoydably lost in Cornwall, some of their Riders being sicke and gone away, others being in partyes from the troope had their horses taken away...and divers of them had their horses killed, & tyred, breaking through the Enemy'. Twelve other horses 'were all either carryed from the troope by them to whom they were delivered, or lost negligently, they departing from their

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 120.

²CSPD 1644, p. 503.

cullors without Licence gave no accompt of them'. Nine more 'were all taken by the Enemy at Plymouth, with 7 of the men', and there were other losses while on guard duty at Plymouth, Wareham and Barnstable.¹

Having been escorted to Poole by the Royalists, the City Green and Orange Auxiliaries continued on to Southampton. Here the brigade commander, brevet Major General Whichcot, received a letter from the Committee of Both Kingdoms:

'We are very sensible of your wants and losses through the base dealing of a perfidious enemy, which we are confident, from experience of your former good service, you will be ready to revenge upon all occasions for the better encouragement of your soldiers. We shall take care that clothes and arms be speedily sent to your soldiers and the rest of the Lord General's army.'²

Once again the Committee were trying to keep the London brigade from returning home, but Essex wrote to the Committee on 13 September to inform them that the Londoners were eager to rejoin their families:

'I sent £1000 to Major-General Whichcott for the pay of the two City regiments, and as soon as they had received their money they were very earnest for leave to return home to London with their regiments. But I told them, till I knew your pleasure or heard from the Committee of the Militia, I should regard them as runaways.'³ On 27 September, nonetheless, 'the two London Regiments that were in Cornwall with the Lord General came into towne; they were met by the Sheriffes and divers other the chiefe citizens of London'.⁴ As usual, some ceremony was made of their entrance into the City, but the rejoicings seem to have been relatively low-key in view of the disastrous outcome of the campaign. Bulstrode Whitelock summed up the feelings of

¹PRO SP 28 22 part 2 f. 278.

²CSPD 1644, p. 513.

³Ibid., pp. 514-5.

⁴The True Informer, 21-28 September (E10/17).

Parliament's supporters in September 1644:

'It was but a few weeks before that Essex and Waller with two great Armies were in pursuit of the King, who could scarce find a way to avoid them, and the Parliaments power and expectation was far above that of the King. Now the dye of War is turned another way, the Parliaments Army is defeated, disarmed and dispersed, and the King becomes Victorious.'¹

¹Whitelock, p. 98.

CHAPTER X
THE NEWBURY II CAMPAIGN

In spite of the defeats at Cropredy Bridge and Lostwithiel, something could still be salvaged from the 1644 campaign if the King could be stopped and defeated on his return from the West. The Committee of Both Kingdoms therefore laid plans to draw together the Earl of Manchester's army and the recruited forces of Essex and Waller at Newbury, and once again the City was asked for support. The imminent return of the City Green and Orange Auxiliaries from Lostwithiel would leave only the City Yellow Auxiliaries and Harvey's City Horse at Plymouth¹ and the City Red, White and Blue Auxiliaries at Abingdon on garrison duty. Neither of these forces could be spared for field service, and the Commons asked the Lord Mayor to call a Common Council meeting on 13 September 'to consider, if there be occasion, what forces they can raise'.² The City fathers agreed to send out the City Red and Blue Trained Bands, the Southwark Yellow Trained Band, the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, and the Westminster Red Trained Band; these units were 'suddainly to march forth of the Citie',³ and Friday 20 September was the day appointed for their departure.⁴

¹It is not clear when these units returned to the capital. Blackwell's Maiden Troop of Harvey's Horse was beaten up at Saltash on 7 October (Mercurius Aulicus, 16 October; E. Walker, Historical Discourses (1705), p. 105), and £200 was ordered to be paid to Lieutenant Colonel Owen, perhaps for the City Yellow Auxiliaries, on 1 July 1645 (Mercurius Civicus, 2-9 July (E292/1)). Plymouth was not relieved until January 1646.

²CJ, III, p. 624.

³The Weekly Account, 11-18 September (E9/4).

⁴Mercurius Civicus, 19-26 September (E10/11).

By now, no one should have been surprised that the London forces were not ready to march on the intended day. One newsbook had already noted the common belief 'that the abundance and delight wherein they live in London would never have allowed the trained bands of London to endure the misery and the hardnesse of Warre; but experience hath demonstrated that there are not any Souldiers in England (and England hath as good as any in the World) that exceed the trained bands of London, either in durance or courage'.¹ On the other hand, the Royalist Mercurius Aulicus observed that

'the Rebels recurre to their old Magazine to cheat out the Londoners, to forsake all they have, and be killed farre from home, without hope of one penny, nay of one good Word for their Widowes and Orphans, whereof no small number came lately to Westminster to seeke their Husbands and Fathers. And this is so knowne a Truth that the Cittizens now refuse to march out.'²

The truth was that they did not march because of a dispute over money. On 21 September the Committee of Both Kingdoms passed on to the Commons the 'Propositions' of the City, 'that they will set forth five regiments of foot, which they esteem to be 5,000 men, for effecting whereof they desire £12,000, whereof £7,000 for a month's pay, about £3,000 of their arrears, and £2,000 for the traine of artillery, which being granted they will stay for two or three months'.³ The Commons seized upon a clever suggestion that Edmund Waller MP, who had attempted to betray the City to the Royalists in May 1643, should be fined £10,000 'and this ten thousand pound to be imployed for the setting forth of the City Forces, now designed for the relief of the

¹The London Post, 24 September (E10/5).

²Mercurius Aulicus, 23 September.

³CSPD 1644, p. 523.

West',¹ but this, being linked with the seriousness of Edmund Waller's crime rather than his ability to pay, was not really a practical proposition. In the end, a new ordinance had to be passed for an assessment of the City and suburbs to pay the brigade.² The drafting of this ordinance would take a few days, but the campaign had to begin immediately; Parliament voted on Friday 4 October 'that the five Regiments designed to march out of the City should (if with convenience they could) advance on Munday next, to be joyned with Sir William Waller or the Earl of Manchester, according as the Committee of both Kingdoms shall direct'.³ This time, however, some special precautions were taken:

'For prevention of such inconveniences as by experience hath been discovered to fall out in former expeditions, by giving great sums of money beforehand to hired soldiers, and by their refusing to serve unless they may have their own demands, it is further ordained that no advance shall be henceforth given beforehand to any soldiers hired, besides their weekly pay'.⁴

One newsbook applauded the decision to free the householders from the burden of paying advance monies to their hired men:

'There hath been Care taken, that those that go in the room of house keepers (who of all others its most unfit should go, having families, whose absence puts all into a stand at home, and whose death is usually the beggering of wife and children) shall not have any advance, nor such pay as they use to have, which pay the poore housekeepers, many of them have pincht for, and have not recovered to this day'.⁵

¹The Weekly Account, 24 September-2 October (E10/28).

²Mercurius Civicus, 10-17 October (E13/6).

³The True Informer, 25 September-5 October (E11/3).

⁴CJ, III, p. 653; LJ, VII, p. 12.

⁵The Parliament Scout, 3-10 October (E12/12).

In case men refused to be hired on these conditions,

'the Committee of the Militia and their subcommittees respectively shall have power to imprest within their several limits all such persons as shall be by them thought fit to serve in this present expedition'.¹

Accordingly, on Saturday morning

'every particular person that is to go forth, was summoned by an Order from the Committee of the Militia, as followeth: "You are required by the Committee for the Militia of the City of London, either in your own person, or some other able man fit for warre, compleatly armed, to be at the usuall place of Rendezvous, the 7th of this instant, as you will answer the contrary upon paine of Fine, Imprisonment, or expulsion out of the Lines of Communication, or other punishment appointed by Ordinances of Parliament"'.²

The Venetian ambassador reported on Monday 7 October that 'five regiments of the trained bands of London are commanded to go out, but there is no sign of their obeying as yet'.³ By the end of the day, however, two of the appointed regiments were indeed on their way west: 'This evening Sir James Harrington marched forth with his Regiment (being the red Regiment of Westminster, which at a full appearance consists of about 1900) and they quartered that night at Braine-ford, Hamersmith, and the parts adjacent; Colonel Hookers⁴ red Regiment of London are also upon their march, and the rest will advance speedily after them'.⁵ The City Blue Trained Band left town on Wednesday afternoon,⁶ but the remaining regiments apparently refused to leave the City until the ordinance for their pay was passed,

¹CJ, III, p. 653; LJ, VII, p. 12.

²The Weekly Account, 2-9 October (E12/8).

³CSPVen 1643-7, p. 142.

⁴'Bookers' by mistake in the original.

⁵Mercurius Civicus, 3-10 October (E12/11).

⁶Ibid.

much to the dismay of the authorities. The Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to the Militia Committee on 10 October 'to expedite the march of the City forces...and that they do not stay for the passing of the Ordinance, being now upon public pay'.¹ The Commons followed this up with a message sent direct to the commanders of the City forces 'to require and enjoin them forthwith to march, and to acquaint them that the House has taken the Ordinance for raising monies to maintain their forces into consideration, and doubt not but to give it a speedy expedition'.² Another order was sent to Harrington, who was acting as commander of the brigade, by the Committee of Both Kingdoms instructing him and his officers 'to march immediately with their forces to be at Colnbrook tomorrow night. It being upon extraordinary service, they will answer upon their peril'.³ The penalty was spelled out on Monday 14 October, when 'all Officers and Souldiers in the London brigade were summoned to be at their severall and respective quarters upon paine of death, and it was referred to the Court martiall to proceede against such as shall be refractory therein'.⁴ The Committee of Both Kingdoms resolved on the same day 'that the Committee of Militia and their sub-committees be desired to speed away the rest of the brigade remaining in the City',⁵ and two days later they wrote to Harrington:

'We understand you are at Colnbrook with a great part of your brigade, and the rest upon the way. We have sent orders both to the Committee of the Militia and to their several sub-committees to hasten away

¹CSPD 1644-5, p. 28.

²CJ, III, p. 659.

³CSPD 1644-5, p. 30.

⁴Mercurius Civicus, 10-17 October (E13/6).

⁵CSPD 1644-5, p. 39.

the rest which are behind in town to join you. Meantime we desire you, with all expedition, to march up to Manchester's army at Reading or elsewhere without tarrying upon any occasion, that the designs of the army may be neither lost nor retarded by want of your forces or attending your coming up....Certify us from time to time of your marching, and where you are'.¹

The passing of the assessment ordinance by Parliament on 14 October, together with the threat of court-martial, seems to have persuaded the recalcitrant regiments to march out. Harrington reported on Saturday 19 October that

'the first meeting and concentration of the regiments into a brigade was on Thursday last in Maidenhead thicket, our numbers then I judged to be 3,000, from whence that night we marched to Reading, where we hope in a day or two our companies, which are yet thin, will be 4,000 complete, if our Committee in London force out our defaulters'.²

Nine days later, however, the Committee of Both Kingdoms still had information 'that numbers of soldiers of the brigade lately sent forth remain yet here', and sent yet another order to the Militia Committee to 'take present care that such soldiers as are yet here be forthwith sent to the army, and such as refuse be proceeded against according to the Ordinance of Parliament in that behalf'.³ But by that time the anticipated battle against the returning Royalist army had already been fought.

A few hours after Harrington's letter of 19 October had been sent from Reading, the London brigade was on the move again. Manchester had received 'a very hot alarm' from Waller the previous night, indicating that the Royalists had now reached Andover, and he thereupon asked Harrington to bring up four of the London units to his support at Basingstoke, leaving the Southwark Yellow Trained Band behind

¹Ibid., p. 49.

²Ibid., p. 56.

³Ibid., p. 76.

in Reading to protect that town.¹ On 20 October, Waller wrote from Basingstoke that 'the City forces are near us. You may now look upon the forces as joined. We hope there will be a battle shortly; to our understandings it cannot be avoided.'² By 22 October the Royalists were in Newbury, and four days later the combined Parliamentary forces confronted them north of the town, where they had entrenched themselves around Shaw House and the village of Speen.

The Parliamentary Council of War met on Saturday night 26 October to consider their plan of attack on the following day, and they saw that the King, although at a disadvantage in numbers, held a strong defensive position. They therefore agreed to divide their own forces, sending Essex's and Waller's armies on a 13-mile night march to confront the Royalists from the west at Speen, while Manchester remained in position on the east opposite Shaw House. The plan was for the main attack to begin simultaneously from the two flanks on a cannon signal from Waller, and in the meantime Manchester would skirmish around Shaw House to distract Royalist attention from the outflanking move. In the event, however, several things went awry: Manchester's skirmishing force pressed too far and was only extricated with some difficulty; Waller's assault on Speen at 3 p.m. was successful, but the advantage was not pressed home; Manchester's main attack was an hour late in beginning, leaving only half an hour before sunset; and a gap in the Parliamentary blockade allowed the Royalists to escape from the trap after nightfall. Although the Roundheads won possession of the battlefield, they had failed in their objective of stopping the King from returning to Oxford; if it was a victory at all, it was not

¹Ibid., p. 57.

²Ibid., p. 60.

much to boast about.¹

But what part did the London brigade pay in the battle? According to Mercurius Aulicus,

'Before it was light, above Eleven hundred of those Rebels on the Hill before Shaw (which was the Earle of Manchesters Army & London Trainedbands) came downe the Hill to passe over that part of the River Kennet which runs betwixt the Hill and Newbury...the Rebels got over, and then advanced with much confidence upon those few Foot at the Passe, who being on a sudden overpressed with multitude gave the Rebels way, till that gallant Gentleman Sir Bernard Asteley (sonne to the Lord Asteley) came up with 400 Musketeers and fell on with such judgement and courage that he totally routed all those Eleven hundred Rebels, While Sir Bernard was upon execution of these Rebels, two other Bodies hasted over the River to second the first, but the brave Knight so followed his blow that he made the first Rebels rout their seconds, who all ran through the River in such distraction and confusion that abundance of them were drown'd, besides those slaine (whereof their Commander in chiefe was one), very many taken Prisoners, 200 Armes gathered up, with great store of good Pillage, Trainedband Buffe (for many of these were Londoners). So that when the Rebels reckon how many were killed in this fight at Newbury, they say nothing of such as were Drowned, which is no faire Account for the Citizens of London, who ought to have it according to their Weekly Bills of Mortality, which would tell how may Londoners were Shot to death - Drowned - Starved - as well within the Quarters as without.'²

Sir Edward Walker's account also names '1000 of Manchester's forces and the London Trained Bands' as the participants in the morning attack.³

In the afternoon, following Waller's thrust against Speen village in the West, Manchester finally led his main assault on Shaw House, as Mercurius Aulicus relates:

'About foure of clock they came downe the Hill before Shaw, advancing towards those guards which the Lord Astley disposed under the command of Colonell George Lisle....The Rebels (to the number of 1200 Horse and 3000 Foot of the Earle of Manchesters and London Trained-bands) came singing Psalms down the hill and advanced hastily upon Colonell Lisle's guards'.⁴

¹P. Young and R. Holmes, The English Civil War (1974), pp. 216-221.

²Mercurius Aulicus, 28 October.

³Walker, op. cit., p.111; Clarendon, II, p. 421 also supports this.

⁴Mercurius Aulicus, 28 October.

This report was echoed a month later by Mercurius Britanicus, the Parliamentary newsbook which always took great care to refute the claims of Aulicus and correct its errors:

'Aulicus proceeds with might and main to belie us concerning the fight at Newbury, and especially the Earl of Manchester's souldiers and the London Trained-Bands, whom of all men he fears most, because they always charge them with gallant resolution....He is so afraid of the gallant Londoners that, if you observe, the most he will have ever to be slain, he names to be Citizens and Trained-Band men....Oh what a glory it is to this City, that they are become so terrible to the enemy! He sayes that the Earl of Manchester's men and the London Trained-bands sang Psalms as they were coming on to fight, but that their souldiers shouted twice: see here how he prints the piety of our souldiers, who were exercised just as the Armies of Martyrs and Saints are in Heaven, whose heavenly Harmony these malicious Hell-hounds strove to drown with confused noise of shoutings.'¹

Britanicus got his facts from Aulicus, but the accounts of Parliamentarians who were actually present at Newbury are significantly different. According to the latter, the London brigade was not with Manchester opposite Shaw House at all, but had joined the flanking force under Waller's command to attack the village of Speen on the western flank of the Royalist army. Lieutenant General Cromwell, in his evidence against Manchester after the battle, noted that this force consisted of 'the Lord Generalls and the City Foote, with the greatest part of the horse'.² Manchester's chaplain, Simeon Ashe, wrote: 'All my Lord Generalls Horse and Foot, the greatest part of my Lord of Manchesters Horse, and almost all the Forces under the Command of Sir William Waller and Sir Arthur Heislerig, together with the London Brigade, did march to Speene hill: But the Earl of Manchesters Foot, with a small body of Horse, was left in the field on this side

¹Mercurius Britanicus, 10-25 November (El0/12).

²J.B. Bruce and D. Masson, eds., Manchester's Quarrel; Documents Relating to the Quarrel between the Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell (Camden Society, 1075).

Shaw'.¹ But the best evidence comes from Skippon, the commander of the infantry element in the force which attacked at Speen. He recalls how he disposed the London regiments during the battle:

'Our holding Resolution was, That all the Horse and Dragoons (except about 1600 or 1800 out of all our Armies, and 200 Dragoons,) with all my Lord Generals Foot, and the four City Regiments, should march about to Speen-Village...which was accordingly put in Execution....On our side, the Foot was ordered to make the Attempt in this manner...the Forlorn-hope, consisting of about 800 Musqueteers, was led by Colonel Aldridge's Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd ...His Excellency's Regiment fell upon the right hand of them with great boldness; Colcnel Aldrige with his Brigade, consisting of his own, Colonel Davies, Colonel Fortescue, and Colonel Ingolsbies Regiments, fell on directly on their main work with undaunted resolution. His Excellency's Regiment coming upon the right hand of them, they both fell pell-mell into the same work. The two Red and Yellow Regiments of the Citizens² held the Enemy play on the right hand; Colonel Barclay with his Brigade alone, wherein was his own, my Lord Roberts, and my Regiment, most resolutely repulsed three violent charges of the Enemies Horse in the plain Field, and after that did further good service; the Blew City Regiment³ came on the left hand of them; his Brigade and this Blew Regiment were the Reserve.'⁴

A newsbook records that 'the London brigade under Sir James Harrington behaved themselves very gallantly', and that Sir James 'was neerly engaged, and his horse shot under him';⁵ he himself later referred to the battle as 'Spine (i.e. Speen) fight',⁶ which shows where the battle had taken place as far as he was concerned.

Why did the Royalists wrongly believe that the London brigade was with Manchester at Shaw House? I believe that Aulicus's reference

¹S. Ashe, A True Relation (1644) (E22/10).

²i.e. the City Red Trained Band, the Westminster Red Trained Band, and the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries. The Southwark Yellow Auxiliaries had been left behind in Reading.

³The City Blue Trained Band.

⁴J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (1721-2), III, part 2, pp. 722-3.

⁵Mercurius Civicus, 24-31 October (E15/1).

⁶CSPD 1644-5, p. 147.

to 'Trainedband Buffe' gives us the clue. The London militia did not wear uniforms, but many of them had buff-coats of their own, as we have seen from Aulicus's report of the first battle of Newbury in 1643.¹ Apparently some of the units with Manchester on the hill above Shaw House were similarly dressed, and the Royalists drew their false conclusion from this. We cannot now determine who the buff-coated regiments with Manchester were, except that they were part of his own army, but the entire London brigade of four regiments present at the battle was with the flanking force at Speen.² The picturesque account of the Londoners coming down the hill singing psalms with Manchester's regiments is not true, as they were $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles away at that time; instead, we must picture them rejoicing with their Parliamentary comrades over the capture at Speen of the cannon abandoned to the Royalists at Lostwithiel in September.

The Friday after the second battle of Newbury was 1 November, by which time the armies would normally be assigning their regiments to garrison duties for the winter, but the Parliamentary authorities resolved 'not to think of any winter quarters so long as the enemy keeps in the fields'.³ Accordingly, two of the City regiments were left to secure Newbury while the others marched towards Abingdon, intending to rendezvous with the rest of the army and then continue to Woodstock to confront the Royalists.⁴ In the event, however, it was decided that the roads to Abingdon were impassable, and the

¹See p. 88.

²Walter Money (The First and Second Battles of Newbury (1881), p. 131n.) accepted both the Royalist and Parliamentary accounts as correct and believed that the brigade had been divided, but Skippon's relation makes it clear that all four regiments were at Speen.

³CSPD 1644-5, p. 90.

⁴Ibid., pp. 89, 90.

Londoners returned to Newbury and then apparently joined their comrades in besieging nearby Donnington Castle.¹ There the King appeared on 9 November, and although outnumbered two-to-one by the Roundheads he succeeded in relieving the garrison at Donnington and rescuing some artillery which he had left behind there - a success which was due mainly to the divided counsels of the Parliamentary leaders and the half-heartedness of Manchester and others.² It was noted, however, that 'the Londoners, who were charged or faced when Dennington Castle was relieved, after they were well in their accoutrements, did bravely salute the enemy with one volley after another'.³

The Southwark Yellow Trained Band had meanwhile been ordered on 6 November to quit Reading and join a new siege at Basing House,⁴ and the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries were also sent from Newbury to Basing on 15 November.⁵ These regiments took an active part in the siege, for it was reported on 18 November that 'they in Basing going to fetch hop-poles for firing were so pelted by some of our City forces that they left 18 behinde, besides those that went halting in'.⁶ But the siege was lifted on 19 November and the Parliamentary forces finally withdrew into winter quarters; by 25 November the London brigade was fortifying Henley, where Sir James Harrington learned that the Committee of Both Kingdoms wanted him to send one of

¹Ibid., p. 96.

²Young and Holmes, op. cit., p. 223.

³The Parliament Scout, 7-14 November (E17/9).

⁴CSPD 1644-5, p. 100.

⁵Ibid , p. 125; Perfect Passages, 13-20 November (E18/1).

⁶The Parliament Scout, 14-21 November (E18/16).

his regiments, along with units from Essex's and Manchester's armies, to reinforce the garrison of Abingdon. Harrington was prepared to comply, but not without expressing his misgivings:

'I received your order of 23rd November, and in obedience thereto have prepared the regiment of Auxiliaries¹ to be ready to march forth at the command and with the forces of the Earl of Manchester; only I shall crave leave to offer to your wisdoms - that this town is untenable, by reason of the hills near about it, even for a winter quarter, unless manned with numbers of men, the line being large and the old work scarcely visible. Our labours very great and duty upon guard every third night, so that our condition, at a time when others are refreshing themselves, requires rather an addition than diminution, especially of horse.'²

Despite his protests, the regiment marched out to Abingdon at the end of the month. On 4 December Harrington wrote again:

'It is my duty to represent to your Lordships that these City forces think they are much neglected in that after many solicitations, though placed in a frontier garrison as yet unfortified, they have not assigned unto them the 200 horse promised, and are now of necessity required to keep their outguards, give intelligence of the enemy, bring in necessary provision for their subsistence, and to secure the country, yesterday plundered within a mile of us'.³

The fact that the men in Henley had to do their own foraging was indeed a great inconvenience, as lamented by Bulstrode Whitelock, who had his country home there:

'The Parliaments forces quartered at Reading, Abington and Henley, where the rude Souldiers did great mischief to Friends as well as Enemies in their Houses and more in their Woods, but such insolencies and mischiefs must be expected from this brood of Men or rather bruitish Souldiers, who know no difference between Friends and Foes, but all is Plunder that they can fasten their hands upon'.⁴

On 6 December the Committee of Both Kingdoms, having assigned other forces to the garrison for the winter, gave permission to the Militia

¹The Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries.

²CSPD 1644-5, p. 145.

³Ibid., p. 175.

⁴Whitelock, p. 109.

Committee to recall their regiments from Henley on 9 December - although the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries were to remain in Abingdon. No doubt the citizens of the London brigade were thankful at being allowed to return home, although Harrington feared that their recent labours might prove to have been wasted:

'According to your order we were ready to march on Monday morning, when we received an express from the Earl of Manchester desiring our stay till Tuesday. Our departure was again deferred till this morning [Wednesday 11 December]....This town is of considerable importance...our unwearied labours have made it within a week's work defensible...I hope that upon our return the enemy will not draw his strength towards the Eastern Association, for, if these forces of the Earl of Manchester be called hence for the relief of the Associated counties, this town will be open to the enemy, after we have fortified it.'¹

Harrington also put in a plea for the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, who were 'much discontented to be cut off from us',² but these remained in Abingdon when the other four regiments of Harrington's brigade arrived back in London on Saturday 14 December.³

In addition to the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, there were three other London regiments at Abingdon - the City Red, White and Blue Auxiliaries. These had been part of the garrison since the late summer, but they had not been forgotten by the authorities in London; the governor of Abingdon, Richard Browne, had seen to that, and his pleas for help form a substantial part of the surviving papers of the Committee of Both Kingdoms in the autumn of 1644. Browne's first letter to the Committee from Abingdon came in the middle of August, shortly after his brigade had arrived there:

'We find provisions here very scarce, and hardly to be had for money, so that our wants are like to be great. Our quarters are also exceedingly strait, so that there are near 10 men in a room,

¹CSPD 1644-5, pp. 184-5.

²Ibid., p. 185.

³The Weekly Account, 11-18 December (E21/27).

besides many sick....The want of money and the mischiefs it occasions amongst the soldiers makes me still request to be relieved of this command. Nor can I endure to see the poor country despoiled and ruined by the soldiers, which they being in want are compelled unto, or must starve and moulder away.'¹

Another request for money was sent a week later, and on 27 August he wrote again:

'I am forced to continue the story of our wants of money, without which I believe our soldiers will very shortly drop all away; at least 100 being gone within two or three days past. I desire a strict course may be taken for their punishment and return. The rest threaten and are resolved to be gone without money, although they be hanged when they come to London. Provision will not satisfy them, for when they have bread and cheese they sell it for a third part of the value to make money.'²

Some money was indeed sent to Abingdon at the beginning of September, but it was not nearly enough:

'If only £500 be coming to us, being but two or three days' pay, I fear the rest of the soldiers will also run away, some telling me so much and in so mutinous a manner that I was forced this day to punish both officers and soldiers. We will want many pieces of ordnance to keep the works when they are finished, but that cannot be for many months. In the meantime they will do us but little service. We have followed the form begun before my coming hither, but which is so extended that when finished they cannot be kept by fewer than 4,000 men.'³

Later in the month there was a mutiny in one of the regiments in Abingdon, and one man was executed as a result. Browne duly reported this to the Committee, and stressed that he was not exaggerating the privations of the garrison:

'My Lords, it troubles me much to complain, and did I not see so many pressing necessities in the soldiers, as well those of the country as all the others from London, whose bare feet and hollow cheeks plead aloud, I should for ever be silent'.⁴

The Committee sent an engineer to Abingdon at the end of September

¹CSPD 1644, p. 429.

²Ibid., pp. 454-5.

³Ibid., p. 471.

⁴Ibid., p. 527.

to make recommendations for shortening the line of defences,¹ and this may have lightened the work-load of the soldiers and allowed them to make occasional forays against the enemy; it was reported on 12 October that 'Major-General Brown still continues at Abbingdon with the London Auxiliaries, who often advance under the wals of Oxford, but the Garrison of that town and University...dare not once to appeare against them, although they divers times seize upon some of their Scouts, and other straglers'.² But at the same time, Browne was reporting to the Committee of Both Kingdoms:

'We have 500 fallen sick of late, and one or two being perished for want of clothes have died in the streets. I beg you to pity our sad condition....The officers...being left almost without men, humbly desire there may be present course taken for recruiting their companies and clothing the soldiers they have left, or else that these may be disbanded.'³

The Committee attempted to reassure him a few days later:

'The condition of Abingdon as you have represented it to us we have reported to the Lord General and the Committee at the army, and have desired them to have a care for the preservation thereof. We desire you to use all endeavours for its defence and keeping.'⁴

But it was too little, too late, as Browne reported at the end of October:

'Yesterday above 80 of Major Underwood's troop⁵ ran away from us to London, pretending want of pay, although they were not above 4 or 5 weeks behind. I beg that they may be made exemplary in punishment, as they never were nor will be serviceable as soldiers. The condition of our poor foot is still very sad, and increasing beyond belief. I hear there is £2,000 coming to us, but that will do little good, only supplying the soldiers with shoes to run away, besides the officers are six times that proportion already out of

¹Ibid., p. 546.

²The True Informer, 5-12 October (E12/17).

³CSPD 1644-5, p. 45.

⁴Ibid., p. 63.

⁵Newly raised in the City in July and sent to Abingdon at the end of August (CSPD 1644, pp. 442, 451-2, 460).

purse to their soldiers....I therefore renew my former suit to you to be recalled hence, not being able to do that service I desire for the reasons humbly presented, nor to behold so many starving wretches without ability to relieve them.'¹

The Committee resolved on 9 November 'that it be reported to the House [of Commons] that the wants and necessities of the garrison at Abingdon are very great, and to desire that a speedy course be taken for the supply thereof, especially money, whereof they stand most in need'.² Nothing was done immediately, and on 18 November the Committee was sent yet another letter by Browne:

'I would have you take notice that great numbers of our foot have lately run away; above half of Major Underwood's horse...besides half those that yet remain, both horse and foot, are fallen sick and unserviceable, so that we are in no sort able to endure a siege or storm, having not half enough to man the works'.³

The Committee sent some men from Manchester's army and the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries from Henley early in December, together with some provisions, but Browne was not, it seems, adequately grateful. It also appears that the Committee was growing tired of Browne's pleas and his requests for a transfer:

'Besides those provisions we sent you, which, however they be valued, we understand to be of consequence for the preservation of that place, we are in further consideration to send thither horse for the security of the town, besides further necessary provisions. We therefore desire you to continue there with cheerfulness, and not to discover to the soldiers that willingness to come away that you intimate to us in your letters, lest you thereby discourage the soldiers to tarry there and endanger the loss of the place by their coming away.'⁴

The extra supplies were sent to Abingdon shortly before Christmas:

'We have taken care to send provisions to Abingdon for the relief and clothing of the forces in your garrison there. You are to take care that those only be clothed of whom you can have assurance that they intend to tarry there during the winter and to do service,

¹CSPD 1644-5, p. 84.

²Ibid., p. 108.

³Ibid., p. 132.

⁴Ibid., p. 176.

and not to depart when they are refurnished.'¹

The horse arrived on 22 December, and included a troop raised in London during the summer under Colonel Heriot Washbourne.² But the cavalry reinforcement was weaker than Browne had expected, and the garrison's infantry strength was also declining rapidly - so much so that he recommended 'the removal of our Londoners, more being sent in their room, as those here are resolved not to stay, running away at the rate of 20 to 30 a day'.³

The Committee of Both Kingdoms apparently did not consider it possible to obtain other London infantry units to replace the remnants of the Red, White and Blue Auxiliaries, but chose to recommend their reorganisation in an attempt to save money and create a credible military unit from the remaining material. On 26 December, the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to the Militia Committee:

'The three regiments of City Auxiliaries at Abingdon are so weak that it would be well to have them reduced into one, many of the officers being willing to be reduced and so save unnecessary charge to the State. We leave you to the manner of doing it as being best acquainted with the state of those regiments.'⁴

The Militia Committee sent the appropriate orders to Browne early in January, along with £1000 to pay some of the arrears of the three City Auxiliary regiments and Underwood's troop of horse. The Governor indicated his intention of carrying out the planned reorganisation, but first he had some news to report:

'The enemy at Oxford, with a party of 800 horse and 1,000 foot, drawn together from Wallingford, Farrington, and their horse quarters round Oxford, march forth on Friday night [10 January 1645], commanded by Prince Rupert....their intention...was to storm Abingdon on Culham side of the town.'

¹Ibid., p. 193.

²See p.

³CSPD 1644-5, p. 195.

⁴Ibid., p. 199.

The surprise attack nearly succeeded, but Roundhead musket-fire from the meadows finally drove the Royalists back from the bridge. Browne reported that 'most of our officers did well, as also did the soldiers of the London Auxiliaries'.¹ Having survived this attack, he turned to the reducing of the Auxiliaries, and on 21 January he reported to the Committee of Both Kingdoms that 'the three regiments of London Auxiliaries are reduced according to your order, but I am confident it will prove their dissolution'.² Nevertheless, the sending of another £1000 for the pay of Colonel Washbourne's recently-arrived troop of horse and the other, non-London forces in the garrison seems to have staunched the flow of letters from Browne, and the rest of the winter was relatively quiet.

¹Ibid., pp. 245-7.

²Ibid., p. 266.

CHAPTER XI

REORGANISATION AND RETIREMENT

During the summer and autumn of 1644, while the various London brigades were on campaign with Essex, Waller, Browne and Manchester, the duty of guarding the forts naturally fell more frequently on the units which remained at home. This task could not be adequately performed from a military standpoint in view of the 11-mile length and obsolete design of the fortifications, and there was little enthusiasm for the work. On 30 August,

'an unknown fellow came in at the Court of Guard at Shorditch, pistoled the Sentinell, rode through Bishopsgate-street, Gracious street, and escaped over the Bridge, and so through Southwark Court of Guard, notwithstanding the pursuit. This may teach our Courts of Guard more care than to be at NINE-PINS when they should stand SENTINELL.'¹

If the common soldiers were lax, the officers were even more careless in fulfilling their duty: on 18 October 'the Committee for the Fortifications taking occasion to survey the keeping of the Workes found but one Captaine and two Lieutenants at twelve Forts and Redouts, whereas the Commanders have constant pay allowed them for that service'.²

The Trained Bands had already protested against having to guard the forts, but both attempts at a solution - the raising of the Auxiliaries in the spring of 1643 and the campaign to recruit separate units for this task in December - had failed to ease the burden. By now, however, it was felt that 'the souldiers in the Trained-bands would be more willing to pay towards the maintenance of a constant Garrison then to be so often taken off from their more necessary and profitable

¹The Parliament Scout, 29 August-5 September (E8/11).

²Mercurius Civicus, 10-17 October (E13/6).

imployments'.¹ At the beginning of October, a third attempt was made to create a unit whose sole task would be to defend the forts:

'Some Propositions have been this week presented by divers well-affected persons to the Committee of Fortifications of London, and by them taken into consideration concerning the raising and maintaining a Regiment of 1200 foote souldiers to be constantly imployed in keeping the Forts and Works about the City and within the Lines of Communication, which will not only much ease the Trainedbands, but be a meanes also of support to divers poore men about the City, who for the present are destitute of imployment'.²

But nothing was done about this in 1644, and on 24 February 1645 the Committee for the Fortifications received another petition from 'many tradesmen shewing that their trade and estates are much decayed by reason of their great and often service at the forts', although it curiously went on to claim that there were 'not 150 men constantly in all the said works'.³

While the City authorities were seeking an answer to this problem, another garrison was causing more immediate worries for the Committee of Both Kingdoms. In the autumn of 1642, John Venn MP had left his post as lieutenant colonel of the City Yellow Trained Band and raised an army regiment for the defence of Windsor Castle, taking several other Trained Band officers with him.⁴ The soldiers, too, were probably all Londoners, and by the summer of 1644 they had apparently grown tired of Venn, or Windsor, or garrison duty, or all three. The arrival of Browne's London brigade at Henley in July allowed some of

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., 26 September-3 October (E10/30).

³Common Council Journal 40 f. 120b.

⁴John Bradley, Thomas Buxton, Jonathan Gauthorne, and William Stackhouse. For accounts and other records of Venn's regiment at Windsor see PRO SP 28 16 ff. 184-200; 34 part 2 f. 171; 145 ff. 14-17, 57-8; 147 ff. 359-61; 261 part 2 f. 294; 262 part 2 ff. 183, 219, part 3 f. 306; 263 ff. 76, 234, 263, 276, 280, 297; 298 part 1 ff. 18-19, 123, 239-40, 314-7.

the garrison to leave Windsor in order to join Browne at the siege of Greenland House,¹ and on 13 July Browne wrote to the Committee of Both Kingdoms: 'The gentlemen of the Windsor regiment, now with me, desire they may be still continued in this service, and that Colonel Venn may have order to raise men in the country thereabouts to keep the Castle, that such willing men as are there may be permitted to come hither to compleate the regiment'.² The Committee seems to have acquiesced, at least in part, for a portion of 'the Windsor Regiment' was still with Browne at Abingdon in January 1645.³ The Committee had also decided that a smaller force would be adequate for Windsor, resolving on 26 October that 'the garrison of Windsor shall consist of 200 men in two companies';⁴ these officers and men were, however, 'to be chosen out of the soldiers and officers now in the Castle, by the said Colonel'.⁵ In addition, some money was to be sent to Windsor, 'where the soldiers are in great want',⁶ and Common Council agreed on 9 November to loan Venn £300 to pay the garrison until funds were forthcoming from Parliament.⁷

As with the Abingdon garrison, the pay was too little and too late. On 15 November, apparently before any funds had arrived at Windsor, 'some discontent did arise for want of pay, and upon misdemeanour one of the Garrison was committed to prison, and was set at liberty by the

¹PRO SP 28 47 f. 69.

²CSPD 1644, p. 347.

³CSPD 1644-5, p. 247.

⁴Ibid., p. 73.

⁵CJ, III, p. 681.

⁶Ibid., p. 682.

⁷Common Council Journal 40 f. 116.

rest without order, which done, the difference was ended'.¹ But as far as the Committee of Both Kingdoms was concerned, the matter was not ended at all; the garrison had clearly mutinied against Venn's disciplinary authority and was still in a state of revolt. The Committee immediately ordered the Middlesex authorities to send 300 men to Windsor to put down the mutiny, and sent a despatch to Venn:

'Your letters concerning the mutiny of your soldiers have been received by us, and we are very sorry that they should have been so unmindful of their duty as not to have manifested their grievances in a fair way, but, on the contrary, behaved themselves in so insolent a manner to their Commander-in-Chief. We have written to your officers to continue their endeavours for quieting of that distemper, and shall be further careful to settle you in the peaceable command of that garrison.'²

The Committee attributed a share of the blame to Venn's officers in the message which was sent to them:

'We understand that there has been a mutiny amongst the soldiers under your command, which by your active endeavours we conceive might easily have been suppressed. Neither the Houses of Parliament nor this Committee have ever at any time been unwilling to hear your just grievances, and when they shall be represented by you will be ready to take them into consideration, and we trust you will be so sensible of your duty for the future that you will contribute your utmost endeavours for appeasing and quieting of the present distemper.'³

Two companies of the Middlesex Trained Bands arrived in Windsor by 18 November, but were not admitted into the Castle; however, the disturbance had subsided by that time and the Middlesex men were allowed to return home three days later.⁴

Although Venn continued in his command at Windsor after the quelling of the mutiny, some if not all of his subordinate officers were removed. On 23 November the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered 'that

¹The Weekly Account, 13-20 November (E18/2).

²CSPD 1644-5, p. 126.

³Ibid., pp. 126-7.

⁴Ibid., pp. 130, 138.

the officers of Windsor Castle lately cashiered, and some of the Militia [Committee], be at this Committee on Monday morning',¹ and a fortnight later another order was issued 'that Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley and the rest of the Windsor Captains do attend Sir William Waller tomorrow in the evening at his own house'.² It appears that the Committee of Both Kingdoms was trying to find some new employment for the experienced officers who had served under Venn; it was inappropriate for them to continue at Windsor Castle, but their conduct had not been so reprehensible that they must return to private life. It is not clear whether or not the common soldiers of Venn's regiment were also removed, although the governor was certainly recruiting 'raw countrymen' to reinforce the garrison in January 1645.³

By the following spring, the Militia Committee had found the answer to two problems: the need for a separate military units to guard the London fortifications, and the lack of employment for the officer cadre of Venn's old regiment. Parliament was persuaded to vote the necessary funds to pay the arrears of the gunners and workmen in the forts and to raise a new regiment of 1200 men, to be led by Colonel John Bradley (formerly Venn's second-in-command) and his fellow officers. This new regiment would, unlike Venn's, come under the authority of the Militia Committee and would be used only to man the fortifications - a promise which, this time, was duly kept. Arms were bought and the new companies mustered at the end of June 1645, and 'the new modell at the forts',⁴ - a label adapted from

¹Ibid., p. 140. Major Henry Saunders was one of the officers who was discharged on 22 November (PRO SP 28 47 f. 67).

²Ibid., p. 179.

³Ibid., p. 247.

⁴Common Council Journal 40 f. 155b.

military developments on the national scene - began its duties by the beginning of July.¹ The citizens' relief was recorded in one of the newsbooks:

'We shall take notice in speciall this day, of a great happines that hath this week befallen the House-keepers of London and the line of Communication: its a deliverance from duty at the Courts of Guard; by this we are Masters of much time, and much money spent that way there, to say nothing of company; what a man looses at home while he is abroad in considerable; and now had we but this blessing, that the Gentry might dwel among us, that so we might gaine from them & lodge them, which could not be worth lesse than £20,000 a yeare to us, which now is most of it lost, they not daring to come, or come, not willing to stay, so hard are the impositions laid upon them. Setting a blessed and happy Accord aside, these are the two greatest earthly favours poor London can enjoy, to be at home to follow their busines, and have busines to follow.'²

While London was creating its own 'New Model', Parliament's major military reorganisation could not be ignored, and the Militia Committee was ordered on severall occasions to press men for Fairfax's army during the spring of 1645. The Self-Denying Ordinance also had minor effects on the City: John Venn, being a member of the House of Commons, was compelled to resign his command at Windsor in April and was replaced by Christopher Whichcot, formerly a captain in the City White Trained Band and colonel of the City Green Auxiliaries.³ Issac Penington also had to leave the Tower, of which he had remained

¹PRO SP 28 143 (part), 'Acquittance Book for the new Regiment'. The regiment had no less than 11 companies, and although the senior officers (Bradley, Lt Col Thomas Buxton, Major Henry Saunders, and Captains Richard Lane, Jonathan Gauthorn, Joseph Symonds and Philip Pinchon) had served under Venn, there were also some new captains (Timothy Wilkes, Richard Bolt, Francis Maissy, and William Walden).

²The Moderate Intelligencer, 26 June-3 July (E292/3). But the Trained Bands apparently continued to serve at the courts of guard from time to time: Captain Andrew Neale (City Yellow Trained Band) was paid 'for service done by him and his officers upon the severall [Courts of] Guard in and about the City of London' until 29 July, Captain Walter Boswell (Orange) till 27 September, Captain Edward Bellamy (Blue) until 19 October, Colonel Edward Hooker (Red) till 27 November, and Major John Brett (Yellow) until 12 December (CSPD 1645-7, p. 385). The captains of the Westminster Red Trained Band were paid 'for their drawings out to the Forts' until 12 November (PRO SP 28 38 part 6).

Lieutenant after the end of his term as Lord Mayor, and the Militia Committee had a ready candidate for nomination to this post as a result of a blunder by the Earl of Essex in 1643. At the first battle of Newbury, the City Blue Trained Band had been led by Lieutenant Colonel Francis West, and Essex had rewarded him for his good service with a colonel's commission. But appointments in the Trained Bands were the sole responsibility of the Militia Committee, and each regiment was then under the nominal command of an alderman even though he did not take the field when the regiment marched out on campaign. The result was a dispute between West and Alderman Thomas Adams, the officially appointed colonel of the Blue Trained Band, and this was eventually referred to the Committee of Both Kingdoms for resolution. In August 1644, it was announced that

'this Committee is of the opinion that Alderman Adams is in point of right colonel of the said regiment by the authority of the Committee of the Militia of the City of London, who derive their authority from both Houses of Parliament. And for a final composing of the difference between them we have this day ordered that Colonel West be recommended to the Houses to be preferred to some place worthy of his merit, both for honour and profit.'¹

West was duly nominated by the Aldermen and Common Council in April 1645 to fill the vacancy at the Tower, and Parliament agreed on 3 May to appoint him as Lieutenant.²

As spring came round once again, the usual efforts were made to recruit the Auxiliary regiments in preparation for any forthcoming campaigns. On 29 April, Common Council ordered that 'the Committee formerly appointed for buying and providing Arms for the Auxiliaries shall call before them the Captains of the said Auxiliaries to examine what is become of those Arms. Also the Common Councilmen in

¹CSPD 1644, p. 404.

²The Scottish Dove, 25 April-2 May (E281/10); LJ, VII, pp. 348-51.

each ward to list for the Auxiliaries so that every Captain's roll be made complete'.¹ Less than three weeks later, a committee of the Lords and Commons appeared before Common Council to ask for the assistance of a London brigade in the first campaign of the new season, a fresh attempt on the Royalist headquarters; it was decided that 'four Regiments of the the Train Bands, two of the Auxiliaries, and 2000 Prest men are to go forth to the besieging (or otherwise gaining) of Oxford'.² But the City authorities were again reluctant to send out their forces before Parliament had passed a new ordinance setting out their rights and guaranteeing their pay for the new expedition, and on 29 May the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to the Militia Committee:

'The blocking up of Oxford in order to a future siege being a service of so great concernment, we hold it most necessary that it be carried on with effect. You must therefore cause your forces to march out with all expedition toward Oxford. We have reported to the House of Commons the great consequence of that service, and desired them to take your Ordinance concerning it into present consideration.'³

By this time Fairfax's New Model Army, of which much was expected, had already sat down before Oxford; as one newsbook observed, 'it seems they at Oxford thought they should have libertie to provide for themselves against a Siege till the London Regiments came to besiege them, but they see wee have a new-moulded Armie; wee doe but speake, and act in an instant'.⁴ At the end of May the force required from London was reduced to two regiments, the Southwark White Auxiliaries and the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries,⁵ and Major General Browne was

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 128.

²Mercurius Veridicus, 17-24 May (E285/12).

³CSPD 1644-5, p. 539.

⁴The Scottish Dove, 16-23 May (E285/4).

⁵Mercurius Civicus, 29 May-5 June (E286/28).

to command the siege operations while Fairfax went in pursuit of the King near Leicester. Browne was in London at the beginning of June to hasten the sending out of forces to him, and when he returned to Abingdon on 4 June it was announced that 'the Auxiliaries of Southwark and Westminster are speedily to be completed and in a readinesse for that purpose'.¹

The last few campaigns had revealed increasing difficulty in bringing the London regiments up to strength and persuading or compelling them to march out. On this occasion, however, the Southwark and Westminster men never left London at all, and nothing more was heard of the plan. Instead, on 18 July an ordinance was passed to authorise the recruitment of dragoons in London and Middlesex for service in 'the 3 Associated Countyes of Oxon: Barks: and Bucks' under Browne's command, and these newly raised forces entered into service in the middle of August.² It is possible that the plans were altered because it was felt that dragoons would be more useful than the infantry Auxiliaries in a conflict which was becoming increasingly a war of movement, but it seems likely that reluctance to send out the militia on campaign again was also an important factor. In response to a simultaneous request from Colonel Edward Massey for 500 musketeers from the London militia to assist him in the relief of Taunton, the Militia Committee had replied that they 'were not in a capacitie' to send them but suggested that they be raised by voluntary subscriptions in the City, which was done.³

¹The True Informer, 7 June (E286/33).

²Accounts of Captain Francis Hanson's troop of dragoons, PRO SP 28 131 (part). The dragoons were raised by voluntary subscription; for details of collections in Westminster see PRO E 179 253/12 p. 35.

³Sharpe, p. 217; Common Council Journal 40 f. 133.

A few days previously, Mercurius Aulicus had quoted an unidentified Parliamentary newsbook concerning the state of opinion in the City; a recent series of Royalist successes had made 'their Weekly Intelligencer shake his head and say "It's time to looke about us when the enemy doe so bestirre themselves; Charity begins at home"; the man already sees His Majesty before the Garrison of London, and therefore thinkes it fit that the Citizens should not march forth, but stay to defend themselves'.¹ A small 'commanded party' of 100 musketeers from Southwark was sent to the final siege of Basing House in September,² but aside from this the London Trained Bands and Auxiliaries were not called out on campaign again.³

While the militia units in the capital were now only liable for occasional duties such as the escorting of the Royalist prisoners from Naseby into London on 21 June,⁴ their unfortunate comrades were still stuck in the garrison of Abingdon and perhaps in Plymouth. The three City Auxiliary units - the Red, White, and Blue - had by now been reduced to a single regiment, apparently under the command of Colonel George Paine, and they had been joined at Abingdon by the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries under Colonel William Willoughby in December 1644 as well as by City cavalry troops under Heriot Washbourne and William Underwood. The difficulty in obtaining pay for the

¹Mercurius Aulicus, 31 May.

²CJ, IV, p. 263; Mercurius Veridicus, 6-13 September (E301/6). This apparently resulted from an order sent direct from the Commons to the Subcommittee in Southwark, bypassing the Militia Committee. The musketeers served under Colonel Dalbier at Basing until the house was stormed on 14 October.

³On 8 September Parliament passed an ordinance authorising the raising of 500 horse and 500 dragoons in London and the suburbs. These units, under the command of Robert Mainwaring and William Webb respectively, served with Poyntz in the Midlands.

⁴The Manner how the Prisoners are to be Brought into...London (1645) (E288/45).

garrison had prompted many letters from Browne to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, and then during the summer there was an outbreak of the plague: on 26 July it was reported that 'the sickness increaseth much at Abington, 100 houses there shut up, and the Souldiers lye without the Town in Hutts'.¹ At about the same time, the Commons were informed that 'unless care be taken for the recruit of the regiments at Abingdon and for establishing a constant pay for them, that place may be in some danger'.² Some additional troops were sent to join the garrison, but they soon left 'for want of means of subsistence'.³

The long-delayed return of the Londoners from Abingdon was finally hinted at on 10 October, when the Committee for the Three Associated Counties of Oxon, Berks and Bucks declared 'that they can now spare Colonel Washbourne's and Colonel Underwood's Troops of Horse and Colonel Willoughbie's Regiment of Foot'.⁴ On receiving this news, the City Militia Committee asked Parliament 'that Care be taken for Payment of their Arrears, and Direction for speedy Return to London'.⁵ Although Underwood's troop was soon back in the capital,⁶ the foot⁷ were delayed by the need to find replacements from the army. On

¹Whitelock, p. 157.

²CSPD 1645-7, p. 26.

³Ibid., p. 45.

⁴LJ, VII, p. 631.

⁵Ibid.

⁶CSPD 1645-7, pp. 230, 257.

⁷Including the three reduced City Auxiliary regiments as well as Willoughby's Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries; it was the former who had been in Abingdon for 15 months. Colonel George Paine, who had become colonel of the reduced Auxiliaries by March (CJ, IV, p. 93) stayed on as Governor at Abingdon after Browne's departure on 9 October; perhaps Willoughby then assumed command of them.

1 December the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to Fairfax: 'The garrison of Abingdon has been for these 15 months kept by some Auxiliaries of London, but we stand engaged that these shall return at the furthest on the 16th present. Having no other forces that can be so ready for that service, we desire you to send a regiment of your foot thither before then.'¹ The London forces finally left Abingdon on 20 December as Colonel Thomas Rainsborough's regiment marched in to relieve them,² although Washbourne's troop of City Horse stayed behind for several more months.³

It was presumably apparent now that the war was all but won, nevertheless, the Auxiliary regiments were recruited once again during the winter of 1645-6 in preparation for another general muster in May. After some confusion owing to a misunderstanding concerning a supposed request by the Lord Mayor, Thomas Adams, for a delay in the muster, it was eventually fixed for Tuesday 19 May:

'This day appeared in Hide-Park all the Train Souldiers of the City of London and within the Line, with the Auxiliaries (the day proved dry, and in that respect a good change, the first assigned proving wet). All, or the most part of the Lords and Commons were to see them, likewise such a number of Nobles, Gentry, Citizens and common people as the oldest man in London hath hardly seen together: The Colonels and other Officers were most gallantly apparalled and attended, likewise most of the Souldiers, the number of Regiments 18, which were effective as many thousands; the war hath not consumed all, England is now in a hundred times better warlike posture then when the war began.'⁴

Another newsbook reported that 'the Orange and the red Regiments were most looked on (but they all did bravely)',⁵ while a third noted that

¹CSPD 1645-7, p. 244.

²Ibid., p. 262.

³They helped fight off a Royalist attack on Abingdon on 2 March 1646, when Washbourne 'had his great bay horse slaine under him' (A Letter from Colonell Pane (1646)(E325/23)).

⁴The Moderate Intelligencer, 14-21 May 1646 (E337/32).

⁵Mercurius Civicus, 14-21 May (E337/33).

'there are 18 Regements of Foote, and 8 Troopes of Horse; every Regiment carryes with them two great peeces, they draw into battalia and make battle, the Houses of Parliament and City are all there, tents are built like a town or Camp, it is a gallant shew: I pray God we have no other use of such things but for a shew'.¹

These hopes were fulfilled in 1646, for the only other appearance of the London militia regiments was at the 'shew' for the Earl of Essex's funeral on 22 October. The route of the cortège from Essex House in the Strand to Westminster Abbey was lined by the City White, Yellow and Green Trained Bands, the Tower Hamlets Red Trained Band, and the Southwark Yellow Trained Band, while the City Red and Blue Trained Bands, who had stood their ground so valiantly at the first battle of Newbury under Essex's command, marched in the procession 'trailing their Pikes, and the Musketeers in a funerall Posture, having their drums covered with blacke, and each adorned with an Escoccheon (and the fifes, with silke Banners) of his Lordship's Armes'. The two senior regiments of the London militia at this time, the Westminster Red Trained Band and the City Orange Trained Band, also followed the hearse, together with the officers (but not the men) of all the Auxiliary units in the City and suburbs 'with their Swords, black Cloakes and black Feathers in their hats'. The six troops of Colonel Robert Mainwaring's cavalry regiment also took part, while Colonel William Underwood's blue regiment of City Horse stood guard at the doors of the Abbey.²

¹The Scottish Dove, 13-20 May (E337/28).

²The True Manner and Forme of the Proceeding (1646)(E360/1). This pamphlet includes a list of the field officers of all the regiments except those four which marched in the van of the procession; see Appendix 3. This important source gives the only such list for the Auxiliaries and shows the state of the Trained Bands before the great changes of 1647. The junior captains appointed since the time of Symonds's list in 1643 seem generally to have been the same type of men.

The solemnity of the day itself was marred by a 'sad accident' after the funeral, when the guns on the fortifications were ordered to fire a salute, one after another, until three circuits had been discharged:

'One John Lane, who was one of the Gunners at Crab-tree Fort, having discharged his Cannon once or twice, and forgetting to sponge it before he had laden it with the third charge of Powder, the powder through the extream heat of the Canon did immediately take fire, and he standing before the muzzle of the Cannon, the violence of the inflamed powder did levell him with the ground, and did teare open his belly'.¹

The gunner's death was the more unfortunate since the Aldermen and Common Council had asked the Commons on 1 October whether or not the works around the City and suburbs should be 'slighted' now that the war was over; if not, they asked for a grant of £12,000 to maintain them and pay Colonel Bradley's guards.² A week after the funeral, the House compromised by ordering 'that the great Guns should be drawn off from the Forts in and about the Cities of London and Westminster for the ease of the said Cities', but the fortifications themselves were to remain standing and the guards were to continue.³ Accordingly, the guns were dismounted on 12 November. On the same day, by coincidence, 'his Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax came into London; he was met at Hide-Park by the Militia [Committee] of the Citie of London and many other, who brought him to his house in Queens Street with honour and joy, according to his merit'.⁴ He was to find a different welcome awaiting him in 1647.

¹Mercurius Civicus, 5-12 November (E362/3). Crabtree Fort was near Tottenham Court Road (N. Brett-James, The Growth of Stuart London (1935), p. 281).

²Whitelock, pp. 228-30.

³The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 27 October-3 November (E360/3).

⁴The Weekly Account, 11-18 November (E362/13); The Scottish Dove, 11-18 November (E362/14).

CHAPTER XII
NEW CONFLICTS IN THE CITY

On 21 March 1646 the last Royalist field army surrendered at Stow on the Wold and the Royalist commander Lord Astley, now a prisoner in the hands of the Parliamentarians, made his famous comment to his captors: 'You have done your work, boys, and may go play, unless you will fall out among yourselves'.¹ The Parliamentarians had, in fact, been falling out among themselves since the summer of 1644, and the final removal of the Royalist military threat allowed all the repressed antagonisms to come out into the open. In London, the conflicts were becoming centred around two main issues: the dispute between the City and the suburbs over the control of the militia, and the debate over a religious settlement.

In the crisis months of 1643, when there appeared to be a danger of an outright Royalist victory and when the ring of defences was consolidated around the capital, there was little protest at the extension of the City Militia Committee's authority into the suburbs, especially as the day-to-day running of the suburban militia units was left in the hands of local subcommittees. No doubt it was felt that this arrangement, eminently sensible from a military viewpoint, would only be 'for the duration', and when the fighting was over the suburbs would regain control over their own units independently of the City. But in May 1644, when the Houses of Parliament were debating the terms to be included in a possible treaty with the King, the City fathers were asked for their own proposals for inclusion in a permanent settlement of the kingdom; prominent among the City's list of 28 demands was the continuation of the City's control over

¹Rushworth, VI, p. 140.

the suburban militia.¹ In October 1644, when these propositions were reduced to six at Parliament's request, this demand was placed second only to the confirmation of the City's ancient charters and liberties.² Parliament incorporated the City's six demands in the proposals submitted to the King in November which formed the basis of the treaty negotiations at Uxbridge during the winter, but after the failure of these talks nothing more was heard about the question of City control over the suburban militia until the autumn of 1645.³

The City fathers, having once obtained Parliament's backing for their demand, did not throw away their advantage. In September 1645, when Parliament asked for nearly 1500 recruits to be pressed in the City for the New Model Army, the Militia Committee claimed that this number was too great and asked that 'the places within the lines of communication, Bills of Mortality, and Tower Hamlets' be added to the recruiting area. On 1 October, the Committee of Both Kingdoms replied:

'Upon the report to the House of Commons of your restraint from impressing men without the liberties of the City for recruiting Sir Thos. Fairfax's army, the House have ordered that all places within the lines of communication, Bills of Mortality, and Hamlets of the Tower are to be added to the jurisdiction and liberties of the City'.⁴

At the same time, the 'Committee of Southwark' (properly the Subcommittee of the Militia of Southwark) was ordered 'to impress forthwith such proportion...as shall be assigned by the Committee of the Militia to the borough of Southwark'.⁵

¹Sharpe, pp. 202, 209, 230.

²CJ, III, p. 680.

³Sharpe, p. 213; Clarendon, II, p. 457.

⁴CSPD 1645-7, pp. 151, 170.

⁵Ibid.

The Southwark subcommittee and those of the other suburban areas objected to this, and on 7 October the Commons decided to refer it to a committee 'to consider of, and determine (if possible) the Differences that are between the City of London, and between the Borough of Southwark, City of Westminster, and Hamlets, and Lines of Communication, touching the Proportions of Monies and Men, which, upon all Occasions, they hold with the City of London'.¹ On 4 December the Commons debated 'the settling of the Militia of London', but this 'great business' was put aside while the Militia Committee and the suburban subcommittees were asked to produce their own rival propositions.²

The City replied at great length on 6 February 1646; among the many arguments set forth were the successes achieved during the war by combined brigades from the City and suburbs, and the danger that the fortifications could be seized and used to threaten the City and Parliament if the Militia Committee lost total control of them.³ Three days later the counter-petitions began to flock in: there was a request 'from the Inhabitants of Westminster and Middlesex that the Militia might not be settled as was desired by the London petition',⁴ another on 11 February from 'the Gentlemen of Middlesex...to desire that Middlesex may not be put into the hands of any, but kept in the Parliament's own hands',⁵ a third on 13 February from 'the Committee

¹CJ, III, p. 299. The Westminster subcommittee engaged legal counsel to present its case before the Commons committee (PRO SP 28 38 pt 6).

²A Diary, or an Exact Journal, 4-11 December (E311/23).

³Sharpe, pp. 231-2.

⁴Whitelock, p. 197.

⁵A Diary, or an Exact Journal, 5-12 February (E322/18).

of Westminster...shewing that the said City is not within the charter of London',¹ and a fourth the next day from 'the Committees and Gentlemen of Middlesex and Surrey...desiring that their militia may remain in the Parliament'² - that is, under the control of local men nominated or approved by Parliament alone and responsible directly to it, not to the City Militia Committee. These petitions made a telling point, for the City's own petition had not referred to any approval by Parliament of those chosen to govern the militia; the citizens appeared to be asking not only for control over the militia of the suburbs but for the right to name their own Militia Committee without any scrutiny by the Lords and Commons. On 13 March the Commons appointed a committee to 'consider of the said Petitions and of some good expedient for the reconciling of the differences, and the giving of satisfaction to all parties',³ and it is not surprising that the claims of the suburbs were eventually acknowledged - especially as the City had managed to antagonise the Commons over other issues during the spring of 1646.⁴ When, on 4 June, the Commons again debated the settlement of the London militia as part of a package of terms to be presented to the King, they 'agreed it as before, but the rest of that within the Line and out of the Freedome is not included, the Line being but during trouble, and that slighted the places are part of the Counties of Middlesex and Surrey'.⁵ As

¹Mercurius Veridicus, 7-14 February (E322/24).

²A Diary, or an Exact Journal, 12-18 February (E322/36).

³Mercurius Civicus, 11-18 March (E328/13).

⁴Whitelock states (p. 203) that it was the City's petition concerning the militia which was erased out of the Commons' and the City's records in March, but this is incorrect; see p. 257 below.

⁵The Moderate Intelligencer, 4-11 June (E340/18).

far as the rest of 1646 was concerned, the dispute was academic; Colonel John Bradley's regiment alone was guarding the forts, there was no military threat to the capital, and the arrangements for Essex's funeral in October did not cause any disputes. But the issue was far from being settled, and the year 1647 would bring drastic changes as the threat of civil war loomed once again.

The second main area of dispute in the capital in 1645-7 was much more complicated and more fundamental: the debate over the religious settlement. This was an issue which dated back to the early 1640s, when the hopes of the majority of London Puritan ministers for a national church reformed along Scottish Presbyterian lines had been challenged by a growing party favouring independent, non-parochial 'gathered' churches of 'visible saints'. In November 1641, however, the ministers agreed to bury their differences for the time being in order to mount a united attack on the bishops and the Laudian establishment: it was accepted that 'for advancing of the publicke cause of a happy Reformation neither side should preach, print, or dispute, or otherwise act against the other's way'.¹ As benefices in the City fell vacant in 1642-3 through the deprivation of Royalist clergy, the vacancies were filled by Puritan ministers who wished to reform the parochial system rather than replace it with gathered churches, and the party favouring a Presbyterian settlement grew stronger. It also received vigorous support from the Scottish representatives at the Westminster Assembly of Divines, particularly from Robert Baillie, who expected the Independent party to 'join to overthrow Episcopacy, erect Presbyterian government and Assemblies, and in any difference they have to be silent upon hope either of

¹Liu, p. 111; Tolmie, p. 88.

satisfaction when we get leisure, or of toleration on their good and peaceable behaviour'.¹

In September 1643, as part of the price for Scottish military support against the Royalist army, Parliament entered into the Solemn League and Covenant by which the members promised to

'endeavour in our several places and callings, the preservation of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, against our common enemies; the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the Word of God and the example of the best reformed Churches; and we shall endeavour to bring the Churches of God in the three kingdoms to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of Church government, directory for worship and catechising...'

This was not quite a promise to impose the Scottish system in England, since 'the best reformed Churches' were left unspecified; but taken together with the vow to defend that system in Scotland itself and to bring the churches of the three kingdoms into conformity, the effect was nearly the same.

The Covenant was aimed against the episcopal system, but the Independents immediately recognised that it could be used against themselves as well, and they drew up 'a very high and daring petition to the parliament [which] required that the Scots Covenant might not pass, or at least not be pressed upon them'.² Although this petition was suppressed before it could be presented to Parliament, the Presbyterian clergy of London counterattacked in November 1643 with a petition to the Westminster Assembly of Divines against the gathering of Independent churches and the growth of the sects.³ While the Assembly was considering this petition, the Covenant was being

¹Liu, loc. cit.

²Tolmie, p. 94.

³Ibid., p. 95.

extended outside Parliament to the City authorities as well, and refusal to subscribe was made punishable by law; on 20 December an ordinance was passed 'to disable any person within the City and Liberties thereof, to be of the Common-Councell, or in any Office of trust within the said City, that shall not take the late Solemne League and Covenant'.¹

The gathering of Independent congregations had been taking place without fanfare since the spring of 1643, and this led to the breakdown of the truce drawn up at the end of 1641; henceforth there would be no compromise between the London Presbyterian clergy and the Independents.² The petition to the Assembly in November 1643 was followed by the drafting of another in January for presentation by Common Council to Parliament, asking that private individuals 'may bee prohibited...from assembling themselves together and Exercising of Church discipline without the warrant of Civile power, which tendeth much to the dishonour of the Parliament and distrubance of the Peace of the Church, City and Kingdom'.³ The acceptance of this petition by Common Council gives a hint of the future support by laymen in the City government for the Presbyterian programme advocated by the ministers. This lay support was based partly on the religious principles involved, but it also grew out of the threat to the social order which the rise of Independency and sectarianism implied, as Dr Valerie Pearl has noted:

'The attraction of the Presbyterian system with its combination of strict discipline, lay participation and genuine concern with moral reform and godliness found a particularly receptive audience among the second rank of London citizens, men who had challenged and displaced the aldermanic elite in 1641 and 1642 and now wished

¹Liu, p. 115, n. 35.

²Tolmie, loc. cit.

³Liu, p. 112.

to preserve their own established position in city government, threatened from below by the sects and lower-class radicals'.¹

With the removal of episcopal discipline, the parochial system in London had been plunged into chaos by 1644. A few vestries had been opened to wider participation by the parishoners, but most of the old 'select' vestries remained; there were many cases of non-payment of tithes, leaving some parishes without settled ministers; the 'godly' call for an examination of intending communicants as to the soundness of their doctrine and morals was being ignored in some parishes, fulfilled by ministers alone in others, and put into practice by both ministers and prominent laymen in still others.² The resulting confusion and the delay in reforming the manifest defects of the current ecclesiastical situation were inevitably aiding the growth of Independency as citizens despaired of salvation through the chaotic parochial system. And Independents who did not seek the sacrament of Holy Communion in their local parish churches could not be examined by anyone, ordained or lay, concerning their doctrine and morals; the intended 'godly reformation' was thus being frustrated and social anarchy was ensuing.

The particular attraction of the 'High' or Scottish model of Presbyterianism, from the point of view of the leading citizens, was the role of elected lay elders (sc. themselves) in the enforcement of parish discipline. The leading citizens, as 'men of substance', would naturally be chosen as elders just as they had heretofore been elected as vestrymen, churchwardens, and Common Councilmen, and the right to

¹V. Pearl, 'London's Counter-Revolution', in G.E. Aylmer (ed.), The Interregnum (1972), p. 34.

²M. Mahony, 'Presbyterianism in London, 1645-1647', in The Historical Journal, XXII (1979), 1, pp. 95-9.

examine their parishoners concerning faith and morals would obviously be a great advantage in ensuring social control. In Dr Pearl's words,

'The growth of the sects and the disruption of parochial organisation undermined the traditional ecclesiastical system and presented a threat to the stability of city rule. To the supporters of sound municipal government and to those who cherished the partnership of precinct and Church it seemed as if the twin pillars of the temple were about to be pulled down. But salvation was at hand in the Kirk. The Presbyterian system with its strict discipline and lay participation through the eldership offered the road to deliverance....The citizens approved. Although they were not aware of the paradox, they found purpose and comfort in a regime which seems to us to have conflicting characteristics - an authoritarian order with democratic forms.'¹

The advocates of High Presbyterianism, like those favouring all other types of church polity, claimed scriptural support for their system. In its fully developed form, the system called for a recognition that church discipline by ministers and elders was divinely instituted and therefore not subject to restriction by the secular power. Appeals against the judgements of local ministers and elders were to be heard by superior church assemblies - classical, provincial, and national (roughly corresponding in Anglican terms to deanery, diocesan and provincial). But Parliament could not agree to this: one of the first successes of the Long Parliament had been the abolition of the Laudian mechanism for arbitrary church government, the Court of High Commission, and the Civil War had been fought precisely in order to establish the principle of Parliamentary supremacy against all arbitrary rule. Appeals against the decisions of local ministers and elders must therefore lie ultimately in Parliament itself, or else in commissioners appointed for the purpose by Parliament. Another issue at stake was the accomodation of 'tender consciences', which Parliament was much more willing to grant than were the High Presbyterians. When, therefore, on 19 August 1645,

¹Pearl, Counter-Revolution, pp. 31-2.

Parliament finally passed an ordinance for the establishment of church government along Presbyterian lines - an establishment which was to begin in London - it did not refer to the claim of jus divinum for the new system, it did not give the elders authority to try alleged cases of heresy, unauthorised preaching, or attendance at unauthorised sermons, and it made the selection of elders subject to Parliamentary approval; a Parliamentary committee was later to be set up to hear appeals against local excommunication for 'scandalous sins'.¹

The London clergy quickly replied to this ordinance with a petition to the Commons, and this was followed shortly afterwards by a second petition, this time from lay supporters of the Scottish system, asking for 'a compleat measure of power and authoritie upon the Presbyteries'.² Far from agreeing to the changes asked for in these two petitions, Parliament made a further order on 23 September calling for the immediate election of ruling elders for each classis (group of between 8 and 15 parishes, depending on size) in the Presbyterian province of London, subject to the scrutiny of 'tryers' named by Parliament. At this point the clergy turned to the City fathers for support, and Common Council established a committee to meet with the ministers and come up with proposals as to what could be done. This committee included six officers of the City Trained Bands among its eighteen members: Lord Mayor Thomas Atkins, colonel of the Red Regiment; Alderman Sir John Wollaston, colonel of the Yellow; Alderman John Warner, colonel of the Green; Lieutenant Colonel Laurence Bromfield of the Yellow;³ Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hooker

¹Liu, pp. 112-4; S. Foster, 'The Presbyterian Independents Exorcised', in Past & Present, XLIV (August 1969), p. 60.

²Liu, pp. 112-3.

³Bromfield had been third captain in the Red Trained Band in 1643; it is not known when he transferred to the Yellow.

of the Red; and Captain Richard Venner of the White. Of these six, the three aldermanic colonels were political and religious 'moderates': Lord Mayor Atkins favoured the Independents but was essentially a trimmer concerned mainly with the lining of his own pockets; Wollaston supported the religious principles of Presbyterianism, but came to terms with the Army in 1647; Warner, too, was a Presbyterian in religious terms but supported the Independents in political disputes in subsequent years.¹ But the three Trained Bands officers among the Common Councilmen on the committee - Bromfield, Hooker, and Venner - were all among the staunchest supporters of the Presbyterian system throughout the late 1640s, and can be regarded as leaders among the lay organisers of Presbyterian support in the City.

The result of the committee's consultations with the London ministers was the presentation of two further petitions to Parliament in November 1645. One of these, the 'Desires and Reasons of the Ministers', was subscribed by 88 of the City clergy and set forth the claims for jus divinum, the establishment of the disciplinary powers of ministers and elders on the strongest possible basis, their jurisdiction in cases of heresy, unauthorised preaching, and attendance at private sermons, and their freedom from secular control.² The other petition was signed by 60 laymen in support of the 'Desires and Reasons of the Ministers', and this gives us some further names of supporters of High Presbyterianism among the London militia officers: Captains Walter Lee, John Hinde, and Nicholas Widmerpoole of the City Yellow Trained Band, Captain John Lane of the Green, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Evershed of the Orange Auxiliaries. As M. Mahony has

¹Pearl, pp. 311-3, 325-7, 328-30.

²Liu, p. 114.

shown, the signatories of this petition were concentrated in the area around St Paul's Cathedral, the area of the City where Robert Baillie's influence was strongest,¹ and this is reflected in the number of officers of the Yellow Trained Band who subscribed their names. If we include the regiment's two representatives on the Common Council committee itself, we find that five of the seven² field officers of the Yellow Trained Band supported the High Presbyterian arguments against Parliament's settlement of the church in late 1645.

As in September, the petitions from the City were not well received by Parliament. The Lords returned a vaguely conciliatory answer, but the Commons took a strong line against the paper signed by the 60 laymen; it was regarded as an encroachment on the privilege of Parliament, being based (it was claimed) on a misrepresentation of Parliament's intentions. The petitioners were sternly informed that 'in things depending in Parliament, their proceedings may neither bee prejudged, nor precipitated nor any sense put uppon them, other than the Parliament itself shall declare'. As for the 'Desires and Reasons of the Ministers', the Commons simply ignored them and told the presenters of the petition to go away and look after their parishes.³

The fact was that Parliament was having quite enough difficulties itself over the settlement of religion without this attempted dictation by the citizens and similar pressure from the Assembly of

¹Mahony, loc. cit.

²The Yellow Trained Band, like the Red, White and Blue, had four captains, while the Green and Orange had three. Symonds records four captains' colours in 1643, although he did not have the name of the junior captain.

³CJ, IV, p. 348; Liu, p. 115.

Divines and the Scots Commissioners. Although the bulk of the members of the Commons were undifferentiated Puritans favouring a 'godly reformation' and changes in church government, there were three small groups with clearly defined views of what form the settlement should take - Presbyterians, Erastians and Independents. John Pym had managed to keep the dispute over the church settlement out of Parliament during his lifetime, but during 1644 the differences came into sharper focus in Parliament even though the borderlines and memberships of the three groups were still somewhat hazy. At the beginning of the year the leaders of the Independents in Parliament, Henry Vane the younger and Oliver St John, were still working closely with the organisers of the High Presbyterian section, the Scots Commissioners. After the battle of Marston Moor, however, the quarrel between Cromwell and the Scots, and later between Cromwell and Manchester, brought the suppressed antagonisms over the church settlement out into the open as well.¹ Vane and St John, according to J.H. Hexter,

'foresaw the imminent breakdown of the 'godly party', and they worked out a clever scheme to prevent the balance of power from falling into the hands of the Presbyterians. The conduct of the military campaign of 1644 had profoundly disappointed the high hopes of the militant Puritans, and consequently the Independents had no trouble in swinging them in favor of a general army reform. The Independent leaders so manipulated the reform as to displace a high command actually or potentially hostile to them with an officer group friendly to them. At the same time the reforms gave the new force a unified command and reasonable assurance of regular supply and pay. The result was the New Model Army...'.²

The Scots and their City allies, having outlived their usefulness to Vane and St John and been spurned by them,³ now aligned themselves

¹Crawford, p. 105.

²J.H. Hexter, 'The Problem of the Presbyterian Independents', in Reappraisals in History (1967), pp. 176-9.

³Foster, loc cit., p. 72.

with the Presbyterian and Erastian groups in Parliament, with those who had opposed the creation of the New Model or had lost their commands through the Self-Denying Ordinance which was part of the New Model 'package', with those who sought a negotiated settlement with the King rather than a prolongation of the fighting - a 'peace party' whose figurehead was the former Lord General, the Earl of Essex, and whose main leader in the Commons was Denzil Holles.¹ But the settlement of the church ordained by Parliament in the autumn of 1645, although based on Presbyterian forms, shows that concessions were needed in order to allay the suspicions of many members of the Commons that the ministers (and particularly the Scots Commissioners who were behind them) were seeking ultimate power over the life of the nation through an uncontrolled Scottish-style Kirk. The result was, in Robert Baillie's words, 'a lame Erastian Presbyterie',² a political compromise; in particular, as the 'Desires and Reasons of the Ministers' rightly observed, it took 'no notice at all of any intrinsicall power in the Ministers or Elders derived unto them from Christ', but ran 'in such a straine as if all of it were onely of Politicall institution, and merely to be derived from the Civile Magistrate'.³ It also revealed a concession to the Independents in refusing to give the ministers and elders authority to hear cases of alleged heresy or the frequenting of unauthorised religious assemblies, reserving these questions to Parliamentary commissioners and thus guaranteeing in effect, if not in name, toleration for 'tender consciences'.

The rejection of the City laymen's and ministers' petitions was

¹Hexter, loc. cit., pp. 179-80; Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 38.

²Hexter, loc. cit., p. 176.

³Liu, p. 114.

followed by an attempted counterattack by Independents in London during the Common Council elections in December: 'The sectaries used all means, yea, and tumultuous dishonest wayes, to get faithful godly well-affected men to the Parliament who were Presbyterians not to be chosen, and to bring in Independents and Independentish persons in their roome'.¹ These attempts were defeated,² and meanwhile new Presbyterian petitions were being circulated in the City for presentation to Common Council when it met again on 8 January 1646. The Council responded by re-appointing the committee of the previous autumn to consider new addresses to Parliament, and it also called for a civic 'Day of Humiliation' on 14 January at which the two leading Presbyterian ministers in the City, Edmund Calamy and Simeon Ashe, would preach and would then re-administer the Covenant to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Councilmen. This political demonstration, designed to show support for the Presbyterian cause and to intimidate its opponents, duly took place, and on the same day the draft of a new petition was submitted by the committee for addresses to the full Common Council. This petition, which was approved and sent up to Parliament, did not make the mistake of criticising Parliament's legislation in detail, but asked that no toleration should be given to those who held doctrines inconsistent with the Covenant and called for the suppression of all private and separate congregations.³ The Commons made a polite reply and referred the petition to a committee, although the Lords were as usual more encouraging. In the meantime, however, the Commons went ahead with plans for the appointment of county commissioners to hear certain types of cases alleging breaches

¹T. Edwards, Gangraena (1646)(E323/2), p. 105.

²Tolmie, p. 134.

³Liu, p. 116; Sharpe, p. 227.

of church discipline, to be under the control of Parliament rather than the church synods.¹

Common Council received some moral support for its High Presbyterian stand in February, when the Scots Commissioners delivered a letter from the president of the Scottish Parliament thanking the citizens for their zeal for reformation and the uniformity of the churches. Thus emboldened, the Presbyterians in London once again began collecting signatures for an address to Parliament specifically criticising the appointment of secular commissioners, 'of whom nothing was known in any of the reformed Churches'.² This new petition, which was accepted by Common Council for presentation to Parliament in March, claimed that the commissioners' appointment 'tendieth much to the discouragement of such as are willing to submit to the Presbyteriall government established by both houses of Parliament', and was only 'well pleasing to those that have opposed the Establishment of Presbyteriall Government'.³ This was strong language indeed, and the citizens compounded their error by presenting the document to the Lords first, since the upper house had not yet passed the ordinance to establish the secular commissioners. A clearer breach of Parliamentary privilege could scarcely be imagined, and this time even the generally sympathetic House of Lords was compelled to denounce the City's presumption. The Common Council delegation wisely decided not to present the petition to the Commons, although the lower chamber had already been informed of its content by the peers. A committee of the Lords and Commons visited Guildhall to

¹Liu, p. 116.

²Common Council Journal 40 ff. 173b-174b.

³Liu, p. 117.

make their displeasure known, and on 19 March Common Council humbly asked for all reference to the petition to be expunged from the records of Parliament.¹ After this the City lost heart and did not make any further claims for jus divinum and the freedom of the church from Parliamentary control, much to Robert Baillie's disgust.²

The City's discomfiture was only temporary, however; a new petition was being circulated a month later, although this time the demands were more broadly based. The new 'Remonstrance and Petition' - a name reminiscent of the Grand Remonstrance of 1641 listing all the Puritan party's complaints against the royal government - incorporated political and financial demands as well as religious ones. The Remonstrance asked for the suppression of heresy, no toleration for schismatics and unbelievers, the restriction of public office to Presbyterians, repayment of debts, the reform or abolition of the emergency taxation committee, a close union with the Scots, and a speedy settlement with the King. Politically, socially and religiously it was a conservative document, the result of a growing union between the City Presbyterian ministers and leading laymen, the Scots, and the Peace Party led by Essex and Holles in Parliament.

The Remonstrance caused heated debate in Common Council, while a pamphlet war raged simultaneously in the City. Its supporters received added encouragement on 29 April when news reached London that the King had surrendered to the Scots. But the Independents fought tenaciously to prevent Common Council from adopting the Remonstrance, and when the final vote came 'Lt. Col. Tichburn desired to have the freedom to speak

¹Juxon, ff. 66-7. Juxon's diary is especially valuable for its accounts of debates in Common Council and the growth of party strife in the City. Juxon, who favoured the Independents, was a captain in the Green Trained Band.

²Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 35.

and then did solemnly make his protestation against every particular and the whole; after him Ald. Tooke and Ald. Andrews and to the number of eleven, all considerable persons, and desired it might be entered. This was not done without many bitter words given them.¹ It seems probable that another of the protestors was Colonel Thomas Player of the White Trained Band, who had been labelled as an Independent during a Common Council debate in February.² But the Remonstrance was accepted by Common Council, and two representatives were sent to consult with Essex concerning the timing of its presentation to Parliament; these two were Captain John Jones of the White Trained Band and Colonel John Bellamy of the White Auxiliaries, both of whom were strong Presbyterians and would later write pamphlets supporting the Remonstrance and attacking the sects.³ The Remonstrance was finally presented to Parliament on 26 May and was accepted by both Houses by narrow majorities, but the Commons told the City delegates that they would consider it when the time was convenient - 'which amountes to nothinge', as the Independent Thomas Juxon noted.⁴ The City Independents quickly brought in their own counter-petition, which was sent direct to Parliament and courteously accepted; Common Council voted on 1 June that this bypassing of the City government 'tended to sedition'.⁵ Despite intense lobbying by the citizens,⁶

¹Juxon, f. 70.

²Ibid., f. 77.

³Tolmie, p. 135; Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 33.

⁴Juxon, f. 79b; Tolmie, p. 135.

⁵R. Brenner, 'The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant Community', in Past & Present, LVIII (February 1973), p. 88.

⁶Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 37.

however, the Remonstrance made no further progress in Parliament.

The King, now resident in the Scots army, was meanwhile engaged in playing off the Scots, Lords, Commons, City, and New Model against each other. The City's demand for a speedy settlement with him encouraged the King to write to the City authorities in mid-May to express his hopes for an accord, and after some delay Common Council voted on 2 July to reply in terms which stressed the citizens' loyalty to him and to the Covenant, together with their hopes for his speedy return to London, and asked him to assent to Parliament's forthcoming propositions for peace. The content of this reply was probably unobjectionable, but the City fathers rightly judged that a direct correspondance between the King and the City would lead to trouble with Parliament. The City's answer was therefore taken to Westminster for approval, and it is significant that three of the six members of the City delegation were Richard Venner, Edward Hooker and John Jones - Trained Band officers who had recently been at the forefront of the campaign for a High Presbyterian settlement.¹

The Lords agreed that the City's letter might be sent to the King, but the Commons pleaded pressure of business and said they needed time to consider it. A week later the City delegation was again rebuffed, and the next day they were told that the letter was not to be sent. The Commons later explained that they had sent propositions to the King on 13 June embracing the whole kingdom and thus superseding any response from London alone. At the same time, it became known that the Commons had appointed a committee to investigate the Remonstrance presented in May - not to answer its demands, but to enquire 'concerning the first principal contrivers of the city remonstrance, and concerning such as have or do labour to disaffect

¹Juxon, f. 83.

the people and the city from the parliament'.¹ The Commons were beginning to counterattack, and there was now a prospect of serious conflict between the Commons and the City. Perhaps most of those involved on both sides expected these troubles to be forgotten once the King had agreed to the propositions presented to him at Newcastle in June, allowing the King to return to London and officially bringing the Civil War to an end.

On 12 August the King's reply to the Newcastle Propositions was opened and read in Parliament, and it was clear that the terms had effectively been rejected.² Yet the King had no army, no garrisons - nothing to back up his resistance to Parliament's demands...or had he? It was well known that the only 'war aim' of the Scots was the establishment of their Presbyterian system in England, and that they were peeved by their treatment by Parliament and alarmed by the growth of Independency and sectarianism in the New Model Army. The threat of an alliance between the King and the Scots was immediately obvious at Westminster once the Propositions had been rejected. In order to avoid a new war, therefore, the immediate priorities were to obtain custody of the King and to send the Scots home. The price was the granting of the Scots' demands for arrears of pay of £400,000, and this would require a loan from the City.³ In these circumstances, the Commons quickly forgot their annoyance over the Remonstrance and other impertinent demands from the City government during the spring.

While negotiations over the amount of arrears continued with the Scots and the question of security for the required loan was debated in the City, the Commons were also considering what to do with the

¹Sharpe, p. 239.

²Ibid., p. 238.

³Kishlansky, pp. 107-110.

redundant and expensive New Model Army. Parliament had already decided that an army must be sent to Ireland to avenge the rebellion and massacre of 1641, and it had been hoped in July that part of the New Model could be used for this purpose. The failure of the Newcastle Propositions temporarily quashed this idea, since there was 'a general unwillingness in the house that that Army should be diminished till the Scottish Army were gone out of the kingdom'.¹ However, there was a local brigade under Major General Edward Massey which was not part of the New Model and which was noted for its lack of discipline, and Parliament voted in October to send the troops of Massey's brigade six weeks' back pay, disband them, and offer them four weeks' advance money if they would agree to serve in Ireland. Parliament expected that most would gladly accept this offer, and they stipulated that the officers could remain in charge of their existing units when they went to Ireland. In the event, however, almost none of Massey's brigade accepted, and many were angered at being given only six weeks' arrears on disbandment² - an ominous portent of the difficulties to come with the New Model in 1647.

By the end of 1646 the negotiations with the Scots had been concluded successfully; the King would be handed over in January and the Scots army would depart. This ended the threat of an alliance between the King and the Scots, removing the main cause of fear among the Independents and their supporters in Parliament and leading to increased support for the Presbyterian Peace Party led by Holles. Conservative sentiment was also boosted by increased fears of social disruption. Large groups of petitioners were coming to Westminster

¹ Laurence Whitacre's Diary, BL Add. MS 31116 f. 279, quoted in Crawford, p. 131.

² Kishlansky, p. 115.

throughout the autumn of 1646, including some which protested against the duty of paying tithes; if this trend continued, perhaps Parliament soon 'might expect a petition that no tenants should pay rents to the landlords'.¹ In Parliament as in the City, mass petitioning had been encouraged in 1642, but the wheel had now come a full circle.

Having reached agreement on the security for the loan to pay the Scots, the City submitted a petition of its own again in December 1646, perhaps hoping that the Commons would agree to the demands as a quid pro quo for the City's financial help.² The Commons learned about the new petition early in the month, and three citizens who were active in collecting signatures were quickly imprisoned.³ Of these three, Nicholas Widmerpoole of St Sepulchre's parish was a captain in the Yellow Trained Band, the militia unit drawn from the area where Robert Baillie's High Presbyterian agitation was most effective,⁴ while Patrick Bamford of Christ Church parish had been a subaltern in the same regiment in 1642 and probably later. Despite the arrests, the petition went forward to Common Council in the middle of December and was accepted and sent on to Parliament. The main demands this time were the disbandment of the New Model Army, the suppression of lay preaching and of 'separate congregations, the very nurseries of all damnable heresies', the removal from office of those who refused to take the Covenant, City control over the Militia Committee, and the free election of MPs, as well as financial grievances and the

¹Whitacre's Diary, f. 268, quoted in Crawford, p. 135.

²Tolmie, p. 136.

³Mahony, loc. cit., pp. 109, 111.

⁴See p. 252.

freeing of the three arrested men.¹ A programme of lobbying was organised to support this new petition.²

Although Parliament did take some measures against lay preaching and the spread of sectarianism in response to the December petition, the main concern was the question of disbanding the New Model Army. With the Scots gone, most MPs agreed that there could be, as the City fathers had pointed out, no 'security or settlement...while they are masters of such a power'.³ On 18 February 1647 the Commons voted that, aside from local garrison troops, only 5000 cavalry and 1000 dragoons were required in England; the remainder of the cavalry and all of the infantry should be disbanded.⁴ The French representative in the capital noted that 'the Independents, who command it, did what they could to prevent it, but in vain; the Presbyterians carried it with a large majority'.⁵ It was further stipulated in March that the officers of the remaining units must take the Covenant.⁶

A delegation from Parliament was sent to the army to recruit troops for the Irish campaign in March, but (as with Massey's brigade the previous autumn) there were objections from the soldiers concerning arrears of pay. Over the next few days a petition was circulated in the army and was signed by many, sometimes as a result of threats by senior officers, stating that the subscribers would not engage for the

¹Tolmie, p. 136; Pearl, Counter-Revolution, pp. 141-2; Sharpe, p. 239.

²Pearl, loc. cit.

³Tolmie, p. 136.

⁴Kishlansky, p. 154; Crawford, p. 140.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Kishlansky, p. 155.

Irish service until their grievances were redressed. The news of this petition was announced in the Commons on 29 March, and before midnight they had voted their 'high dislike of that petition' and warned that 'all those who shall continue in their distempered condition, and go on in advancing and promoting that petition, shall be looked upon and proceeded against as enemies to the state and disturbers of the public peace'.¹ By April, one MP was stating that the soldiers should either go to Ireland or be hanged, while another gave his opinion that 'we must sink them...or they sink us'.²

¹Crawford, pp. 140-4; Kishlansky, p. 159.

²William Strode and Sir Philip Stapleton respectively; Crawford, p. 144.

CHAPTER XIII

1647: PRESBYTERIAN TRIUMPH AND FAILURE

To many of the Common Councilmen and leading citizens of London in the spring of 1647, the New Model Army was the greatest threat to peace and stability in the kingdom. The citizens wanted to abolish the extraordinary excise taxes introduced during the war; the army needed them for its support. The citizens demanded a uniform Presbyterian church; the army harboured and favoured the Independents and sectaries. The citizens wanted to bring the King back to London on relatively easy conditions; the army opposed such a compromise. The citizens sought an expeditionary force for a campaign in Ireland which would, among other things, give them a return on their investments in the Irish Adventures of 1642; the army refused to go. The citizens, most of all, looked forward to a return to stable government, while the army's growing political consciousness and militancy threatened parliamentary rule as well as the King's. The campaign of the Presbyterian Peace party in the Commons to disband the army therefore received strong support from the City government in the early months of 1647.

The City's support was more broadly based than that for the High Presbyterian movement of 1646, which centred around a relatively narrow theological issue; it now included the backing of 'malignants', since there was little in the City's objectives which the outright Royalists could not support. A notable case in point was Sir John Gayre, elected Lord Mayor in September 1646 despite having been passed over in previous years because of his suspected disaffection to the Parliamentary cause.¹ As early as the previous May there had been

¹Juxon, f. 91.

thought to be some danger that the City might declare for the King if he came to London, and that it was the news of his escape from Oxford which had prompted the rather mysterious postponement of the annual muster of the London militia: 'If the Generall Trayning day had held as intended...the K. had certainly come in to the parke and have putt it to aventure, therefore was wisely putt off'.¹ Thomas Juxon also records the existence of a plot, otherwise unknown, for a coup d'etat in September 1646 which was only foiled by the timely death of the Earl of Essex: 'Had he lived but a weeke longer the Lords had voated him Generalissimo and Sir Thomas layd aside for his good service, and Masseys horse & Sheffield and others should have declaired for him & many Mallignants and the Cittie and forced the howse of Commons to concur towards the K. But in the season God rather tooke him away than would permitte soe great mischief.'²

The campaign to disband the New Model Army in the spring of 1647 took two forms, of which the first was a public attempt to meet the soldiers' demands for arrears of pay. At the beginning of April the Commons decided to request a loan of £200,000 from the City to pay off the army, although the arrears actually amounted to nearly £3 million. Once again the citizens argued about the amount of security to be demanded for this loan, although the Earl of Pembroke told them in early May 'that did they know so much as he, coming from the fountain's head of the Army, they would not scruple the lending of the £200,000 to be rid of the Army', and by 8 May the loan had been agreed.³

¹Ibid., f. 76b.

²Ibid., f. 92.

³Crawford, pp. 144-5.

By this time, too, the second and clandestine part of the campaign against the army was under way: an attempt by Holles and the Peace party, aided by their friends in the City, to create a rival army which would intimidate and, if necessary, defeat and destroy the New Model.¹ The nucleus of this force would be the London militia, and the first priority was to ensure that this was in safe hands. The request for the loan of £200,000 prompted Common Council to revive the old demands for control over the suburban militia and the right to name their own militia committee. Parliament was now in no position to refuse, even if the Presbyterian majority which now dominated both Houses had not supported the change: 'The Common Counsell, haveing promised to advance the money desired, after make these demurrs: that in regard the army did seame to threaten them and that there were maney in the Cittie of their opinions pressed that for the security of the Cittie & their sattisfaction they might have power to choose their Millitia annually and to march forth at pleasure. 'Twas at last granted them to Nominate 31 persones for their Comittee, to be approved of by the Parliament and to continue only for one yeare',² and this committee was to control the suburban Trained Bands and Auxiliaries as well as those in the City.³

Having finally obtained the right to name their own Militia Committee, Common Council made a solemn business of the nomination of its members; 27 April was the day chosen for this, and the nomination was to be preceded by a sermon and (yet again) the renewal of the Covenant.⁴ The result was clear-cut, with all known Independents

¹Ibid., Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 44.

²Juxon, f. 107b.

³CJ, v, p. 145.

⁴Sharpe, p. 241.

excluded from the list of nominees, including Aldermen Penington and Warner and Colonels Wilson, Player and Tichborne.¹ The militia officers who were named to the committee were Colonels John Bellamy, Robert Mainwaring, Thomas Gower, Edward Hooker, and Richard Turner, Lieutenant Colonels Nathaniel Camfield, Lawrence Bromfield, and Edward Bellamy, and Captains John Jones and Richard Venner - most if not all of whom were strongly associated with both political and religious Presbyterianism,² and several of whom had been active in the High Presbyterian campaign of 1646.

The new Presbyterian Militia Committee was approved by both Houses of Parliament on 4 May³ and immediately set about purging unreliable officers from the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries. In the City Orange Trained Band, for example, Colonel Rowland Wilson was dismissed or resigned following his removal from the Militia Committee, whereupon Lieutenant Colonel Camfield moved up to fill the vacant place and Major Miles Petit was promoted to lieutenant colonel - although there were some doubts about Petit's suitability:

'About the beginning of May...Lieutennant Colonel Petit of Snow Hill being somoned before the Comittee for the militia of the Citty of London, at which time Mr. Alderman Gibbs had the chayre, who declared unto him that the Committee had conferred the office of a Lieutennant Collonell upon him, and further told him that hee was to take notice hee must fight against all malignants, sects and sectaries and all Godly persons that shall come to oppose the Citty; to which the Lieutennant Collonell replyed, Gentlemen, I thought you had all of you professed Godlynesse, for my part I doe, and therefore shall not engage against any godly man. Whereupon Mr. Alderman Gibbs or some other of the Militia then answered, that their meaning was, that if any out of pretence of Godlynesse should come to oppose them that hee should fight against such, or words to this effect.'⁴

¹The Perfect Diurnall, 26 April-3 May (E515/10).

²All except Mainwaring, Bromfield and Edward Bellamy were ruling elders and delegates to the Provincial Assembly.

³Sharpe, pp. 241-2.

⁴C.H. Firth (ed.), The Clarke Papers (1891), I, pp. 152-3.

Petit succeeded in obtaining confirmation of his promotion, but a number of other officers who favoured the Independents and the army were dismissed over the next few weeks despite displays of ingenuity similar to Petit's. Major Edward Abell of the City Green Auxiliaries was one:

'In the month of June...divers Comanders of the Citty were summoned before the Militia, amongst whome was Major Abell, to whome it was propounded whether or noe they would all stand as one man for the safety of the Parliament and the Citty against all tumults and such as should come against them in a hostile manner, the said Major Abell affirming hee knewe of noe Army that would oppose the Parliament or Citty, notwithstanding hee could engage his life for the safetie of the Citty or the just priviledges of Parliament; this being said hee was dismiss his Comand, noe cause being showne except for his difference in judgment.'¹

Colonel George Langham of the Blue Auxiliaries, Captain Robert Thompson of the White Trained Band, Lieutenant Colonel William Shambrook of the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, and Captain Francis Maizy of Bradley's reduced regiment of 'outguards' were also victims of the purge, together with many members of the subcommittees for Southwark and the Tower Hamlets.² In their places, the Independents complained, were put such men as Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Clarke, who replaced Langham in the City Blue Auxiliaries and who was 'one that sayd that if the Army should come neere London, if other men were of his mind they should march through their blouds',³ and Captain William Wane, 'one who lately deserted this Army, being now put into Commission by the Militia in the Regiment of the Blew Auxiliaries to be a Captaine, [who] did say there would not be soe much ware in their shopps if the Army came to London, and said to Will Pepiatt, Ensigne, that if hee would not fight against the Army

¹Ibid., pp. 153-4.

²Ibid., pp. 153-6.

³Ibid., p. 155.

hee should be noe officer of his; for, hee said, hee knew more of the Army then any there present'.¹ Another newly promoted captain had for a lieutenant 'one...who said hee would prove that Sir Thomas Fairfax was a Rogue, a Rascall, and base fellowe'.² Nevertheless, the Independents still had some support among the common soldiers of the Trained Bands: 'The Militia of London...have voted out all the Godly party out of the commission of the trayned Bands, but this is not well relished by many, and few of the Souldiers ('tis conceived) will be subject to the new Officers they intend to put over them'.³

Aside from the London militia, there was another important source of men for the military force which Holles and his party hoped to raise - the reformadoes, or disbanded soldiers from the earlier Parliamentary armies which the New Model had replaced in 1645. It may be that there was no love lost between the old and new soldiers anyway, but the decision to pay at least some of the arrears of the New Model troops increased any latent jealousy; the pay of the reformadoes had been in arrears for much longer, and some of the former officers, having lost the protection which current military service offered, had even been imprisoned for debt. The reformadoes therefore flocked to Westminster in the spring and early summer of 1647 to seek redress. A large crowd presented a formal petition to Parliament on 4 June and reminded the Members that 'they had always obeyed them and when commanded did disband; yet were not their arrears voted'.⁴ The Commons agreed to allocate £10,000 for this

¹Ibid., p. 154.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 118.

⁴Juxon, f. 109.

purpose, and another £10,000 was added on Monday 7 June after the mob of reformadoes had grown over the weekend - although the Commons also asked for a guard of a regiment of the City Trained Bands to keep the disbanded soldiers at a safe distance.¹

The petition of the reformadoes had, in turn, aroused hostility in the New Model Army, especially in its reference to their disbanding when ordered. The Commons had finally voted on 25 May to disband the New Model, and the army had not only refused but had gone a stage further by seizing control of the King from the Parliamentary commissioners at Holdenby House. The army was now clearly in rebellion against Parliament, and the officers had to search their hearts and determine where their allegiance lay; nearly a third of the officers left their commands in the army early in June,² and many of them came to London to volunteer instead for the Irish expedition planned by Parliament. So, too, did a few entire units of the army, taking advantage of the Commons' promise of a month's pay for those units which cooperated by disbanding and re-enlisting for Ireland.³ By the second week in June, the Presbyterian party led by Holles had the support of the London militia, the reformadoes, and the newly formed regiment for the Irish service. If brought together and persuaded to resist the army, these three forces would be a match in numbers for the New Model - and there were also hopes of support from the navy and the Scots.⁴ On 8 June, Common Council proceeded to ask Parliament for permission to raise a force of cavalry 'for the better defence and

¹CJ, V, pp. 205-6.

²Kishlansky, pp. 218-22, 236-8.

³CJ, V, p. 195.

⁴Kishlansky, p. 237; Crawford, p. 150.

security of the Parliament and City in these Tumultuous and troublesome times'.¹

The army's Council of War was well aware of all these manoeuvres, and saw that it would now have to move quickly. On 11 June, 'two messengers that looked like soldiers' brought a letter to Common Council, signed by Fairfax and 12 other senior officers the day before at the army's headquarters near Royston in Hertfordshire.² The letter was couched in moderate terms, but the gist of it was that the army was now marching towards London: 'We are drawing near your city, professing sincerely from our hearts we intend not evil toward you; declaring with all confidence and assurance that if you appear not against us in these our just desires to assist that wicked party that would embroil us and the Kingdom, nor we nor our soldiers shall give you the least offence'. On the other hand, 'if after all this you, or a considerable part of you, be seduced to take up arms in opposition to, or hindrance of, these our just undertakings, we hope by this brotherly premonition, to the sincerity thereof we call God to witness, we have freed ourselves from all that ruin which may befall that great and populous city, having thereby washed our hands thereof'.³

The army hoped by this threat to frighten the citizens into giving up any thought of military support for the Presbyterian party. Common Council, however, decided on continued resistance. A copy of the army's letter was sent to the Commons, which quickly passed the ordinance empowering the Militia Committee to raise cavalry and also appointed a committee of both Houses, led by Holles, to join with the

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 218b.

²Sharpe, p. 243.

³Ibid., pp. 244-5; Kishlansky, pp. 238-9.

Militia Committee in the City and prepare a plan of defence. This joint Committee of Safety met at Guildhall in the evening of Friday 11 June and immediately set to work: 'They passed maney voates, as to have the Gunns caried to the Forts, to have the Blockhowses secured, to send to the adjacent Counties to bee upp in armes, to sende to there severall forces as Pointz, Lahorne and thoose intended for Ireland to keepe them in a good understanding with the Parliament - but there were privately letters sent to the aforesaid to march upp to a certaine Rendevouz. Then to secure all the horses about London and that none might pass without the Lines and lastly a Generall allarme in the Cittie presently.'¹ Many of the reformadoes had gathered outside Guildhall, hoping for some employment during the crisis, and the Committee of Safety appointed three of the former colonels among them 'to take the Names and Liste the next day thoose that would offer their service'.² As night fell, the Committee of Safety finished its work for the day; the 'general alarm' would take place in the morning, when the City would be put in a posture of defence and Common Council would ratify the emergency measures ordered by the Committee.

On Saturday morning 'all the Trayned Bands of London were commanded to rise on paine of death, and all the shopps to be shutt upp'. The Lord Mayor, Sir John Gayre, personally visited the shops near the Exchange and in Cornhill and persuaded the shopkeepers to keep their premises closed, but this order had little effect elsewhere in the City. As for the Trained Bands, they 'would not budge, not 10 men of some companies appeared, and many companies none at all but the Officers; nay the very boyes in the streets jeered the drums as they

¹Juxon, f. 110.

²Ibid.

went about with their charge upon paine of death'.¹ Only in Westminster did any substantial proportion of the Trained Bands appear in answer to the summons, and by the afternoon they and their City counterparts had all returned to their homes and the shops had re-opened.² The attempted rising had failed miserably; the anonymous army correspondent in the City had been correct in his opinion that the soldiers of the Trained Bands would not follow their Presbyterian officers in an armed confrontation with the New Model. The unity and enthusiasm with which the citizens had prepared to defend themselves against the Royalists in 1643 were absent now, and the householders and tradesmen who made up the rank-and-file of the Trained Bands had no desire for a new war with its risks to their homes and livelihoods.

Faced with this collapse of resistance, Common Council voted to send a conciliatory reply to the army and to revoke the decisions of the Committee of Safety.³ The army, which had now reached St Albans, was asked to stay at least 30 miles from London to keep food prices from rising and prevent disorders, but Fairfax and the Council of War replied that this could not be done until the enlistment of reformadoes was stopped, those already enlisted were disbanded, and Holles and 10 other prominent Presbyterians were expelled from the Commons for their attempts 'to overthrow the rights and liberties of the subjects of this nation'.⁴ The Commons agreed to stop the enlistments and to disband the recently formed units of reformadoes, but it was impossible to compel the reformadoes to leave London as the

¹Firth, Clarke Papers, I, pp. 132-3.

²Ibid.

³Sharpe, p. 245; Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 47; Kishlansky, p. 240.

⁴Sharpe, pp. 245-6; Kishlansky, pp. 242-3.

army wished - indeed, their numbers were increasing all the time as the news spread of the Commons' willingness to vote money to pay their arrears. There were 'great tumults and insolencies' at Westminster on Monday 14 June when MPs who supported the army came to the Commons, with 'some of their members (and by name Sir Henry Vane Junior) threatened to be cutt in pieces, many others of them insufferably abused, and the whole House threatened, and I may truly say at this houre close block't up by common Souldiers clamouring for their pay, and vowing to lett noe member passe out till they be satisfied'.¹ The Commons, for their own protection, ordered two captains of the Westminster Trained Bands to send down 'a considerable guard',² but even this move aroused suspicion among the army's supporters; one correspondent wrote of his fears that

'under this colour the Parliament would be forced to drawe downe the Citty Guards for their owne securitie, and by this the Army not only have some cause of jealousie ministered to them when they shall see the whole Citty in a posture of defence, which hath been soe often urged to be done and except under this colour would hardly be obteyned, but also those spiritts who soe much thirst after a second warre exceedingly encouraged and heightened, looking upon this as a handsome foundation to raise another Army upon'.³

As we have seen, the Westminster Trained Bands had been the most willing of the London militia to obey the summons to arms on Saturday; it was undoubtedly convenient that these men, with their long-standing taint of conservative sympathy, were also the closest available troops to provide a guard for the Presbyterian-dominated Commons.

The tumults raised by the reformadoes in the middle of June provided a justification for efforts to encourage the Trained Bands in the City, as had been predicted. On 17 June Common Council noted that

¹Firth, Clarke Papers, I, p. 136.

²Captains Thomas Falconbridge and Christopher White (Whitelock, p. 256).

³Firth, Clarke Papers, I, p. 136.

'the trayned bands and Auxiliaries listed in this Citie and liberties thereof appeare not readily upon beat of the Drumm commanded by order of the Committee of the Militia for the safety & defence of this Citie, notwithstanding the apparent danger through the great distempers & distractions of these times and the frequent tumults made in the Cities of London and Westminster by the souldiers and ill affected persons within the same and parts adjacent',

and the Militia Committee was asked to prepare a declaration concerning this.¹ Two days later, 'the Lord Mayor with the advice of the Aldermen and Common-Council published a command for all the Trained-Bands and Auxiliaries to appear at their Colours (taking notice of their former backwardness) for suppressing of tumults and unlawful Assemblies in the City',² but the result of this summons is not recorded.

In the meantime, the City had prepared another letter for despatch to Fairfax as part of the campaign to mollify the New Model; this letter was held up for a day or two by the Commons, but finally reached St Albans around 20 June. In it, Common Council pointed out that the actions of the Committee of Safety had been repudiated and the enlistments of reformadoes had stopped; in return, the army was asked to withdraw farther from London.³ Fairfax and the Council of War replied on 21 June, acknowledging that the City had acted properly over the enlistments, 'some persons of your Militia onelie haveing bin active for the raysing of them without your privitie', but went on to refer to 'the manie informacions which daylie come to us of the continued underhand workings of some persons still to list men', and to 'divers Agents' who were being sent 'into severall parts of the kingdome to leavie forces, and Worcester the place appoynted for a

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 224.

²Whitelock, p. 257.

³Sharpe, pp. 247-8.

Generall Randezvouz, whither the Forces designed for Ireland (that were parte of this Armie) are...ordered to march'.¹ There was also the continuing danger from the reformadoes in the capital, who had assembled at Westminster again on 21 June 'to the great affrightment and terror of divers faithfull members then present, and to the discouragement of others from their attendance there'.² A second letter from the army on 25 June noted that there were continuing attempts to raise troops in Wales, 'besides underhand workings in your city and other places' where 'men are raised and that in noe small numbers'. In addition, the 11 accused members of the Commons still controlled the House and its committees. In these circumstances, it was necessary for the army to march up to Uxbridge rather than withdraw farther from London.³

The army's renewed approach towards London again led to a collapse of resistance in Common Council, and in these circumstances the 11 accused members of the Commons voluntarily withdrew from the House to forestall an occupation of the capital. Parliament also agreed to stop encouraging soldiers to desert the army in order to obtain their arrears and volunteer for the Irish service; henceforth they must obtain Fairfax's permission before leaving the headquarters.⁴ These concessions satisfied the army, which withdrew to Wycombe at the end of June and to Reading in early July.⁵ Meanwhile, however, the secret plans for resistance were still going forward. An informant

¹Common Council Journal 40 ff. 225b, 226.

²Ibid.

³Sharpe, p. 249; Common Council Journal 40 f. 227.

⁴CJ, V, pp. 226-7.

⁵Rushworth, VI, pp. 594, 603.

told the army on 6 July that 16,000 reformadoes had been enlisted to date and would soon be sent into Kent 'where it was thought the Scots do intend to land'; there were also rumours of a planned Scottish invasion across the border.¹ On the same day, while the army was hearing details from the purged Independent officers of the London Trained Bands about the Presbyterian takeover, Common Council was asking Parliament for more money to help build up the militia of the capital:

'Whereas your petitioners upon their humble desires 3^o June last to have £20,000 granted them for the ordering the great affaires of the Militia, this honourable House was pleased to graunt them £12,000, before which tyme there was about £8,000 arreres owing to the Guards of the Parliament, Tower and Citty, besides the great charges of the Outguards which yet contynue, and the compleating the Regiment of Horse, trayned bands and Auxiliaries within the line, by which meanes the said £12,000 is expended, and yet much to be done to compleat the said forces to be serviceable for the safety of the Parliament and Citie, all of which with the debts yet unsatisfied and the mainteynance of such guards and frequent duties as these tumultuous tymes do require, will occasion the expence of a great summe of meoney....May it therefore please this Honourable House to graunt unto your petitioners £20,000...'2

Within the army, the soldiers' elected agitators responded to these developments by demanding that the Council of War order a new march on London from Reading; they clearly recognised that 'upon the Army's drawing back from the City, the Parliament's proceedings for the good of the people and Army hath been slackened'.³ Only force, or the threat of force, could prevent the Presbyterian party from regaining control in Parliament and the City. But the senior officers of the army were currently drawing up plans for a settlement, the Heads of the Proposals, and the agitators' demand was politically inopportune; the Council of War eventually compromised by giving Parliament four days

¹Crawford, p. 155.

²Common Council Journal 40 f. 233b.

³Firth, Clarke Papers, I, pp. 170-4.

to respond to the agitators' petition, in which the main demand was for the London Militia Committee to be restored to its former membership.¹ The election in April, in which the Independents on the Militia Committee had been voted out, 'did savour of nothing but evil intendments and factions, as since hath appeared by the said committee's actions in putting out men of known integrity',² and control of the London militia must therefore be put 'unto those hands out of which it was taken; of whose care and fidelity to the public there hath been so long and large experience'.³

Parliament received the agitators' petition on 19 July, and on 22 July the Commons agreed to reinstate the old Militia Committee. The Lords, too, accepted the demand on 23 July as the army's deadline approached, and the old committee was ordered to meet that night to take charge of the security of the City and Parliament.⁴ But the new, Presbyterian-dominated committee, forewarned by the Commons' vote on the 22nd, hurriedly voted before nightfall on the 23rd to pay the arrears of all the field officers of the City Trained Bands as confirmed by them after the recent purge of the Independents. Anticipating that the approved Presbyterian officers might now in turn be purged by the restored Militia Committee, the Presbyterians issued pay warrants to each officer for services in the City since 11 June, to be paid out of what remained of the £12,000 voted by Parliament on 3 June.⁵

¹Kishlansky, pp. 257-63.

²Ibid., p. 257.

³Whitelock, p. 263.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Pay warrants, PRO SP 28 237 (loose sheets). For a list of the officers named in these warrants see Appendix 4.

In the meantime, the Presbyterian party in the City had been actively organising its strength, possibly under the direct leadership of Holles and the other 10 members who had withdrawn from the Commons.¹ A mass meeting was held at Skinners' Hall on 21 July, resulting in a 'Solemn Engagement' to support the terms of the Covenant and restore the King to power on easy conditions - 'taking into serious consideration how religion, his Majesty's honour and safety, the privilege of Parliament and liberties of the subject are at present greatly endangered, and likely to be destroyed'.² The Engagement was signed by a large number of people, who described themselves as 'the citizens, commanders, officers and souldiers of the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries, the young men and apprentices of the cities of London and Westminster, sea commanders, seamen, watermen, together with divers other commanders, officers and souldiers within the lines of communication';³ in other words, the actual or potential military forces of the capital. While the promoters of the Engagement attempted to get the backing of Common Council and obtain the signatures of every Freeman of the City, Fairfax wrote to say that the army regarded it as 'set on foot by the malice of some desperate-minded men, this being their last engine for the putting all into confusion when they could not accomplish their wicked ends by other means'.⁴ When, therefore, the Engagement was presented at Westminster on 23 July, the Commons, with its former Presbyterian leadership absent, condemned the Engagement outright and ordered this condemnation

¹Juxon, f. 112.

²Kishlansky, p. 264.

³Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 49.

⁴Sharpe, pp. 252-3.

to be published by beat of drum throughout the lines of communication; anyone subscribing his name thereafter would be judged guilty of high treason.¹

The declaration against the Engagement was made on Saturday 24 July, but without the help of the City militia it could not be enforced. As the apprentices and reformadoes continued to flock to Skinners' Hall to add their names to the Engagement, the restored Militia Committee, no longer controlled by the Presbyterians, met to consider that action to take. While the Committee was debating the sending of a strong guard to Westminster, a mob of 'young men' broke into the meeting and sent the Committee packing from Guildhall, 'telling them if they caught them there again they would hang their guts about their ears'.² Common Council, meanwhile, was meeting nearby to draw up a more formal attack on the restoration of the old Committee, calling on Parliament to restore the City's right to name its own rulers for the militia, or at least to be consulted beforehand.

The official City delegation which took Common Council's petition concerning the Militia Committee to Parliament on Monday morning 26 July was accompanied, perhaps without its consent, by a large crowd of citizens and apprentices. The Houses agreed to take the petition into consideration, but the crowd, having been fobbed off before, refused to disperse. As the day wore on it was swelled by the arrival of more citizens and reformadoes, and then in the afternoon a new group arrived to protest against the Houses' declaration against the Engagement. The mob surged through Westminster Hall to the door of the House of Lords, uttering threats at the nine peers present in the chamber; here the votes restoring the old Militia Committee and

¹CJ, V, p. 256.

²Juxon, f. 112b.

condemning the Engagement were soon repealed, and the Lords then escaped from the House by the back door. The mob then moved across to the Commons, and this time it did not stop at the door but surged forward to the bar of the House, where the apprentices refused to remove their hats and demanded an immediate vote. Nearly 200 men of the City Orange Trained Band were in attendance on the Houses, but Colonel Nathaniel Camfield 'stood looking on like a cowardly base fellow, never offering to strike blow',¹ while his lieutenant said that 'the carriage of the apprentices was more warrantable than the House's'.² When the Commons finally agreed to vote, the mob added its own voice to the chorus of ayes and noes; the House then agreed to divide, but this was not permitted by the apprentices. Finally, after the appropriate votes had been entered in the official journal of the House, the mob began to disperse at about 9 p.m. - encouraged, some hostile observers claimed, by a committee of Common Councilmen who had secretly directed the tumult from start to finish.³

Up until now, many members of both Houses had been fearing an intimidation of Parliament by the army and had hoped that the City would protect them. With the tables turned, however, more than 50 MPs, several peers, and the Speakers of both Houses (with the mace of the Commons) fled to the army for protection in the aftermath of the apprentices' invasion. The City, meanwhile, having obtained the desired ends, sought to justify the means; the Presbyterian Militia Committee, now in power once again, drew up a statement on 27 July inviting the King to London and claiming that the apprentices had acted as they did 'to establish religion and preserve the rights of

¹A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie('1648', correctly 1647)(E419/9).

²Firth, Clarke Papers, I, p. 218.

³Juxon, f. 113; Pearl, Counter-Revolution, p. 51.

the Kingdom'.¹ A letter was sent to Fairfax stating that the restoration of the City's nominated Militia Committee had contented the citizens, and that there would be no more disorders. By Wednesday night 28 July, however, the army was fully informed about the events at Westminster on Monday, and the Council of War voted for an immediate march on London. Fairfax's letter to the City announcing this move put the blame on the City fathers: 'I cannot but look upon you, who are in authority, as accountable to the Kingdom for your present interruption of that hopeful way of peace and settlement things were in for this nation'. The army was now marching from its headquarters at Bedford to London 'to be an effectual saving of the great and just authority of the Kingdom in Parliament'.²

Parliament re-assembled on Friday 30 July, and although the two Houses soon discovered that their Speakers and many of their members had fled to the army, the remainder resolved to continue in support of the Presbyterian programme. The City's mace was borrowed by the Commons, and with this makeshift symbol of authority the House quickly passed a series of ordinances to put the City in a posture of defence against the New Model. The joint Committee of Safety was revived once again and the Militia Committee was given authority to recruit the reformadoes; soon the guns were being hauled up to the forts and the guards were again placed along the lines of communication, while the reformadoes were ordered to appear in St James's Fields on the following morning to be assigned to regiments. All horses in London were ordered to be seized, and the Militia Committee debated the choice of a major-general for the City forces; Skippon was offered the post

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 240.

²Kishlansky, p. 269.

but declined it, and Massey was chosen instead. On Saturday afternoon 31 July, Massey (assisted by Sir William Waller and Lieutenant General Sydenham Poyntz) listed the reformadoes, and an order was given for the shops in the City to be shut.¹ Meanwhile the Commons (with the 11 Members now in attendance once again) and the Lords wrote to the army, protesting at its advance towards London and claiming that Parliament was now well guarded by the City against further tumults.²

On Monday 2 August there was 'great expectation of a new war'; Waller had a force of horse and dragoons 'in the nature of a flying army' and Poyntz was confident that the City forces 'would have been able to have defended themselves against the opposition of many Armies'.³ But by now the Independents in the City had swung into action, as Juxon reports:

'Maney honest cittizens went to Guildhall to perswade by a petitione the Lord Major to avoide a new warr, and being there, there happned to bee some of the Reformadoz whome they justeled and broake his sworde. Hereuppon Pointz and Massey and maney more not being far off, but in the New-Artillery-grounde mounteing their men, came suddenly thither and with their swords drawne fell upon the naked men, whome they slashed & cutt barberously, and some killd outright, and followed them upp & downe the streete cuttinge them, and at last the horsemen came in to Cheapeside with their swords drawne crying out for K: Charles. This was a sad sight to all true harted Cittizens & tould them what they were t'expect from such fellowes.'⁴

But a group of ministers from the Assembly of Divines, led by Stephen Marshall, persuaded Common Council to seek a compromise with the army, and a delegation was sent to make excuses to Fairfax and blame everything on Parliament or the lack of settlement or the circumstances

¹Juxon, f. 114; Kishlansky, p. 270; Pearl, Counter-Revolution, pp. 51-2; Sharpe, p. 257.

²Kishlansky, p. 270.

³Crawford, p. 158.

⁴Juxon, ff. 117-117b.

of the time, not on the City government.¹

By now the army was at Hounslow, and there was evidence that some of the London militia units did not relish a fight. Juxon reports that 'maney of the Comanders of the Trayned bands and Auxiliaries lay downe their comissions' and that there was 'a strange unwillingness to ingage against the army'.² The suburban militia units were unhappy about their enforced subservience to the City Militia Committee; on 2 August 'divers Officers of the Trained Bands in Southwarke intreated the Common Council that they might not go forth in a hostile manner under any Command but such as should be approved of by the generality of that Borough, and that they might be left to defend themselves and stand on their own guard'.³ It remained to be seen how many of the Londoners would turn out when called to arms. A general muster was ordered, apparently on Tuesday 3 August, and Juxon records the result:

'The forces of the Cittie had a Generall order to appeare at their Rendevouzes uppon the armies coming to Hantslo, but now as formerly there was an inconsiderable appearance; the Aprentizes cam not out as was promized; for the auxilliaries, could scarce aney of them be gott uppon the Guard; the seamen were promized by the Trinity howse to 10,000 but came not above 300; there were none of the hamletts would obey comands, all their officers haveing layd downe; and tho there was all the meanes that could be possible used to make readey soe maney horse as might looke the armies in the face (whoe were now come to Hamersmith), to the intent they might but ingaige and make a begininge, thinkeinge that would runn all in to a desperate pointe, yett Massey declared in Common Council that hee could not make 700 horse fitt for to ingage'.⁴

The delegation from Common Council had meanwhile arrived at Hounslow, where they saw the army's own general muster of 20,000 horse and foot

¹Sharpe, pp. 257-8.

²Juxon, f. 115b.

³Whitelock, p. 265.

⁴Juxon, f. 116.

and a large train of artillery,¹ and where they were handed a letter from Fairfax and the Council of War listing the army's complaints and its determination to see the Independents safely restored to Parliament and the 11 Members removed.

The City delegation returned to Common Council during the afternoon of 3 August with this letter and their eyewitness report of the state of the army. In these circumstances, together with the poor showing at the City's muster, it was clear that resistance was impractical.

Common Council sent a letter that night to the army, concurring with the desire for a free Parliament and placing the City's forces entirely in Parliament's hands.² In the meantime, Fairfax had already acted on a request from Southwark, which 'disliked the proceedings of London against the Army and desired assistance from the General'; at about 2 a.m. on Wednesday 4 August a brigade commanded by Colonel Thomas Rainsborough 'marched into Southwarke without any opposition, the souldiers carrying themselves very civilly'. Finding the gates on London Bridge shut and the portcullis let down, 'they planted two peices of ordnance against the Gate and set a guard without'; shortly afterward, they also obtained possession of the 'great fort', probably the one in St George's Fields.³ During the day the City authorities agreed to surrender the forts on the north side of the Thames from St Giles's Fields to the river by 6 p.m., and the Militia Committee was also directed to 'give order for quitting such Forts on Southwarke side as are not yet in possession of your Forces'.⁴

¹Whitelock, p. 265.

²Sharpe, p. 259.

³Whitelock, pp. 265-6.

⁴Common Council Journal 40 f. 251.

While six of the 11 Members fled to the Continent, the army escorted the Speakers and the Independents back to Westminster on 6 August,¹ and on the following day the New Model 'did marche in at Hide Parke forte and through Cheapeside over the Bridge with Bagg & Baggaige & artillery &c., in soe great order & civillity that 'twas not heard of soe much as an apple tooke by aney of them'.²

¹Firth, Clarke Papers, I, pp. 220-1; Common Council Journal 40 f. 250.

²Juxon, f. 119.

CHAPTER XIV
REVERSAL, REPRISE AND FINALE

In August 1647, having successfully occupied the capital, the army took steps to prevent any possibility of renewed resistance in the future. Fairfax demanded and obtained the handing over of the Tower by order of Parliament, and on 9 August he took possession,

'attended by many Commanders and other Gentlemen, his Life-Guard, and part of Collonel Pride's Regiment of Foot, and the City Guard that was there marched out. In the Afternoon a Committee from the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common-Councel came to the Tower to the General, and Alderman Gibbes made a Speech to him, to give his Excellency thanks for their love and care of the City of London, and after complements, recommended to his Excellency the faithfulness and care of Collonel West, Lieutenant of the Tower.... The General returned thanks...and said that for Lieutenant of the Tower, He had appointed a Gentleman of worth and fidelity dwelling among them, Collonel Tichburne, to have that charge.'¹

This appointment, Juxon records, 'did very much startle the Cittie';² a hostile Presbyterian pamphleteer wrote that 'they have...put that gallant and faithful Colonell, Colonell West, out of the Tower, only because no Sectary, and the City placed him there, and in his roome that thing Tichborne is put, a fellow much below the Command, fitter for a Possit and a warme Bed then to keep a Cittadell, only a Peevish Sectary, for that he must be Honoured'.³ Indeed, another hostile source records that 'not above a month before he was chosen Lieutenant of the Tower' Tichborne 'held an opinion that it was not lawful for men to fight or kill men, [not] thinking that fighting would be in fashion again'.⁴ The guard for the Tower provided by the Militia

¹Whitelock, p. 267.

²Juxon, f. 119b.

³A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie.

⁴Firth, Clarke Papers, I, p. 396n.

Committee was removed, and the Tower was then garrisoned by army units until a new regiment could be raised specifically for this purpose as part of the army.¹

On 28 August, Parliament having declared void all votes taken between 26 July and 6 August, the 'old' Militia Committee met once again.² This restoration of the status quo ante not only meant that the Independents regained their places on the Committee, but also restricted the Committee's authority to the City itself; an ordinance was passed on 9 September establishing new, self-governing committees for Westminster, Southwark, and the Tower Hamlets.³ The first act of the restored City Militia Committee was to dismantle the lines of communication, pull down the courts of guard, sell the timber, and discharge Colonel John Bradley's regiment of 'outguards', in accordance with decisions made by Parliament early in September at the army's insistence.⁴ Not only did this remove the immediate danger to the army should London try to resist again, but it also destroyed the chief justification for a united military command over the City and suburbs. Next, the Trained Bands officers who had been expelled by the Presbyterian Militia Committee had to be restored, and those who had supported the Presbyterian takeover had to be purged in their turn. This process was completed by the beginning of December, when a virulent Presbyterian propagandist issued an anonymous pamphlet attacking many Independent-approved officers by name and defending each of the dismissed Presbyterian colonels and captains of the City Trained Bands.

¹Juxon, f. 119b.

²Whitelock, pp. 268-9; CJ, V, p. 280.

³Whitelock, p. 271.

⁴Ibid.

For the author of A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie, the purged Presbyterian officers were uniformly discreet, faithful, courageons, prudent, valiant, godly, honest, stout, and conscientious. The Independents, on the other hand, included 'an antinomian', 'a cowardly base fellow', 'a swearing phantastick fool', 'a coward', 'a great Booby', 'a silly weak old man', 'a proud, insolent, schismaticall, beggerly fool', 'a kickshaw', 'a cowardly fop', and 'a most unworthy sniveling foole'. His comments on the misbehaviour of certain officers of the White and Yellow regiments at Cheriton, together with the modesty and piety of his description of Captain Henry Potter of the latter unit, suggest that Potter himself may have been the author of the tract. Not all of the field officers of the City Trained Bands, of whom there were presumably still 40, are mentioned in A Paire of Spectacles, as the author did not know what changes had taken place among the junior captains of some units, but his list includes all of the most prominent names and shows how the Independent-dominated Militia Committee proceeded. In the case of the colonels, the Committee simply restored the former leaders;¹ the Presbyterian-appointed colonels were dismissed, except for one who had shown himself to be a crypto-Independent and who was therefore allowed to resume his old post of lieutenant colonel.² Independent-minded officers who had nevertheless survived the Presbyterian purge during the summer, such as Miles Petit and Thomas Juxon, were confirmed in the same or similar posts. It is not possible to determine how many of the purged junior captains were now restored, but it seems likely

¹Except for Edward Hooker of the Red Regiment, who was replaced by John Hayes. William Underwood of the Blue retained his colonelcy through both purges, and Rowland Wilson, Owen Roe, Thomas Player, and Ralph Harrison were now restored.

²Nathaniel Camfield of the Orange Trained Band.

that the list of officers after the second purge bore at least as close a relation to the situation in late 1646 as did the list during the summer.

The one exception to this was the Yellow Trained Band, which saw a dramatic upheaval: every field officer in this regiment, as approved by the Presbyterian Militia Committee, was replaced by the restored Independent-dominated Committee. 'What have the Commanders of the Yellow Regiment done? They are all turned out...had ye not one Fool nor Knave among ye, nor Cuckold neither? That's a Miracle.' The real reason, as the author of A Paire of Spectacles observed, was that they were all guilty of 'City-high-Treason' - that is, of active support for political Presbyterianism. Four of the seven officers¹ had come to public notice during 1645 in promoting the High Presbyterian movement of that year, and support for that movement was greatest in the area around St Paul's, where Robert Baillie's influence was strongest - the area represented by the Yellow Trained Band. The relationship between religious and political Presbyterianism among members of Parliament has been the cause of a heated debate among historians in recent years,² but among the City Trained Bands, if we consider the High Presbyterian agitation of 1645-6 to be a mainly 'religious' campaign, the relationship seems to be a close one.

At the beginning of 1648, London appeared to be firmly under the military control of the Independents. The City Militia Committee comprised supporters of the Army; the Trained Bands had been purged of Presbyterian officers; the suburbs had been removed from control by the City; the fortifications had been dismantled; the Tower was

¹See pp. 250-1. The pretence of aldermanic colonelship ended in 1646.

²See Past & Present, XLIV (August 1969), p. 52n., and XLVII (May 1970), pp. 116-46.

defended by soldiers of the army, under the command of the radical sectarian Robert Tichborne; and the Lord Mayor was now John Warner, whose election had been assured by the presence of a strong force of soldiers around Guildhall on the polling day. The former Lord Mayor and several aldermen and Trained Band colonels had been arrested and imprisoned, charged with either high treason or high misdemeanour. But the City fathers were still trying to undermine the army's power, particularly by failing to collect the large assessments demanded for the army's arrears of pay. Without money, as both the Council of the Army and the citizens were aware, the army would be forced to live off the country and would thus antagonise the people; the soldiers saw this as a deliberate plot to bring them into disrepute.¹ There was also yet another petition from Common Council in December 1647 calling for the removal of the army from London and the observance of the Covenant, as well as the release of the imprisoned Presbyterian aldermen and officials.² By now, however, there was also a third force in the City - a popular movement of apprentices and other ordinary citizens advocating out-and-out Royalism. At Christmas 1647 the shops in the City had been shut despite Parliament's abolition of the holiday, either because of widespread conservative sentiment or because of threats from mobs of apprentices against those which remained open; the Lord Mayor could not prevent the apprentices from decorating the pump in Cornhill with evergreens at Christmas; malignant preachers were known to have given sermons on the festival and to have used the banned Book of Common Prayer; a mob had stopped a coach in the Strand and forced the occupants to drink the King's

¹Sharpe, pp. 265, 275.

²Ibid., pp. 269-70.

health; numerous bonfires were lit to celebrate the King's birthday on 27 March 1648; and many in the City 'spoke disgracefully of the Parliament'.¹

Royalist sentiment was transformed into action in April as the result of a heavy-handed attempt by the Lord Mayor to suppress the apprentices' amusements on the Lord's Day. On Sunday 9 April,

'There met in Moorefeilds London some thousands of apprentices and others to sport, which being contrary to the ordinance of Parliament the Lord Major indeavoured to prevent, and sent one of the Trained bands to disperse them; butt such was the greatnesse of their number and their resolutenesse that they pelted the Trained bands with stones and att last fell in upon them, and disarm'd divers of them, and tooke away their colours. This done, they thought their designe was now ripe, and that they were fitt for any enterprize; whereuppon they gave a generall shoute, and cryed "Now for King Charles", and soe went shouting alonge; their number increased downe towards Whitehall, crying out "For King Charles"....In this manner they passed through Fleetstreete and the Strand, where they were animated and incouraged by divers Malignants, and their number made them about 3000, some with musketts, others with swords and clubbs.'²

The mob planned to attack Colonel Barkstead's army regiment in Whitehall, but a party of horse was drawn forth from the Mews at Charing Cross which 'fell upon them, kill'd him who carried the colours, and one or two more were slaine, and divers of them cutt and hack'd by the troopers, whereuppon they soone fled and were dissipated. This was about 8 att night. The troopers followed them and clear'd the streetes, and the Generall went in person to Ludgate, and soe into Smythfeild, giving charge to all to keepe within their houses.'³ A thunderstorm helped persuade the rioters to retire indoors, and after midnight Fairfax was finally able to go to bed. But the disturbance was not, as had been hoped, at an end:

¹Whitelock, pp. 286, 290; LJ, IX, p. 553.

²Newsletter from London, 10 April, in Firth, Clarke Papers, II, p. 3.

³Ibid.

'About two in the morning there came newes that the rude rabble were againe mett, and had secur'd Ludgate and Newgate, and afterwards went to the Lord Mayor's house and fell upon some of the Trained bands there, kill'd 2 or 3, and tooke 2 drakes which hee had for the security of his house'.¹

Lord Mayor Warner fled to the Tower for protection, while the rioters drew their newly acquired artillery to Ludgate.²

'They alsoe went into Milkestreete and broke open the Armorie there and furnished divers of themselves with armes. Thus they continued till about 7 or 8 in the morning, their numbers nott much increasing, nor any of the Citty Trained bands appearing to oppose them'.³

The Council of War assembled to debate whether the two army regiments at the Mews and in Whitehall should be used to put down the riot, or whether action should be delayed until more units could be brought up to the capital; it was decided to hazard the two regiments (Barkstead's foot and Rich's horse) immediately. Ludgate and Newgate being barred to them, the troops entered the City at Aldersgate and made their way to Leadenhall, where the rioters were attempting to seize the magazine. Taking their stand in Gracechurch Street, the insurgents stood firm against the first charge of Barkstead's and Rich's men although they lost eight killed and a number of others wounded; they managed to fire one of their drakes and wounded two of the officers among their attackers.⁴ At the second charge, however, the waterman who had fired the drake was killed and the rest of the insurgents were 'driven like sheep into Leadenhall, the cheif of them prisoners. Afterwards the horse and foot clear'd the streetes of them'.⁵

¹Ibid.

²Whitelock, p. 298.

³Firth, Clarke Papers, II, p. 4.

⁴Ibid.; Whitelock, pp. 298-9.

⁵Firth, Clarke Papers, II, p. 4.

By 10 a.m. the rioters had all dispersed, the gates were open, and all was quiet throughout the City.¹

Common Council quickly assured Parliament that it was not responsible for the riot, and the Houses accepted this. But they also voted on 13 April that the City's chains, together with the hooks and staples used to secure them, should be removed immediately to prevent their being used against the forces of order in any future insurrection.² The City fathers took the view that the City's defences should be strengthened rather than weakened, and this prompted a petition from Common Council on 15 April that the chains be restored 'and that the army may speedily be removed to a further distance from the Citty'. The fear of a popular Royalist coup did not lessen Common Council's antipathy to the army, and the City was still relying on its own militia for protection despite the poor showing of the Trained Bands in the riot of 9-10 April. Common Council asked the Militia Committee 'that for the space of tenn dayes and tenn nights next ensuing certaine Companies of the trayned bands of this Citty furnished with compleate armes and ammunicion be appointed...each day and night to attend and walke the rounds of the Citty, vizt. fower Companies for the night and two for the day'. At the same time, the Common Councilmen themselves, attended by the parish constables, were to 'visit each household to warn them against allowing their servants to commit outrages or other disorders'.³

The need for defence was the more urgent because of the threat of a Scottish invasion in support of forces in South Wales and elsewhere who had declared for the King, a threat which might lead to a

¹Whitelock, p. 299.

²Sharpe, pp. 272-3; Common Council Journal 40 f. 268.

³Ibid., f. 269b.

pre-emptive strike by the army against a potentially Royalist City of London. On 24 April Common Council heard the evidence of one Everard,

'That he being at Windsor in an Inn in Bed, heard some Gentlemen (whereof he supposeth one was Collonel Grosvenour, another Ewer, and others with them in the next Room to him) discoursing together to this effect, "That they doubted not but the Scots would come in, for the preventing of which they found no way but to disarm the City, friend and foe. That such as were friends to the Army should be armed, and keep the rest in aw, and that they would make the City advance a Million of mony, or else would plunder them, and that they had acquainted Ireton therewith."'¹

This evidence was laid before Parliament by Common Council, together with a new request for the chains to be restored (which was quickly granted) and for the army to be withdrawn from London (concerning which Parliament could do little). A third request marked a new approach by Common Council; this was a plea 'that an Ordinance may pass to constitute Major General Skippon Major General of all Forces within the Lines of Communication for defence of the City and of the Parliament, to whom the City resolve to adhere'.² The lines of communication had already been abolished, and Parliament had quite deliberately removed the suburban militias from the control of the City Militia Committee; the request for a major-general over all the forces within the former lines was a roundabout way of achieving a unified command over the forces of the City and suburbs once again and reconstituting a force which could theoretically outnumber any potential opponent.

Skippon himself had, of course, been appointed major-general of the City forces in 1642, but his long-standing association with the army since then made him an odd choice for the City in 1648; one Common

¹Whitelock, p. 301.

²Ibid., p. 302.

Councilman was accused of claiming that Skippon's appointment was not the Council's real wish.¹ An anonymous Presbyterian pamphleteer also added his own advice to Common Council: 'You have had some thoughts of Major-General Skippon to be your Major General; he will merely cheat and gull you and bring in a second Trojan-horse amongst you, as he was accessory in bringing in the former and marching thorow your City in triumph with the Grandees and Rebels of the Army'.² But the choice of Skippon appears, in fact, to have been the result of a political deal; Fairfax announced that he was satisfied with Skippon's appointment and agreed to withdraw the two regiments from the Mews and Whitehall.³

The sudden shift in the army's attitude brought about by the deal with the City and the need to use Barkstead's and Rich's regiments elsewhere meant that Parliament was once again forced to rely on the London militia for its own guards. Common Council immediately seized this opportunity to petition for a restoration of its own right to nominate the members of the Militia Committee and for City control over the Tower to be resumed. The point was clearly made in a second petition on 9 May, when the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council announced 'that they are willing to undertake the guarding of the Houses, the Militia being settled and they authorised'. As for the Tower, they claimed that 'their nomination of the Lieutenant of the Tower being suspended, and importation of Bullion hindred and Merchandising diverted, Trade is much decayed'⁴ - a standard complaint

¹ Sharpe, p. 276.

² The Honest Citizen (1648)(E438/5).

³ I. Gentles, The Struggle for London in the Second Civil War (unpublished article), pp. 23-4; Whitelock, pp. 302-3.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 303-4.

by merchants who distrusted the man in charge of the Tower, as had been seen with Thomas Lunsford in December 1641. Colonel Robert Tichborne had now become the bête noir of the citizens, who wanted Francis West restored to the post from which he had been removed by the army in August 1647:

'Colonel West is the fittest man to be Lieutenant of the Tower, where now that peevish Sectary Lieutenant-Colonel Tichburn is, alias Cromwel's sirreverence, or a new confiding light; I will not profane the word Saint; I will not call him Colonel, his commission being illegal, and he fitter for a warm bed then to command a regiment or citadel...and truly, until the walls fall down that support this milk-sop, no Merchant...will trust his Bullion within the Tower-walls...trade being never so decayed as since he came into his preaching Government'.¹

Parliament now had little choice but to agree to the City's demands. Having taken the precaution of sending the arms and ammunition from the Tower to army-controlled Windsor Castle,² the Houses sent a delegation to Common Council on 19 May to inform the City fathers that their nominees for the Militia Committee had been approved and that West would be placed in control of the Tower. At the same time, Parliament expected protection against tumults since the Houses 'did now put themselves really and truly into the hands of the City'.³

Common Council, having regained control over the naming of the Militia Committee, proceeded with caution and did not repeat the mistakes of 1647. Prominent Presbyterians who had sat on the Presbyterian Militia Committee of April 1647, such as Laurence Bromfield, Edward Hooker, Richard Venner and John Jones, were not now re-appointed, and although John and Edward Bellamy were nominated, so was the Independent Thomas Player.⁴ Common Council also informed

¹The Honest Citizen.

²Gentles, loc. cit., p. 24.

³Sharpe, p. 279.

⁴Common Council Journal 40 f. 274b.

Parliament 'that they resolve to remain firmly joyned against the Common Enemy',¹ who were at this time the Scots and Royalists rather than the army. A request from the Commons for an advance of £6000 for the pay of the New Model was quickly agreed to, especially since part of the money was needed to allow the army regiment in the Tower to march out and leave the defence of that fortress to the London militia.²

The new Militia Committee, like those before it, made a number of changes in the officers of the City Trained Bands, but although the effect of the changes was to restore most of the Presbyterian officers who had served in the summer of 1647, a few of the Independents managed to retain their posts this time. Among the colonels, for example, the Independents Rowland Wilson and Thomas Player were dismissed, but John Hayes was merely demoted to major and Owen Roe remained in his command. Once again the major change was in the Yellow Trained Band, where all the Independent-approved officers were dismissed and all but one of the previous Presbyterian appointees were restored.³

While the Militia Committee was pursuing a course somewhere between the outright Royalism of the mob and the radicalism of the army, Common Council also followed a moderately conservative Presbyterian

¹Whitelock, p. 305.

²The Tower Regiment left at the end of May to take part in the siege of Colchester. Tichborne, its colonel, did not take the field, and a Colonel Simon Needham was appointed to the command of the regiment; he was killed on 13 June and replaced by William Shambrook, formerly of the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries, who fell in turn on 5 July. Two other officers of the regiment, Timothy Wilkes and Francis Maizey, had been captains in Colonel John Bradley's former regiment of outguards manning the London fortifications (C. Firth and G. Davis, The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army (Oxford, 1940), pp. 571-3).

³See Appendix 7.

programme. The end of May had seen the first petition to Common Council from 'divers well-affected citizens' calling for a personal treaty with the King.¹ This had been sent forward to Parliament, and on 27 June the Council submitted its own request that Parliament allow Charles to come near London for negotiations, to which 'our brethren of Scotland' should also be invited; any resulting treaty would have to be in accordance with the Covenant, it was stressed.² The 'Common Officers of the Trained bands' followed on 5 July with their own petition to Parliament 'that the King may be brought to London with freedom, honour and safety to treat with his Parliament for settling a safe and well-grounded Peace'.³ A counter-petition from 'divers well-affected magistrates, citizens, ministers and other inhabitants', presented to Parliament on 12 July without the approval of Common Council, did not object to the principle of a treaty with the King but merely demanded adequate assurances for the enforcement of the Covenant.⁴ The mob made no such scruples, and there were signs of support for the Royalist position even among the men of the Trained Bands. On 11 July Common Council heard a report of misbehaviour by 'some of the guards, and particularly one of them vizt. Francis Fawkenner in Leiftenant Collonell Brett's company of Algate, that on Saturday last conducted Mr Speaker⁵ to his coach and there uttered these words by way of incitement and encouragement to the clamorous women, "that now he was out of their charge they should teare him

¹ Sharpe, p. 281.

² Whitelock, p. 311.

³ Ibid., p. 313.

⁴ Sharpe, p. 286.

⁵ William Lenthall, Speaker of the House of Commons.

in peeces".¹

The anger of the women was presumably due to the fact that the Commons had not, like the Lords, immediately accepted the demand for a personal treaty with the King. They asked the City what security could be offered for the King's safety, and Common Council replied that its members and the officers of the militia were 'ready according to their ingagement, as much as in them lyes, by the trained-bands to guard and defend the King and Parliament against all Force and violence'.² At the same time, a house-to-house campaign was being conducted by the aldermen, Common Councilmen and officers to collect subscriptions to the 'Engagement for a Personal Treaty'.³

The City's call for negotiations with the King was linked with a second demand, the familiar requirement 'that London and all the parts within the late lines of communication, Hamblets of the Tower, and parishes mencioned in the weekly bills of mortality be united under the command of one millicia'.⁴ In May, when the City had successfully petitioned for the right to nominate its own Militia Committee, this demand had not been made - presumably because of the difficulties it had created in Parliament in previous years. Instead, Skippon had been appointed major-general of all the militia forces within the former lines, probably as the result of a political deal with the army. With the removal of army pressure in the summer, however, the City now renewed its old claim for control over the suburbs without any mention of Skippon's role. Common Council simultaneously listed

¹Common Council Journal 40 f. 286b.

²Whitelock, p. 317.

³Common Council Journal 40 f. 286b.

⁴Ibid., f. 284.

its nominees from the suburbs to sit on the enlarged Militia Committee - trustworthy men such as Lieutenant Colonel Walter Bigg and Captain Christopher White from Westminster, Colonel Daniel Sowton from Southwark, and Captain Leonard Leonards from the Tower Hamlets.¹

The demand for the uniting of the suburban militias under the City Militia Committee, made in a petition to Parliament on 5 July, was once again met with a flurry of objections from the suburbs themselves. On 18 July the Commons received 'another Petition, not from the Common Council, but with ten thousand Hands to it, that the Militiaes may continue distinct....These and other Petitions from Southwark, Westminster, &c. for joyning the Militias together, and some against it, were referred to a Committee to hear all parties, and their Claims, and report their opinions to the House'.² Skippon, meanwhile, responding to clandestine Royalist recruiting in the City, was listing volunteers for new infantry and cavalry units, ostensibly for despatch to the siege of Colchester.³ Common Council protested on 22 July, asking that Skippon should not have power to enlist men without the consent of the Militia Committee, but this petition was rejected by the Commons. On 28 July, however, the demand was repeated in a second petition, 'expressing how much the City was unsatisfyed and jealous of the listing of Horse and Foot under Major General Skippon, and praying that no more may be listed unless by him and the Militia of London, and that those already listed under him may be discharged'.⁴ This petition, too, was referred to a committee of the Commons, and

¹Ibid., f. 285.

²Whitelock, p. 317.

³Gentles, loc. cit., pp. 29-30.

⁴Whitelock, p. 320.

nothing was done.

Skippon's activities brought fear within the City to a new height, for here indeed was a Trojan horse within the walls of London. Skippon's volunteers were predominantly servants and apprentices, and these had been encouraged to enlist each other 'in a clandestine way at unseasonable times in the night...tending to the raising of tumults, dividing and breaking of the trained bands and auxiliary forces of this City'.¹ This threat 'to put the power of the sword into the hands of servants and sectaries'² prompted the Militia Committee to order the City's chains to be put up each night, and Common Council resolved to raise a new cavalry regiment of its own without authority from Parliament.³ Large numbers of volunteers came to Guildhall in early August to enlist in the new unit, which was to be commanded by one of the Presbyterian officers who had left the New Model in the summer of 1647. The army was more unpopular than ever; Skippon found it advisable to withdraw to the suburbs; Royalist activity in the City increased and became less discreet, and there were hopes that the Prince of Wales would shortly sail up the Thames to take possession of the capital.⁴

During the latter part of August, while the Royalist and Presbyterian alliance in the City was entertaining hopes for the future and the Lords and Commons were passing conflicting votes concerning the respective rights of Skippon and the Militia Committee to raise cavalry, the main issue was being settled on the battlefield.

¹The Humble Petition (1648)(E453/39).

²The Perfect Diurnall, 29 July (E525/10).

³Common Council Journal 40 ff. 290-1.

⁴Gentles, loc. cit., pp. 31-2.

The New Model's victory over the Scots at Preston on 17 August had little immediate effect on Royalist activity in London, but the fall of Colchester on the 28th dashed the remaining hopes of the outright supporters of the King, and many fled from the capital.¹ On the other hand, the military defeat of the Scots and Royalists did not impede Presbyterian hopes for a treaty with the King on the basis of the Covenant, and progress continued to be made in this direction. On 4 September Parliament requested a loan from the City to permit negotiations to begin on the Isle of Wight, and this was readily granted.² Parliament's commissioners met with the King for the first time on 18 September and the negotiations continued throughout the next two months, with some progress being reported on minor points. Petitions to the Commons from the growing Leveller movement, opposing the treaty and calling instead for 'justice upon the Capital Authours and Promoters of the former or late wars',³ were ignored, and the City's temper at this time is demonstrated by the election of a crypto-Royalist, Abraham Reynardson, as Lord Mayor at the end of September.

In the optimism generated by the treaty negotiations during the autumn, both Parliament and City appear to have taken little notice of the attitude of the army. The politicisation of the New Model, already demonstrated during the summer of 1647, had gathered strength through the shedding of blood at Pembroke, Preston, Colchester and Pontefract in 1648; the raising of a new war by the King had led to a general acceptance throughout the army of the Leveller demand for the King to be 'brought to justice' - yet Parliament was negotiating

¹A Looking-Glasse for the Well-Affected in the City (1648)(E460/26).

²Sharpe, pp. 290-1.

³Whitelock, pp. 330-1, 335, 337.

to restore him to honour and (somewhat circumscribed) power, and the City, which could not afford to pay its assessments for the support of the army, could easily find £10,000 to finance peace negotiations. On 20 November,

'Several Officers of the Army presented to the Commons (not to the Lords) the Large Remonstrance of the Army, with a Letter from the General to the House desiring the Remonstrance might have a present reading, and the things propounded therein be timely considered....The preamble of the Remonstrance shewed the miscarriages of the King and of the Parliament severally and in Treaties between them, especially that Treaty wherein they now are. That they conceive the Parliament hath abundant cause to lay aside any further proceedings in this Treaty...and to reject the King's demands for himself and his Party, and that he may no more come to Government nor to London. That Delinquents be no more bargained with, nor partially dealt with....That the King be brought to Justice as the Capital cause of all.'¹

This Remonstrance, with the threat implicit in any political demand coming from the army, caused great consternation in the House and prompted 'a long and high debate, some inveighing sharply against the insolency of it, others palliated and excused the matters in it, and some did not stick to justify it; most were silent because it came from the army, and feared the like to be done by them as had been done formerly; in fine the debate was adjourned'.² Nothing was done about the Remonstrance during the following week, although with the New Model quartered at Windsor there were rumours on 23 and 29 November that the regiments were preparing to march on the capital once again.³

On the last day of November the Commons rejected by 90 votes a proposal to take the army's Remonstrance into consideration;⁴ the members apparently still hoped that the problem would go away. But

¹Ibid., p. 350.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 351-2.

⁴Ibid.

the Council of the Army had already decided on its next course of action, the officers having spent all of 26 November in prayer for guidance.¹ Late on 30 November the Commons received notice from Windsor

'that a full Council of the Army had agreed upon a Declaration expressing their sad apprehension of the danger and evil of the Treaty with the King, and of any accomodation with him or restitution of him thereupon....That they can see in the Majority of those trusted with the great affairs of the Kingdom nothing less than a treacherous or corrupt neglect of, and apostacie from, the publick trust reposed in them....That this Parliament being sole Judges of their own performance or breach of trust, they hold themselves necessitated to, and justified in, an appeal from this Parliament in the present constitution as it now stands unto the extraordinary judgment of God and good People....That for all these ends they are drawing up with the Army to London, there to follow providence as God shall clear their way.'²

That night, Lord Mayor Reynardson received a letter from Fairfax to the effect that he was 'upon an immediate advance with the Army towards London', assuring him that 'they are far from the least plunder or wrong to any, and for the better prevention of any disorder, they desire £40,000 may be paid to them tomorrow night, and they will quarter in the void and great Houses in and about the City'.³

Fairfax marched in on Saturday 2 December and made his headquarters in Whitehall, but Parliament continued to ignore the army's political demands. Both the Commons and the City hoped that promises of payment of the £40,000 would induce the army to withdraw from London,⁴ and Parliament also took the provocative step of passing a new ordinance for settling the militia of England and Wales, 'finding it necessary that the severall Counties...be put into a posture of Defence for the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 353.

⁴Ibid.

preservation and safety of the King, Parliament and Kingdome'.¹ This ordinance did not amalgamate the London suburban militias under the City Militia Committee, but the men appointed as commissioners in Westminster and the Tower Hamlets² were ones whom Parliament felt it could trust. Finally, after an all-night sitting on 4-5 December, the Commons voted 'that his Majesties concessions to the propositions of the Parliament upon the Treaty are Sufficient grounds for settling the Peace of the Kingdom'.³

The acceptance of the treaty with the King was the last straw for the army, and on Wednesday morning 6 December the guard on the Houses provided by the City Trained Bands⁴ was dismissed and replaced by Colonel Pride's infantry regiment and Colonel Rich's horse, with results which are well known. During the following week, the Rump which was permitted to sit in Parliament broke off negotiations with the King and again excluded the Presbyterian leaders who had dominated Parliament in 1647. On 16 December 'several of the Inhabitants and Militia of Westminster' attended the purged House of Commons, 'acquainting them that the Persons mentioned in their new Militia [as voted on 2 December] were divers of them Officers of the Trained Bands, Malignants against the Parliament and Army'.⁵ It appears from this complaint that the nominated men who were officers of the Westminster Red Trained Band (Walter Bigg, Thomas Falconbridge, and

¹C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 (1911), pp. 1233-46.

²None were named for Southwark, and the City Militia Committee was not changed.

³Whitelock, p. 353.

⁴See Appendix 7.

⁵Rushworth, IV, vol. 2, p. 1364.

Christopher White) and perhaps also those of the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries (James Prince and George Crompton) were now regarded as ipso facto 'malignants'. The Rump promptly voted to repeal the Militia Ordinance of 2 December, 'it being made upon design to destroy the present Army'.¹

That army, meanwhile, had arrested Major-General Richard Browne, one of the City Sheriffs, on suspicion of having supported the Scots invasion during the summer, and had also taken into custody Major-General Massey, Sir William Waller, and the treasuries at Haberdashers' Hall, Goldsmiths' Hall and Weavers' Hall. The soldiers were quartered in private houses in the City, where they announced their intention of remaining until the City paid their arrears.² Common Council asked the Militia Committee to consider discontinuing the guards of Trained Bands in the City as a money-saving measure to help provide funds,³ but the required sum was not guaranteed until sometime in January, and meanwhile the occupation of the capital continued.

With the army in control of the streets of London, it could only be a matter of time before Common Council and the City Militia Committee were purged as Parliament had been. The date for elections to Common Council was now imminent, and on 18 December the Rump passed an ordinance 'for the chusing of Common Council-men' stating that those who had assisted the King in either war, been sequestered for delinquency, or subscribed the 1647 Engagement were to be disqualified; two days later this was supplemented by a second

¹Firth and Rait, op. cit., pp. 1251-2; Whitelock, p. 356.

²Ibid., p. 355.

³With the army in control, the guards were hardly needed, and they were ineffective anyway: 'They doe absent themselves from their duty and sett their Pikes and musketts in a corner, and only some few to looke to them, which gives occasion to the souldiers belonging to the army to laugh at them' (Common Council Journal 40 f. 308b).

ordinance disabling all those who had subscribed, promoted or abetted the 1648 Engagement for a Personal Treaty.¹ This second Engagement had of course been promoted by Common Council as a whole, and thousands of names had been subscribed. On 23 December 'a Committee of the Common Council informed the House that the Citizens of London were so generally engaged in the Petition for a personal Treaty that if the restriction in the late Ordinance should stand, that none of them should be capable to be elected Officers of the City; there would want sufficient persons to be chosen to supply necessary Offices in the City'.² Nevertheless, on 28 December the City was ordered to proceed with the election.³

At the beginning of January 1649 the newly elected members of Common Council, chosen in accordance with this greatly restrictive set of qualifications, came to Guildhall to take their seats. Lord Mayor Reynardson refused to admit them until they had taken the oath of allegiance to the King, but the Commons sent him an order that the oath was to be suspended and the elections ratified; on the same day, they took the precaution of ordering the City's chains to be removed once again, allowing Fairfax's cavalry to operate freely in the event of any disturbance.⁴ The stage was now set for a new conflict between a Royalist Lord Mayor and a radical Common Council, reminiscent of the events seven years before. On 13 January Common Council met as arranged at 8 a.m., but Reynardson was not present; he eventually arrived at 11 a.m. accompanied by only two aldermen, the minimum number required for a quorum. He then refused to allow the minutes

¹Firth and Rait, op. cit., pp. 1252-3.

²Whitelock, p. 358.

³Ibid., p. 359.

⁴Ibid., p. 361; Sharpe, p. 298.

of the previous meeting to be read, so the Council passed on to the next business; this was the consideration of a petition drawn up by a committee for presentation to the Commons, calling on the House 'to proceed in the execution of justice against all Capital actors in the War against the Parliament, from the highest to the lowest'.

Reynardson was firmly opposed to any such support for the Commons' action in establishing its 'High Court of Justice' to try the King, and he and the two aldermen withdrew from the chamber, thereby dissolving the session. The Town Clerk and the Common Sergeant also refused to put the question and left the chamber, but the remaining Common Councilmen voted that Colonel Owen Rowe (commander of the Green Trained Band) should take the chair and put the question, which was then carried unanimously¹ and ordered to be taken to the Commons by a delegation including Rowe, Tichborne, Hayes, and other well-known Independents.² The Commons not only sanctioned this revolutionary action but resolved that any six Common Councilmen might call a meeting in the future, with or without the Lord Mayor's consent,³ thereby institutionalising the Independent takeover of the Court.

The Militia Committee, too, was quickly dealt with. On 17 January the Commons, acting on their own authority without the concurrence of the Lords, replaced the Committee nominated by the City in May 1648 with a new list of Independents, including Isaac Penington and Rowland Wilson among the aldermen and John Venn, Edmund Harvey, Owen Rowe, Robert Tichborne, Nathaniel Camfield and John Hayes among the Common Councilmen, together with William Underwood, who had managed

¹Sharpe, pp. 298-9.

²Common Council Journal 40 f. 313.

³J.E. Farnell, 'The Usurpation of Honest London Householders: Barebone's Parliament', in English Historical Review, Jan. 1967, p. 26.

to retain his colonelcy of the Blue Trained Band under both Presbyterian and Independent regimes, and Matthew Shepherd, who had apparently changed his opinions since July 1647 when he had been entrusted with the Green Trained Band by the Presbyterian Militia Committee.¹ This new committee undoubtedly purged the officers of the Trained Bands once again, but on this occasion there is no list to show what changes were made. The identities of the militia officers hardly mattered now, however, for the Rump, the army, and the City Independents ensured that there was no further challenge to their rule from the London militia, who therefore had no significant role in the military or political affairs of the Commonwealth.

If the London Trained Bands and Auxiliaries had had their day by 1649, it had been a significant and memorable one. The adherence of the City Trained Bands to the Parliamentary cause had allowed the Lords and Commons to challenge the King in early 1642; their impressive numbers and drill had boosted morale at the annual muster in May; they had provided the backbone of the officer cadre of the first Parliamentary army in the autumn; and their presence and steadfastness at Turnham Green had probably saved the capital from the Royalists in November. The raising of the Auxiliaries in the spring of 1643, together with the construction of the fortifications which they were meant to guard, gave Londoners new confidence in maintaining the war, and the prowess of the London brigade in the Gloucester expedition and at Newbury I ended a string of Parliamentary defeats and saved the army from disaster. In 1644 Parliament made more and more use of what had become its reserve army, and the London militia made important contributions at Cheriton and in the campaigns of Essex, Waller and Browne, as well as at Newbury II. Of course they had their faults as well, especially desertion and an over-readiness to return home when their pay was overdue, and it was these

difficulties which were probably the immediate factor behind the call for a new national army in late 1644, the creation of which meant the end of military campaigns away from home by the militia of London and the suburbs.

As the City's conflicts shifted from the military to the political stage in 1645-6, the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries provided both leaders and victims of party strife. As in Parliament, former comrades in arms became political enemies, and Independent officers were not noticeably younger or less experienced than Presbyterians. The composition of the officer corps, when not affected by party purges, showed a majority of Presbyterians, especially among those drawn from the Yellow Regiment's area around St Paul's, and this was a reflection of the state of opinion in the City as a whole. These officers continued, as always, to be among the most active political leaders in London, but the men, especially the householders of the Trained Bands in 1647-8, had little wish to risk their homes and families by antagonising the army; they preferred to play it safe and refused to answer the summons to arms against the New Model, to the surprise and chagrin of their politically committed officers. By late 1648 their morale appears to have sunk to an all-time low, and the militia which had performed wonders in 1642-4 showed that it had no stomach for a new war against a new and more efficient enemy in the radically changed environment which had been brought about by the Puritan Revolution.

APPENDICES
AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTES TO APPENDIX 1

- ¹From 1610 to about 1640 Tucker was a trader in Virginia; he apparently did not join the HAC or a City company on his return to London.
- ²Hooker earned his living as a distiller.
- ³Davis worked as 'a slopmaker for Seamen'.
- ⁴John Bradley was the major in the spring of 1642, but Geere had replaced him by the autumn. Bradley became lieutenant-colonel of Venn's army regiment at Windsor and would reappear in London in 1645.
- ⁵Cuthbert was originally from the parish of All Hallows Bread Street and was assigned to the Yellow Regiment on that basis, but by the end of 1642 he was living in Fleet Street.
- ⁶Tichborne was a linen-draper by trade.
- ⁷Adams was listed as an inhabitant of Dowgate Ward in the 1640 assessment, but all other records place him in Gracechurch Street in the parish of St Leonard Eastcheap.
- ⁸West traded as 'a Silke man'.
- ⁹Perhaps the Mr Hackett who owned a warehouse in the parish of St Martin in the Vintry in 1638.
- ¹⁰'A Tobacco Seller'.
- ¹¹Originally a silk mercer, Rowe became active in trade with the American colonies; in the late 1630s he had hoped to emigrate to New England and was a supporter of the New Haven project.
- ¹²'A Sugar baker'.
- ¹³Mainwaring was described as 'of the Customhouse', and it is not clear whether he belonged to one of the City companies.
- ¹⁴It may be that it was Rowland Wilson Sr, who joined the HAC in 1614 and served as captain in 1633-4, who was originally named as lieutenant-colonel of the Orange Regiment, but it was his son and namesake who actually filled this position during the Civil War. The father, as a member of the East India Company, can be identified as a political conservative, while Rowland Wilson Jr became a noted radical.
- ¹⁵Perhaps the Thomas Buxton of St Stephen's Walbrook, a Grocer.
- ¹⁶Browne transferred to the Merchant Taylors' Company at an unknown date between 1642 and 1648.
- ¹⁷William Geere had been appointed to this captaincy in the spring of 1642, but transferred to the Yellow Regiment on John Bradley's departure. Gower was probably appointed to the vacant post in the Orange Regiment in June, the month in which he joined the HAC.

APPENDIX 2THE FORTY CAPTAINS IN SEPTEMBER 1643
with details of new officers

	Company	address	HAC	other posts
<u>The Red Regiment</u>				
Col Thomas Atkins				
Lt Col Randall Mainwaring				
Major William Tucker				
Capt William Thomson				
Capt Edward Hooker				
Capt Laurence Bromfield	Cutler	St Dunstan/East	1632	Col 1647 ¹
Capt Richard Hunt	Salter	St Mary W'Church	1631	died 1643 ²
<u>The White Regiment</u>				
Col Isaac Penington				
Lt Col Robert Davis				
Major Thomas Chamberlain				
Capt Thomas Player				
Capt Christopher Whichcott				
Capt William Manby Snr	Fishmonger	Bishopsgate	1618	Lt Col 1646
Capt Joseph Vaughan	Goldsmith	Cornhill	1631	Col 1647
<u>The Yellow Regiment</u>				
Col Sir John Wollaston				
Lt Col Ralph Harrison				
Major Richard Cuthbert				
Capt Robert Tichborne				
Capt Walter Lee	Haberdasher	Ludgate	1631	Lt Col 1647
Capt William Hitchcock	M. Taylor	Watling St	1635	Major 1647
Capt [blank]				
<u>The Blue Regiment</u>				
Col Thomas Adams				
Lt Col Francis West				
Major William Underwood				
Capt Edward Bellamy	Fishmonger	Thames St	1627	Lt Col 1645
Capt John Booker ³		Walbrook	1634	Major 1645
Capt George Dipford	Fishmonger	Bow Ch'yard	1638	
Capt William Coleson	Dyer	Thames St	1635	Major 1647
<u>The Green Regiment</u>				
Col John Warner				
Lt Col Matthew Foster				
Major Owen Rowe				
Capt Matthew Shepherd				
Capt Francis Rowe				
Capt Robert Mainwaring				
<u>The Orange Regiment</u>				
Col John Towse				
Lt Col Rowland Wilson				
Major Nathaniel Camfield				
Capt Thomas Gower				
Capt Richard Wollaston	Fishmonger	Cornhill	1632	Major 1647
Capt Miles Petit	Draper	Snow Hill	1620	Lt Col 1647

¹ Bromfield was knighted in 1660.² Killed at the first battle of Newbury.³ Registrar to the Commissioners of Bankruptcy (Symonds).

APPENDIX 3 LONDON MILITIA OFFICERS AT ESSEX'S FUNERAL, 22 OCT 1646

The City Red, Blue and Orange Trained Bands (Colonels Edward Hooker, William Underwood and Rowland Wilson) took part in the funeral march, and their other officers are not noted in The True Manner and Forme of the Proceeding (E 360/1). The officers of the units which lined the route are as follows, with Christian names supplied from other sources:

<u>City Green Trained Band</u>	<u>City White Trained Band</u>	<u>City Yellow Tr. Band</u>
Col Owen Rowe	Col Thomas Player	Col Ralph Harrison
Lt Col Francis Rowe	Lt Col William Manby Snr	Lt Col Richard Cuthbert
Major John Lane	Major Joseph Vaughan	Major Walter Lee
Capt Thomas Juxon	Capt Robert Thomson	Capt Andrew Neale
Capt William Eardley	Capt John Milton	Capt John Haine
Capt Ralph Tasker	Capt John Taylor Snr	Capt John Fenton
<u>City Orange Aux.</u>	<u>City Red Auxiliaries</u>	<u>City Yellow Aux.</u>
Col Thomas Gower	Col Samuel Harsnet	Col John Owen
Lt Col Thomas Evershed	Lt Col John Andrews	Lt Col Wilding
Major Houblon	Major Moses Meares	Major Day
Capt Stanton	Capt William Skelton	Capt Fawne
Capt Ducane	Capt Anthony Compton	Capt Robinson
Capt Kelke	Capt Mills	Capt Winter
Capt Coysh		Capt Hunt
<u>City Blue Auxiliaries</u>	<u>City Green Auxiliaries</u>	<u>City White Aux.</u>
Col George Langham Jr	Col William Webb	Col John Bellamy
Lt Col Barwick	Lt Col John Tirlington	Lt Col Bailey
Major Hodges	Major Edward Abel	Major Richard Elton
Capt Stamford	Capt Warren	Capt Jenkinson
Capt Trimmer	Capt Wansey	Capt Perkins
Capt Lacey	Capt Sittey	Capt Brickingham
	Capt Beech	Capt Short
<u>Southwark Yellow T.B.</u>	<u>Tower Hamlets Red T.B.</u>	<u>Westminster Red T.B.</u>
Col John Hardwick	Col Francis Zachary	Col Sir James Harrington
Lt Col Pritchard	Lt Col Chapman	(others not listed)
Major Laurence	Major Abraham Woodroffe	
Capt Burton	Capt Thomas Salmon	
Capt Holmeraw	Capt Cutlet	
Capt Coe	Capt Christopher Gore	
	Capt John King	
	Capt Willison	
<u>Southwark Black Aux.</u> ¹	<u>Tower Hamlets Yellow A.</u>	<u>Westminster Yellow A.</u>
Col Daniel Sowton	Col William Willoughby	Col James Prince
Lt Col John Thornton	Lt Col William Shambrook	Lt Col George Crompton
Major Joseph Knapp	Major Levet	Major John Lee
Capt Smiter	Capt William Archer	Capt Thomas Kekewich
Capt Williams	Capt Richard Keilbeater	Capt Henry Turner
Capt White	Capt Reade	Capt John Flood
	Capt Overstreet	

¹There is no other record of a change from white to black in the colours of the Southwark Auxiliaries.

APPENDIX 4 OFFICERS APPROVED BY THE PRESBYTERIAN MILITIA COMMITTEE

Pay warrants survive in PRO SP 28 237 for the following officers, who were hurriedly granted their arrears in the final hours of the Presbyterian Militia Committee's existence on 23 July 1647:

City Orange Trained Band
Colonel Nathaniel Camfield
Lt Col Miles Petit
Major Robert Russell
Capt Giles Rodway

City Green Trained Band
Col Matthew Shepheard
Lt Col John Lane
Major Thomas Juxon
Capt William Eardley
Capt Ralph Tasker

City White Trained Band
Col Joseph Vaughan
Lt Col Robert Thomson
Major John Milton
Capt John Taylor Snr
Capt John Taylor Jnr
Capt William Manby Jnr
Capt John Greenhill

City Red Trained Band
Col Edward Hooker
Lt Col John Brett
Major Peter Cushin
Capt Edward Wallis
Capt Francis Finch
Capt Abraham Stanion

City Blue Trained Band
Col William Underwood
Lt Col Edward Bellamy
Major William Coleson
Capt Thomas Cox
Capt Thomas Gellibrand
Capt Robert Deane

City Yellow Trained Band
Col Laurence Bromfield
Lt Col Walter Lee
Major Andrew Neale
Capt John Haine
Capt Nicholas Widmerpoole
Capt Henry Potter
Capt John Hinde

The ranking of the regiments (reading across, then down) follows that given in The True Manner and Forme of the Proceeding (October 1646) and in A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie (December 1647). Captain Charles Cockin also probably belonged to the Orange Trained Band, and Captain Francis Sedgwick apparently belonged to one of the six Trained Band regiments before transferring to the City Blue Auxiliaries at the end of June 1647 (PRO SP 28 46 part 1 f. 37).

APPENDIX 5 OFFICERS OF THE SIX CITY TRAINED BANDS IN DECEMBER 1647

Between August and December 1647 the officers of the Trained Bands were purged once again, this time by the newly restored, Independent-dominated Militia Committee. Some of the previously expelled Independent officers were restored to their posts, while others were promoted to fill vacancies created by the expulsion of Prebyterians. A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie (E419/9) gives the following list of officers after this second purge:

City Orange Trained Band
Col Rowland Wilson
Lt Col Nathaniel Camfield
Major Miles Petit
Captain Walter Boswell

City Green Trained Band
Col Owen Rowe
Lt Col Thomas Juxon
(others not known)

City White Trained Band
Col Thomas Player
Lt Col William Manby Snr
Major
Capt William Manby Jnr

City Red Trained Band
Col John Hayes
Lt Col Peter Cushin
(others not known)

City Blue Trained Band
Col William Underwood
Lt Col
Major
Capt Richard Rogers
Capt Coe

City Yellow Trained Band
Col Ralph Harrison
Lt Col John Fenton
Msjor Doyle
Capt Gervase Blackwell
Capt John Stone
Capt White
Capt Sherborne

APPENDIX 6

'SMART CHARACTERS' BY A PRESBYTERIAN PROPAGANDIST

A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie contains, as George Thomason noted on his copy, 'smart Characters of divers persons'. Among these are a number of officers of the City Trained Bands, both Presbyterians and Independents. The author's propagandistic intention is obvious, but some facts can also be gleaned from his knowledge of the careers and characters of these officers.

'Lets's see a little how our wise Committee for the Militia hath disposed their business, if we can with patience: I shall run over all I know of them....

The Orange Regiment Colonell Wilson an Antinomian, a Man that hath more Mony then Wit or Valour, but he may serve: the next is Presto Colonell Lieutenant Colonell (what shall I call him) Camfield, a fellow that looks as if he had changed his face with his place...he did them good service at Wesminster, that day they say the House was forced, stood looking on like a cowardly base fellow, never offering to strike blow, though he had nigh two hundred armed men under his command, and might have defended the House against an Army; but that was in order to the designe, or else he had been hanged before this time. Next him is Lieutenant Colonell Major Captaine Petitoes, the sight of whom makes me remember my Aunt Basset Swill Tub; he may doe well to chuse the fat Cook in Py-Corner for his Colours, and Tripes for his Leiutenant; they will dead Bullets if ever he be carried in a Tumbrell into Service, else he will never come where they are. Then that Bartholomew Baby Major, Puny Captaine Russell. Surely this is one of the Shakers they talk of, a fellow that every Step he takes speakes him a Taylor. After him Colonell Leiutenant Colonell Young Captain Hey-day Boswell, a fellow lately put out for caning Train Band Souldiers, but it seems wee must come to it, and this Prick-louse employed to begin the worke. All these I dare say will never be guilty of High Treason, in raising a New Warr, nor except the last be angry to be kick'd or affronted in any manner.

For the Green, I know not what they have done, only they have turn'd out the discreet and faithfull Colonell Shipheard and put in the Bull Roe, as also honest and stout Lieutenant Colonell Lane, and put that Swearing Phantastick Fool Juxon in his place. I suppose the rest of the Commanders of that Regiment will not be commanded by a Knave and a Fool.

For the White, Colonell Vaughan being guilty of High Treason, of City High Treason, that is for retaining so much courage and prudence as to defend the City that gave him his command...must be put off, and Player, that Player that play'd the Coward's part so much at Cherriton, in his roome. Lieutenant Col. Thomson, a valiant and faithful Commander, layd by, and unworthy base-spirited Manby put in his Room, he that upon the routing of a forlorn Hope at Cherriton cryed and wrung his hands, "what shall he doe, what shall he doe, the day is lost", like a great Booby; let them make the Puppy his Sonne Major, in the roome of valiant and resolute Major Milton, whom they have put out, and then I dare promise this Regiment shall never commit City High Treason neither.

In the Red Regiment Colonell Hooker, a valiant, prudent, godly and faithfull Captain, is laid by; a man that stood up with the first and acted with the best, for the safety of King, Parliament, Kingdome, and City, but he indeavoured not to be a Slave to Slaves, had a sword in his hand, and being assaulted by a company of Thieves and Rascalls, was loath to yeeld, but indeavoured to defend himself; this I say being City High Treason, he must be laid by, and in his Roome unworthy peeking Hays is placed. Lieutenant Colonell Brett is turned out too,

and truly I wonder at it; in my Conscience he is no Prebiterian, but I suppose he is too much a man, too much a Souldier to act in these base unworthy wayes now on foot. They say Cushen hath his Room - base-spirited Cushen to be sate upon by Hays, whom he hath Commanded; I wish thou mayst be sate upon by all the foot-boyes, Tapsters, Porters, Journey-men Tailors in the Town. This Act speaks the Tailor and the sonne of a Tailor to the tenth generation. For the rest of that Regiment I hear not of.

In the blew Regiment, Shake-rag Underwood may serve their turn well enough; he basely hid his head when he should have been at the head of his Regiment; but Cox and Gellibrand are out, the first guilty of City high-treason, & the second of too much honesty to serve any base designe, though never so fairly guilded over; both honest, tried, valiant souldiers, and so not fit to be ranked with fools, knaves, and cowards; and in their stead Rogers and Coe are brought, the one a Fool, the other a Broker.

But in the name of the Tower-ghost, what have the Commanders of the Yellow Regiment done? They are all turn'd out, all guilty of City-high-treason; had ye not one Fool nor Knave among ye, nor Cuckold neither? That's a miracle. Let's view you a little more narrowly, for the rareness of the businesse. First, Colonell Bromfield, a Gentleman of unquestionable faithfulness and integrity, upon whom God hath confer'd extraordinary parts and abilities, and a heart to improve all to the service of his Countrey; a fit man to transact any Military affaire at that Councell of Warre where great Gustavus Adolphus sate President; a Gentleman that at the famous Battell of Newbury proved himselfe a valiant Souldier and a discreet Commander; in the Committee for the Militia and Court of Common Councell discreetly, faithfully and stoutly muted those Apostates Fowke, Estwick, Player, and countermined their designs. This last I believe was his great crime, but he is outed, and that shadow of a Souldier, Harrison, in his place; a silly weak old man (God knowes), fitter to eat Pie and Custard, then lead a Regiment; a man of no estate, and meerly for the profits, which he must raise indirectly and dishonestly too...a fellow that carried himselfe like a Fool and a Coward at Cherriton - onely the Colonell Harrison (being forced to marrie his daughter, having that same before-hand) is his sonne in Law, that's desert enough.

Lieutenant-Colonell Leigh is the next, a man of Estate and Quality, an honest, godly, valiant man, a man that did as good service at Cherriton as any man in the Brigade, a man that from principles of Honesty and Piety leads the life of a Christian in sincerity. He is thrown out, and that proud, insolent, Schismaticall, beggerly Fenton in his place. This is he that would needs have a Committee of Aldermen and Commoners to examine whether he were a Cuckold or not, when himselfe, his wife, and the Schoolmaster of Dullidge had concluded on the Affirmative before.... This is he that was shot in the Arse at Caversham-Bridge, he had so much Armour on's back he could not run away fast enough...that carried out a gallant Company of London Apprentices into the Service, and used them like Doggs ('tis their own expression), that must be pleas'd in all the rest of the Commanders, and have power to present them, which our wise Committee granted; that hath brought in a Company of Fooles, that he may be Dominus fac totum; but enough of this proud Thing.

The next is Major Neele; he hath two faults, he's an honest man and no Sectary; in his room is one Doyle, Tichburne's Creature and once Lieutenant, neither Man nor Souldier...and excellent fellow to bring up a File of Dragoons, fit to hold their horses while they fight, or to be an Ensigne, he loves to shelter himselfe amongst the Pikes so well; a man that will never be guilty of breaking the sixth

Commandement, nor raising a New Warre.

The fourth was Captaine Haine, a Gentleman as fit for Command as any in the City, a very knowing experienc'd Souldier, one who hath made as great proficiencie in the Art Militarie as any, and been very instrumentall in making many Souldiers; a man of very good parts, honest and conscientious; he is out, and in his place that Kickshaw Blackwell, a fellow infinitely below the place as man, never capable of it as a Souldier; of his Colonell's complexion, taketh it meerly for profit. This is he that cried he was undone when turned out last, that put Fines for Delinquency and his Officers' Pay in his own pocket (get it out when they can); a cowardly Fop, a silly Goose that if he had a will, hath not parts to acquire any thing in the Art Militarie.

The next was Captain Widmerpoole, a Gentleman of good Account and Quality, a very stout and valiant man, an able and knowing Souldier; one that hath been very active for the Parliament from the beginning of these troubles, was at Cherriton fight, did as good service as any in his Command there. In brief, hath given ample testimony of his faithfulness, resolution and courage in his place. One Stone is put in his place; truly the man may be honest, but as fit to command a Company as to build Paul's, and not so very wise. Surely these Fellowes think the Office of a Captain is nothing but onely to walk before a company to Westminster. The Schollars are like to be well taught when the Master cannot read.

The next was Captain Potter, an honest fellow and a Souldier, so much I may say, yet be modest; I know him faithfull to the Parliament's Cause; he took up a Commission just when the Regiment went out to fight for it. I hope his heart is upright to God, too; I am confident he desires it should be so. He was at Cherriton and did service in the hottest worke there; God's good providence assisting he came not away, nor shrunk from any imployments he was commanded upon; nay, he went upon some and of some danger too, when waved by others, but he cannot be yoaked with Fenton: Exit. In his place is one White, a fellow for whom I cannot meet with a fit Character, the most unworthy sniveling foole that I have heard of to be a Captaine.

The next is Captain Hynde, a man that hath done the Parliament very eminent service at the beginning of these troubles as a Commisary of Horse, and Gratis too; a very discreet, prudent and stout man, and a good Souldier that truly feares God and walkes close with him, but will not be coupled with Oxes and Asses, so laid by. In his roome is one Sherburne, a young fellow and no souldier. I know little of him, but it's like he is one that will be ruled by Lieutenant-Colonel Tap.'

APPENDIX 7 OFFICERS OF THE TRAINED BANDS ON THE EVE OF PRIDE'S PURGE

In May 1648 there was yet another change in the Militia Committee when the City was able to nominate a moderately Presbyterian list in the absence of the army from London. Once again there were purges and restorations in the officers of the Trained Bands over the next few months. The following list comprises those who signed a declaration at the end of November apologising for their great neglect in guarding the Houses of Parliament, as recorded in Common Council Journal 40 f. 302:

City Green Trained Band

Col Owen Rowe
Lt Col Ralph Tasker
Major Edward Huson
Capt Rice Bush

City Red Trained Band

Col Edward Hooker
Lt Col John Brett
Major John Hayes
Capt Francis Finch
Capt Abraham Stanion
Capt Gervase Lake
Capt John Mould

City Blue Trained Band

Col William Underwood
Lt Col Edward Bellamy
Major Thomas Cox
Capt Robert Deane
Capt Thomas Gellibrand

City Yellow Trained Band

Col Laurence Bromfield
Lt Col Walter Lee
Major John Haine
Capt Nicholas Widmerpoole
Capt Henry Potter
Capt John Hinde
Capt Richard Sturges

City White Trained Band

Col Joseph Vaughan
Lt Col Robert Thomson
Major John Milton
Capt John Taylor
Capt John Greenhill
Capt William Manby
Capt Thomas Roberts
Capt John Ford

City Orange Trained Band

Col Richard Wollaston
Lt Col Miles Petit
Major Walter Boswell
Capt Giles Rodway
Capt Robert Russell

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